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Introduction
In light of the great challenges ahead, Russia needs to “address 
the large-scale social, economic and technological tasks facing 
the country more quickly and without delay”. This quote 
is from the Russian President’s Federal Assembly Address 
delivered in early 2019. Most probably, back then, the last 
thing crossing Vladimir Putin’s mind was that one year later 
those challenges would become even greater due to a pandemic. 
The Covid-19 emergency is indeed bound to put further strain 
on the longstanding vulnerabilities that Russia’s economy has 
been facing for years: excessive dependence on energy exports, 
Western sanctions, demographic problems and constant foreign 
policy overreach.
Over the last two decades, these challenges have not stopped 
Russia from pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy. 
Since the early 2000s, the drive to compete on par with global 
powers such as the US and China, as well as the need to capitalise 
on international successes at home, have gradually drawn 
Moscow further away from its immediate neighbourhood. What 
is more, over the last two decades, Russia has progressively come 
back to many “old” foreign theatres where the Soviet Union was 
also actively engaged. More than a quarter of a century after the 
fall of the USSR, it is clear that Russia’s President Putin made 
restoring Russia’s great power status a primary goal during his 
nineteen years at the helm of the country. Political and historical 
links dating back to the Cold War have been capitalised upon 
in order to build fresh partnerships and cement or re-establish 
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Russia’s influence. And, similar to the Soviet Union, which 
supported Western communist parties and ran disinformation 
campaigns, Russia has been frequently accused of meddling 
with the electoral processes of several Western countries.
The most telling example of Russia’s proactive foreign policy 
is Syria. Taking advantage of the gradual US retreat from the 
Middle East, Russia intervened in support of Bashar Al Assad’s 
autocratic government against political opposition groups 
seeking regime change. Many media and academic accounts of 
Russia’s political and military backing of Assad overlook the fact 
that today’s close relations between Moscow and Damascus date 
back to the Cold War era. The two parties signed a friendship 
agreement in 1971, while in 1980 another deal stipulated that 
in case of a third party invasion of Syria, the Soviets would 
intervene. Furthermore, the Soviet Union established its naval 
base in Tartus in the 1970s, and sent over 5,000 military 
advisors and massive amounts of weaponry to Damascus.
Further examples of Russia’s assertiveness around the globe 
abound. For instance, Russia appears to have new aspirations 
in Africa, a continent where Soviet influence had strengthened 
during the decolonisation period, once post-independence 
governments were established – in Angola, Egypt, Somalia and 
Ethiopia, to name a few. All these countries received diplomatic 
or military support from the Soviet Union. Today, Russia is 
gradually increasing its influence in many African countries 
through strategic investment in energy and minerals, arms 
trade, political and military involvement in crises (Libya and 
CAR) and soft power. But while much has been written about 
China’s role in Africa, there is far less discussion about the 
spread and depth of Russia’s contemporary presence in Africa. 
In this Report, we ask: what are the elements of continuity 
and change when comparing Russia’s foreign policy with the 
Soviet Union’s? What are the political, historical, military 
and economic dimensions of Russia’s “return” to the old 
Soviet theatres of influence? The Report also delves into the 
implications of Russia’s stance and strategy for the development 
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of a multipolar world order long-advocated by Moscow, by 
opposing US “unipolarity” and the Western-championed 
liberal order. 
In the first chapter, Elena Alekseenkova explains that 2020 
marks the 20th anniversary of Putin’s presidency, as well as the 
start of concrete steps toward political succession. The year 
actually started with a landmark State of the Nation address 
by Vladimir Putin, in which he proposed several constitutional 
amendments that seemingly reduced presidential powers, 
creating a “system” for the post-Putin era. In March, however, 
the Duma voted in favour of a constitutional amendment to 
“reset the clock” on his mandates, so that he can virtually rule 
until 2036: another 16 years in office would make him modern 
Russia’s longest-serving leader, overtaking Joseph Stalin. Why 
was such a complicated scheme of reforms proposed in January, 
instead of simply abolishing the constitutional rules limiting 
Putin’s presidential terms? Alekseenkova argues that the answer 
to this question lies in the issue of legitimacy and of personal 
versus institutional trust. She explains the meaning of Putin’s 
manoeuvre and suggests its possible consequences for Russia’s 
domestic and foreign policy.
In foreign policy, the most straightforward area for Russia to 
project external influence is its neighbourhood. Is Russia using 
regional integration to re-establish its hegemony, as it did in 
Soviet times? Indeed, Eurasianism has been interpreted as a 
cultural and geopolitical justification for Russian imperialism, 
replacing the role played by Marxism-Leninism in Soviet 
times. Aldo Ferrari reviews the idea of Greater Eurasia and its 
relationship with other recent Russian intellectual and political 
ventures, such as Eurasianism and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU). The Russian leadership’s strong emphasis on 
Greater Eurasia, and especially the role that Eurasianism plays 
within it, has grabbed international attention and is crucial to 
understanding Russia’s self-perception, as well as its ability to 
conduct an effective foreign policy.
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When it comes to soft power, by contrast, a comparison with 
the USSR may seem inappropriate: the concept was created 
after the end of the Cold War and, in any case, today’s Russia is 
perceived as a hard power country. Yet, Eleonora Tafuro argues 
not only that Moscow does have and indeed relies on soft 
power (today as in the past), but also that overlooking this leads 
to the West’s misunderstanding of Russia’s foreign policy. While 
calling for a neutral reading of the concept, Eleonora Tafuro 
Ambrosetti claims that Russia started investing in soft power 
and public diplomacy from the early 2000s through media, 
language and cultural programmes targeted at the post-Soviet 
space and beyond. While it is true that some elements – such 
as the use of sport mega-events or anti-Americanism – may be 
reminiscent of the Soviet past, some novel narratives, such as 
conservatism, are peculiar to the “new Russia”.
Speaking of anti-Americanism, the Soviet Union had a long 
history of “active measures” aimed at influencing US domestic 
politics, including US presidential election campaigns. In recent 
years, the issue of Russian meddling and Russian interference is 
back at the centre of the public and political debate in Europe and 
North America. Giorgio Comai defines “Russian meddling” as 
a temporally delimited phenomenon that grabbed the attention 
of Western mainstream media starting with the US presidential 
elections in November 2016. After outlining some of the 
dynamics of this media narrative, Comai approaches each of its 
main parts separately, discussing evidence on their prevalence 
and impact on both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, he provides 
recommendations on how to deal with Russian interference 
and, in particular, with the vulnerabilities it has exposed.
Meanwhile, the myth of Russia’s “return” to the Middle East 
has been all over the news, especially since Moscow’s intervention 
in Syria in 2015. But how is Russia seen by MENA countries? 
Wolfgang Mühlberger argues that while there is a convergence of 
interests on a number of areas between Russian elites and those 
in power in many MENA countries, public opinion polls in the 
MENA region suggest a mixed picture when it comes to general 
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perceptions of Russia. Russia’s economic and cultural appeal is 
low, and admiration for Putin is also severely limited in some 
MENA countries, mainly due to Moscow’s military action in 
Syria. A detailed survey of Russia’s and Putin’s popularity across 
the region shows a nuanced picture, with strong intra-regional 
and temporal variations, as well as cleavages between public 
opinion and elite attitudes.
Despite the physical distance that separates Russia from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and the weaker dynamics of trade 
and commerce compared with many other cases, relations with 
the countries of the region occupy a special place in Russia’s 
contemporary foreign policy. As Alexandra Koval and Vladimir 
Rouvinski explain, this is because Putin’s government has 
learned to appreciate the value of Russia’s interactions with this 
part of the world for Moscow’s short-, medium- and long-term 
goals on the international arena. Venezuela makes a good case 
study to observe the interplay of political and economic drivers 
of Russian actions in the region. Beyond energy and trade, 
Russia’s strategy aims to provide Moscow with the capacity for 
primarily symbolic reciprocal actions against the United States, 
while promoting the idea of multipolarity and Russia’s quest for 
status on the international arena.
The very same goals are behind Moscow’s foreign policy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Russian presence in the region attracted 
widespread international attention in October 2019, when 
Vladimir Putin hosted 40 African heads of state at the inaugural 
Russia-Africa Economic Forum in Sochi. During that event, his 
government finalised commercial deals with African countries 
and showcased Moscow’s re-emergence as a continent-wide 
player for the first time since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 
1991. Samuel Ramani examines Russia’s African endeavours, 
arguing that they essentially consist of three pillars: energy 
and mining investments, security assistance and engagement 
with multilateral institutions. He examines the case of Nigeria, 
where all three pillars actually inform Moscow’s outreach 
efforts, and highlights how European policymakers can contain 
Russia’s growing influence in Africa by selectively engaging 
with Moscow on areas of common interest.
It is hard to predict how Covid-19 will impact upon the 
frequency and scale of Russia’s forays on the international stage. 
Today, in mid-April 2020, Russia is weakened by the effects of 
an epidemic that is starting to take its toll on this country too, 
with deaths already in the hundreds and mounting fast. The 
epidemic will likely confirm the trend that sees Moscow more 
and more focused on its internal problems compared to theatres 
farther away from home. Yet, almost like war, pandemics are 
predictable in their short-term dynamics, but elude long-term 
forecasting.
This Report shows that Russia’s foreign policy is multifaceted, 
and that it constantly harks back to the Soviet era in order to 
push forward into the future. New and old theatres coexist and 
merge with each other. By underlining the sources of continuity 
and change in Russia’s foreign policy, we might venture to guess 
that – even in this highly volatile and uncertain situation – 
Moscow’s long-term goals are poised to remain similar well into 
the future.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
1.  Russia First? 
     The New Constitution’s Impact 
     on Domestic and Foreign Policy
Elena Alekseenkova
We must create a solid, reliable and invulnerable system
that will be absolutely stable in terms of the external contour
and will securely guarantee Russia’s independence and sovereignty
V. Putin, “Address to the Federal Assembly”, 15 January 2020
Russia enters the third decade of the XXI century with a series 
of political reforms. Vladimir Putin’s “Address”, given on 15 
January 20201, was a landmark event for Russian domestic 
and foreign policy. In his speech, the President made a number 
of proposals for amending the constitution of the Russian 
Federation, adopted in 1993 and never amended since then. 
For the first time in the post-Soviet era, Russia is facing 
changes to key aspects of the distribution of power between 
state institutions, and to the correlation of international and 
national laws. Contrary to many expectations inside and 
outside the country, Putin did not propose to abolish the article 
prohibiting the President from holding office for more than 
two consecutive terms. In the final version of the amendment 
1 V. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, Kremlin.ru, 15 January 
2020. 
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there is even no mention of the word “consecutive”, meaning 
that President’s tenure is effectively limited to a maximum of 12 
years. Nevertheless, many foreign experts and the foreign media 
immediately declared that the reforms are aimed precisely at 
allowing Putin to retain power and influence after 20242.
In contrast, the majority of the Russian expert community 
did not perceive these changes as designed solely to preserve 
Putin’s power after 2024. The declared goal of creating an 
“invulnerable system” plus the decision not to change the 
“two presidential terms” rule gave the impression that the 
ultimate aim of the reforms is to establish a more complex 
decision-making mechanism, i.e. to create “a system” capable of 
replacing the current “manual control” approach. As I shall try 
to explain in this chapter, there is an evident and dire need for 
an institutionalised system and the “Address” seemed to reflect 
this understanding. However, after the State Duma’s approval 
of the reforms on 10 March 2020, which contained a new 
amendment potentially allowing Putin to remain in power until 
2036, the question arose: “Why put such a complicated scheme 
in place instead of simply abolishing the two terms rule?”. In 
other words, why have the reforms announced in January now 
become “Plan B”, replaced by a much simpler “Plan A” only two 
months later? In this chapter I shall try to understand the sense 
of this manoeuvre and to indicate its possible consequences 
for Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. I shall concentrate on 
the reasons and the logic behind the amendments proposed in 
January 2020 first, and then return to the issue of the switch 
between “Plan B” and “Plan A” later. Finally, I shall speculate on 
the possible effects of the coronavirus crisis and the consequent 
global economic downturn on the prospects of both “Plans”, 
though it is still too early to predict the final scale of damage 
caused by the pandemic. 
2 See for example: “Putin’s Power Shake-up: Here Are Six Takeaways”, New York 
Times, 15 January 2020; “‘Kazahskij scenarij’: kakoe budushchee predrekayut 
Putinu eksperty?” (“‘Kazakh scenario’: what future do experts predict for 
Putin?”), BBC, 16 January 2020.
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A Breach in Fortress “Russia”: Lack of Trust
Socio-economic considerations
Unlike the 2018 Address, which impressed the world with its 
detailed analysis and description of Russia’s military-technical 
achievements, the message of 2020 looked surprisingly 
“peaceful” and focused on the problems of the country’s internal 
development. With the exception of a couple of paragraphs, the 
Address was devoted to matters of socio-economic development 
and domestic political reform. According to the President, two 
factors allowed solutions to be found for the nation’s internal 
problems.
Firstly, Putin noted that Russia, having successfully 
consolidated its defence capabilities, is now able to focus on 
internal matters: 
[…] I can assure everyone that our efforts to strengthen national 
security were made in a timely manner and in sufficient 
volume. For the first time ever […] we are not catching up with 
anyone, but, on the contrary, other leading states have yet to 
create the weapons that Russia already possesses […] Reliable 
security creates the basis for Russia’s progressive and peaceful 
development and allows us to do much more to overcome the 
most pressing internal challenges, to focus on the economic and 
social growth of all our regions. 
This makes the 2020 Address quite different from previous 
ones, which focused on the need to ensure Russia’s external 
security, a task, it is claimed, that has now been completed. 
Secondly, the Address stated that the task of stabilising the 
country macroeconomically has also been fulfilled in recent 
years and that this too permits a greater focus on matters of 
economic development and on increasing the real incomes of 
citizens: 
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In recent years, we have focused on strengthening macroeconomic 
sustainability […] The federal budget has recorded a surplus 
again. Our government reserves confidently cover our gross 
external debt…We can see the problems, even shocks that 
citizens of other states face, where government had no such cash 
cushion and their financial position turned out to be unstable 
[…] Now, relying on a stable macroeconomic foundation, we 
need to create conditions for a substantial increase in people’s 
real incomes.
This statement reflects the leadership’s desire to find a way for 
Russia to avoid the social upheavals faced by many modern 
states as a result of changes to the “social contract” brought 
about by globalisation.
In the President’s opinion, the successful solution of these 
two problems – ensuring the security of Russia’s periphery and 
macroeconomic stability – makes it possible to proceed to a 
closer analysis of public demands and requests. 
At the moment, the second component of what I call the 
Russian “happiness formula” (strong power + wellbeing) is 
demonstrably lacking and the President’s statement accepted 
this. The 2020 Address acknowledged this call for change and 
development and the need to overcome territorial imbalances, 
reform healthcare and education, increase citizens’ real incomes 
and improve social security, etc. 
The President recognised that Russian society regards the 
“successes” of previous years in the social sphere, be it healthcare 
or any other, as statistical manipulations irrelevant to people’s 
real lives. The gap between improving indicators at federal 
level and the situation on the ground in individual regions 
and municipalities is viewed as even more disappointing. The 
devastating demographic situation3, which has been understood 
since Putin’s first presidential term, has not been positively 
stabilised over the past 20 years. Not enough has been done to 
3 E. Tafuro Ambrosetti, Russia’s Great Disease: The Demographic Decline, Commentary, 
ISPI, 4 November 2019; “Demograficheskaya situaciya dostigla ‘yamy’” (“The 
demographic situation has reached the ‘pit’”), Kommersant, 13 December 2019.
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improve investment and business climate. There is a dire need 
to increase investment in order to create and update jobs and 
infrastructure, to develop industry, agriculture, and the service 
sector, and to launch a new investment cycle. It is therefore 
clear why the socio-economic part of the Address accepted that 
insufficient effort has been made so far to ensure the wellbeing of 
citizens and their “worthy life”, and why it went on to set out the 
task of formulating new principles for the “social contract” along 
with measures to increase Russia’s economic competitiveness.
Russian officials today are well aware of socio-political 
processes in the developed countries of the West which, since 
the collapse of the USSR, have always been seen as a model 
for the development of a new Russia, a model of a “desired 
future” for the majority of citizens. However, in recent years, 
the need to revise the “social contract” to reflect the processes 
of globalisation has led to serious political turbulence in a 
number of countries. This unsatisfied social demand has 
been championed by the so-called “populist” movements, 
some of which have even succeeded in coming to power. The 
socio-economic agenda of the Address was therefore aimed at 
preventing the development of such processes in Russia.
In terms of the wellbeing of its citizens, Russia is significantly 
behind the developed states of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development), which it has 
always hoped to join. It is quite natural, therefore, to expect 
social tensions and mass protests in EU countries to stir up 
public opinion in Russia, where citizens do not feel that the 
state is ready to guarantee social security. Moreover, the worst 
result of Dmitry Medvedev’s two prime-ministerial terms was 
a further decrease in the standard of living of Russians. Real 
income levels have fallen significantly and 17 million people 
are now earning less than the living wage4. Considering the 
deep-rooted paternalistic attitudes of Russian society, the state 
is expected to take decisive measures to improve the situation.
4 A. Ivanter, “Zastabilizirovalis’ do zastoya” (“Stabilized till stagnation”), Expert, 
20 January 2020.
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Against this background, the package of socio-economic 
measures proposed by the President resembles a set of “preventive 
measures” to avoid a social conflagration. The seriousness of the 
situation and the intentions to rectify it were emphasised by the 
immediate resignation of Medvedev and his entire government.
The 2020 Address, however, also reflected an understanding 
that socio-economic measures alone cannot satisfy the Russian 
public’s demands for a rotation of power and a functional law 
enforcement system. The political part of the President’s speech 
was therefore dedicated to these issues.
Political considerations
Sovereignty remains a key concept in Russia’s official political 
discourse and is therefore central to the political part of this 
year’s Address, as indeed it has been in most previous Addresses. 
The emphasis this time is different, however. 
Let us recall the definition of sovereignty proposed by 
Stephen D. Krasner, one of the most authoritative experts 
on the subject5. According to Krasner, sovereignty can be 
divided into several components: 1) “internal sovereignty”, 
the principle of the organisation of power within the state and 
control over its implementation by citizens; 2) “sovereignty of 
interdependence”, reflecting the ability of the state to control 
cross-border movements of people, capital and goods; 3) 
“international legal sovereignty”, which serves as the basis for 
the equal rights of states in the international arena; and 4) 
“Westphalian sovereignty”, which prohibits the intervention of 
external actors in a state’s internal politics. 
An analysis of Putin’s speeches prior to the 2020 Address 
demonstrates6 that he has appealed mainly to the third and 
5 S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1999.
6 E. Alekseenkova, “‘Vosstanovlennyj suverenitet’ kak osnovanie nacional’noj 
gordosti” (“‘Restored sovereignty’ as the basis of  national pride”), Russia in 
International Affairs Council, no.7, 2018, pp. 98-111. Actually it was first published 
in Russian scientific journal (Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn) and that’s why I gave you this 
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fourth components, i.e. to aspects of “external sovereignty”, 
and addressed “internal sovereignty” (especially the first 
component) only reluctantly. In his 2017 and 2018 Addresses, 
Putin repeatedly emphasised that the main achievement of the 
2000s and 2010s was the restoration of national sovereignty, 
understood as the ability to avoid the “collapse of the country”, 
“state dissolution” and “extinction of the nation”, and the 
ability “to respond to the challenges that we faced in the fight 
against international terrorism” and “to determine and defend 
our national interests”. The main issue was clearly that of the 
country’s “external sovereignty”. The 2020 Address announced 
that this problem has been solved: 
Russia can be and can remain Russia only as a sovereign state. 
Our nation’s sovereignty must be unconditional. We have 
done a great deal to achieve this. We have restored our state’s 
unity. We have overcome the situation when certain powers 
in the government were essentially usurped by oligarch clans. 
Russia has returned to international politics as a country whose 
opinion cannot be ignored. We have created powerful reserves, 
improving our country’s stability and its capability to protect 
its citizens’ social rights and the national economy from any 
attempts of foreign pressure7.
However, the issue of “internal sovereignty” has so far received 
very little attention apart from in the context of maintaining 
territorial integrity. A key aspect of internal sovereignty is the 
legitimacy of power based on trust, understood as latent support for 
the current public authority and the political system as a whole. 
At first glance, Russia has no problems of internal sovereignty. 
The regime is highly consolidated. In the last election in 2018, 
the President received 76.69% of the vote, with a high turnout. 
56.43 million people voted for him, more than the absolute 
figures of 2000, 2004 and 2012. However, there are a number 
link: https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2049
7 V. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, Kremlin.ru, 15 January 
2020. 
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of factors that indicate a risk of erosion of legitimacy as a basis 
of internal sovereignty.
Several such indicators are now being widely discussed in 
Russian society. These include, firstly, a gradual but steady 
increase in the number of people moving abroad for permanent 
residence. These people, for one reason or another, refuse to 
live in the zone of Russian sovereignty and prefer to emigrate. 
In 2017, Rosstat reported that 377,000 people went to live 
abroad, a record for the past five years. Compared to 2012, the 
number of emigrants from Russia has more than tripled. Over 
1,700,000 people have left the country in the third term of 
Putin’s presidency8. Secondly, against the backdrop of current 
international dynamics and Russia’s conflict with the so-called 
“collective West”, i.e. the EU and the US, the proportion of 
people who want to move abroad is of particular importance. 
According to a VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center) survey, as of July 2017, one in ten Russians (10%) would 
like to transfer their permanent residence abroad. According to 
the Levada Center, in February 2019 this figure increased to 
17%, and indeed to 53% among young people under 24 years 
of age. Additionally, those actively interested in politics showed 
“emigration moods” most often: 24% of politically interested 
respondents declared readiness to emigrate. Among the reasons, 
Russians point to a desire to ensure a decent future for their 
children (45%), the economic and political situation in Russia 
and the high quality of medicine and education abroad9.
In addition to this outflow of human capital, it is worth 
mentioning the volume of capital outflow and the very modest 
results achieved by the policy of de-offshoring the Russian 
economy, also relevant to the discussion of legitimacy and state 
sovereignty10.
8 “‘Proekt’: Rosstat v shest’ raz zanizhaet chislo uekhavshih iz Rossii” (“‘Project’: 
Rosstat underestimates the number of  people who have left Russia by six times”). 
Radio Svoboda, 16 January 2019.
9 “Emigracionnye nastroeniya” (“Emigration moods”), Levada-Center, 26 
November 2019.
10 “Deofshorizaciya otmenyaetsya” (“Deoffshorization Canceled”), Expert 
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The clearest confirmation of this crisis of trust, however, is 
the extremely low level of support for key political institutions. 
For example, over the past two years, the level of trust in 
government has fallen from 35% to 26%, in political parties 
from 19% to 16%, in the State Duma from 33% to 24%, in 
the Council of the Federation from 35% to 24% and the in 
Prosecutor’s Office from 33% to 30% while trust in the courts 
has risen from 26% to 28%. The three leaders in terms of 
confidence in 2019 were the army (63% versus 69% in 2017), 
the President (60% compared to 75% in 2017), the Federal 
Security Service and other special services (48% versus 57% in 
2017). The level of trust in key political institutions is therefore 
steadily decreasing and bordering on or even under the level 
of legitimacy. (In classical political science, power is usually 
considered legitimate only if over 30% of the population trusts 
it). In general, Russia in recent years has been distinguished 
by an extremely low level of institutional trust combined with 
a high level of personal trust (as confirmed by the high trust 
ratings of Putin himself ).
It should be remembered that the low approval rating of 
protest activity, though up from 18% to 24% between 2012 
and 2019, reveals a general unreadiness of Russian citizens 
to openly manifest discontent11. However, according to some 
experts, the number of protests in Russia may increase, and 
social unrest may become politicized. Commentators also note 
a trend towards greater popular involvement outside politics. 
In the first half of 2019, several hundred protests took place, 
but these were mainly of a social nature. At the same time, 
protests against pension reform turned out to be weaker than 
expected, and the largest actions occurred where environmental 
risks were added to social problems, as in the case of garbage 
collection reform.
Online, 10 March 2017.
11 “Protestnyj potencial” (“Protest potencial”), Vsyerossiǐskiǐ tsentr izučenija 
obščestvennogo mnenija (VTsIOM), 2019.
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The text of Putin’s 2020 Address recognised that the main 
breach in today’s “fortress Russia” is lack of trust in law 
enforcement and the political system as a whole. That is why 
the key task identified by this Address was to reform the entire 
political system with the aim of legitimizing it and, thereby, 
consolidating internal sovereignty. The key concept running 
through the Address remained that of sovereignty, but the 
emphasis shifted from the components of “external sovereignty” 
to “internal sovereignty”.
If the Address really reflected an awareness of this deep crisis 
of trust, then the constitutional changes it proposed could be 
perceived as a reasonable attempt to get away from the “manual 
control” system and convert the President’s own high level of 
personal trust into institutional trust in the “system” over the 
next four years. 
The Essence of the Reforms: 
Pretending To Build Trust
What were the main instruments for restoring trust according to 
“Plan B”? One of the steps towards increasing trust in political 
institutions and the country’s leadership was to propose a so-
called “nationalisation” of the elite and, in particular, a ban 
on holding foreign citizenship, residence permits, or other 
documents that permit permanent residence in another state, 
in an attempt to stop Russia’s elite questioning the legitimacy 
and internal sovereignty of the Russian Federation. The foreign 
assets held by Russian politicians as well as the acquisition of 
foreign citizenship by their family members and studies at 
leading foreign universities are being actively discussed after 
various scandalous revelations naturally provoked a great deal 
of distrust and frustration among citizens. 
Improper implementation by local authorities of measures 
for the social protection of citizens is a second factor eroding 
trust in the system. The enshrinement in the Constitution of 
the principles of a unified system of public authorities and 
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municipal bodies was therefore presented by the President as 
a way to guarantee uniform protection of citizens’ rights across 
the country. The absence of such guarantees at the moment, 
according to Putin, poses a direct threat to the integrity of the 
country. In particular, the state’s social obligations should be 
guaranteed nationwide. 
A third tool for increasing legitimacy is the creation of a 
system of “checks and balances” between the different branches 
of government. Putin proposed defining the role of the State 
Council in the Constitution and providing the Federal Assembly 
with an opportunity to take on greater responsibility for the 
formation of the Government. According to the reformed 
Article 112, the President can no longer refuse to appoint 
deputy chairmen to the Government of the Russian Federation 
or federal ministers whose candidatures have been approved by 
the State Duma, though he may still dismiss them. At the same 
time, the President is given the right to dismiss any minister 
without prior consultation with the prime minister. According 
to the new Article 83, the President “forms the State Council 
[…] in order to ensure the coordinated functioning and 
interaction of state authorities, determine the main directions 
of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation 
and priority areas for socio-economic state development”12. This 
reform seems to demonstrate a desire to share responsibility for 
determining the main directions of domestic and foreign policy 
with representatives of the State Council. However, no specifics 
concerning the structure or composition of the State Council 
or the role the President will play in its work have yet been 
published, apart from the sole fact that the State Council will 
be formed by the President.
12 Zakonoproekt № 885214-7, Zakon Rossijskoj Federacii o popravke k 
Konstitucii Rossijskoj Federacii “O sovershenstvovanii regulirovaniya otdel’nyh 
voprosov organizacii publichnoj vlasti” (“Bill no. 885214-7, The law of  the 
Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of  the Russian 
Federation “On improving the regulation of  certain issues of  public authority 
organization”), Sistema obespecheniya zakonodatel’noj deyatel’nosti, 20 January 2020, 
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The Federation Council positions representing the regions, 
are being strengthened: the President will be able to appoint 
the heads of all the so-called “power ministries” (defence, state 
security, internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs, emergency 
prevention, natural disaster and public safety) following 
consultation with the Federation Council. Such an approach, 
according to its initiator, should make the work of law 
enforcement agencies more “transparent and more accountable 
to society”, which again can be seen as a measure to increase 
confidence in the law enforcement system. The same applies 
to the appointment of regional prosecutors, who will now also 
be assigned after consultation with the Federation Council – a 
measure aimed at eradicating “homegrown rule of law” in the 
regions.
The President and the Federation Council strengthen their 
control over the judicial system. The Federation Council is 
being given the right to remove judges of the Constitutional 
and Supreme Courts as a result of the President’s initiative, and 
the President himself will have the right to submit federal laws 
to the Constitutional Court to check its compliance with the 
Constitution before signing them.
Nevertheless, according to Putin, Russia must remain a 
strong presidential republic. Just a few days after delivering the 
Address, the President again emphasised that he considers the 
parliamentary form of government unsuitable for Russia13.
The real meaning of these reforms was difficult to assess. 
On the one hand, it seemed that a certain system of “checks 
and balances” was being introduced to share power between 
the Legislative Assembly and the State Council, and attempts 
were also being made to increase trust in the political, law 
enforcement and judicial systems.
On the other hand, the increased power of the executive 
branch over the judicial branch – the Constitutional Court 
13 “Putin zayavil o necelesoobraznosti parlamentskoj respubliki v Rossii” (“Putin 
declared inappropriate parliamentary republic in Russia”), RIA-Novosti, 22 
January 2020. 
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and the Supreme Court – raised serious concerns. In addition, 
the speed of the ongoing changes, the absence of public 
dialogue about the nature, goals and objectives of the proposed 
amendments indicated that Putin was again following a “special 
operation scenario”14, whose final goal remained unclear. 
Though the working group set up to examine the proposed 
amendments to the Constitution had only just started work, 
the State Duma adopted the amendments in their first reading 
on 23 January, only a week after the Address. Nevertheless, it 
was promised that, after approval by the Federal Assembly, the 
amendments would be approved by referendum, scheduled for 
22 April but postponed because of the coronavirus pandemic. 
The amendments were also formulated in such a way that 
the new “checks and balances” will increase the level of trust 
only if there is a political will to use them, and only if there are 
state entities ready to implement them. Taking into account 
how unanimously the State Duma approved first the new 
cabinet and then the amendments, it is difficult to believe that 
this particular state body is determined to play a major part in 
“checks and balances”. 
Yet, dialogue with society is indeed necessary and the fact 
that state institutions need to “earn” the trust of citizens must 
be clearly expressed. Otherwise, as often happens in Russian 
reality, “the severity of the law will be compensated for by its 
non-obligatory execution”, or by its frivolous interpretation, as 
many Russians believe.
Thus, the proposed reforms seemed to prepare Russian 
society for a transition of power in 2024, but not from one 
14 The term “special operation” was used by a journalist of  the TASS news agency 
during an interview with Putin to characterise the speed of  government change 
and its unexpectedness. The term probably refers to the legacy of  Putin’s KGB 
service, as “special operations” are usually conducted by the security services. In 
this context, “special operation” means that the goals, tactics and details of  the 
operation should be kept secret from everyone except for the President himself. 
Interview with Vladimir Putin “20 voprosov Vladimiru Putinu” (“20 questions 
to Vladimir Putin”), TASS. 
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person to another, rather to a new “system” in which roles 
and names are yet to be established. It was obvious that Putin 
would not leave the stage in 2024, but there was yet no hint 
as to his possible future position. Everything seemed to show 
that Putin was hoping to go down in history by performing a 
most ambitious task – that of building a legitimate, functioning 
political system. Yet society itself has not been assigned any 
major role in the latest changes and without this the system’s 
legitimacy is unlikely to improve.
The immediate change in government also seemed to serve 
the purpose of increasing trust to the political system. Dmitry 
Medvedev was replaced by a technocrat, Mikhail V. Mishustin, 
a former head of the Federal Tax Service, and more than half of 
the previous government’s ministers were replaced too. The new 
cabinet is purely technocratic. Never before has the Russian 
government been as “non-political” as it is today. According to 
the experts, “the new government is the first under Putin, where 
there are no old friends of the president”15. 
Most new ministers have experience in administrative 
structures at both the federal and regional levels, and so far, have 
no political baggage. This gives Putin two advantages: first, if the 
socio-economic tasks of the Address are successfully completed, 
this government may well win the trust of Russian citizens. This 
in turn would mean that the transition of power in 2024 will 
take place in a stable and calm social environment. Secondly, 
if the President has not yet formed a concrete preference for a 
successor, he now has four years to find one from among the 
new ministers.
Russian media has already labelled the new cabinet a 
“government of economic breakthrough”. A plan has been 
announced to spend 2 trillion rubles in the near future on social 
needs. First Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Belousov has been 
tasked with updating the plan to implement national projects 
15 T. Stanovaya, “Universal’nost’ i molodost’. Chego zhdat’ ot obnovlennogo 
pravitel’stva” (“Universatility and youth. What to expect from a renewed 
government”), Moscow Carnegie Center, 22 January 2020.
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in one month. Prime Minister Mishustin has also placed him 
in charge of the financial and economic block (the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development), the 
ministries responsible for achieving national development goals 
before 2024 (set by the presidential decree of May 2018). All 
of this allows us to conclude that the country’s leadership is 
indeed hurrying along socio-economic and political measures 
to restore citizens’ trust in order to ensure social stability and 
allow a successful transition of power in 2024.
Despite this logical beginning to a political transition 
process and the declared intention to create a trust-based 
system, the situation changed dramatically on 10 March. In 
his speech to the State Duma16, Putin agreed that even after the 
constitutional reforms, the President in charge can indeed be 
elected for another two terms. The State Duma approved this 
amendment only a few hours later on the same day, while the 
Constitutional Court gave its green light on 16 March 2020. 
This means that Putin may in fact remain in power until 2036. 
The question is how to explain this turn-around?
Several aspects need to be mentioned here. First of all, it should 
be noted that the issue of legitimacy is still important for Putin. 
He has declared that he wants to be elected through democratic 
elections with “choice” and he also required the agreement of 
the Constitutional Court. Secondly, he has emphasised that 
any future vote on these amendments will actually be a vote 
permitting him to stay in power for two more terms. This means 
that he is again relying on people’s trust in him; the vote will 
serve as an indicator of its strength. Even the potential weakening 
of Russia’s economy in the light of reduced global oil prices 
will serve the purpose of boosting trust in Putin so long as the 
population remembers that it was he who “saved” the country 
in several previous crises. The timing of this switch to “Plan A” 
is therefore perfect and the bet is that popular “fear” will make 
further decisions easy. The majority of people are concerned with 
16 V. Putin, “Speech at State Duma plenary session”, Kremlin.ru, 10 March 2020.
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the falling value of the ruble and low wages and have no appetite 
for political change. It is no coincidence that the examples of the 
Great Depression and WWII were brought up in the President’s 
speech as proof that it is better to have political stability during 
turbulent times when the “fortress is under siege”. 
Of course, society’s expectations of reform, formed over the 
previous two months, could lead to some dissatisfaction, but 
since Moscow has banned all gatherings of more than 5000 
participants for one month starting on 10 March (immediately 
after the new amendment was passed, but formally because of 
the coronavirus) all protests are effectively illegal. There is little 
desire to protest in any case. The drop in oil prices after Russia’s 
withdrawal from the OPEC+ deal in March 2020 and the rapid 
spread of the coronavirus in the second half of March and early 
April 2020 are two more factors that should logically lead to the 
preference of “Plan A”. In times of deep crisis, people are more 
likely to place their trust in a strong political leader or “saviour”, 
especially if he has “saved” the country on several previous 
occasions. This time, however, the outcome is particularly 
hard to predict because the real level of economic decline is 
still unknown, although it is already clear that if quarantine 
is not lifted in a month, several million people will lose their 
jobs. Besides, the measures put in place to prevent the spread 
of the virus are inconsistent and contradictory; as a result, 
they are often perceived as too weak or needlessly strict. The 
economic support for families and businesses announced by the 
government is also far inferior to that offered by the EU and the 
US. Thus, together with the drop in oil prices (which Russian 
decision-makers are blamed for) the coronavirus pandemic 
may lead to an unpredictable loss of trust in Russia’s leadership 
and political system as a whole. The counter-argument, of 
course, is that following the collapse of the USSR, Russian 
society has become used to economic turbulence and is not as 
demanding as the citizens of liberal democracies. Considering 
both arguments, “Plan A” still seems the more probable because 
of one simple truth: in an emergency or crisis, institutional 
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trust is very difficult to build from scratch. As Carl Schmitt 
pointed out in “Dictatorship”, in national emergencies, normal 
institutions are usually suspended and replaced by the logic of 
sovereign decision-making based on personal trust.
Consequences for Foreign Policy: 
Responsibility for Rebuilding Trust?
What are the implications of the current political situation 
for Russia’s foreign policy? The text of the Address declared 
that Russia “does not threaten anyone” and does not impose 
its will, that Russia is ready for partnership and ready to take 
responsibility for the world order as one of the permanent 
member states of the UN Security Council. Much has been 
said about responsibility in the field of climate change and 
readiness to assume obligations and cooperate multilaterally. 
This can be understood as a declaration that Russia no longer 
wishes to be “angry”17, but finally wants to focus on itself and, 
above all, to stop wasting effort and resources on mutually 
exhausting confrontations with other global powers, and direct 
them instead to increasing capacity for domestic economic 
development. It seems that the Address reflects an awareness 
of internal weaknesses – distrust in the “system” and lack of 
economic growth – that are indeed a major breach in the wall of 
“fortress Russia” and that leave the country highly vulnerable. 
To ignore this internal vulnerability and the basic needs of 
Russian people in a context in which an increasing number of 
states, driven by public discontent, are beginning to apply the 
logic of “America first”, would mean falling into the same trap 
17 “Russia is reproached for being isolated and silent in the face of  facts that are 
not in harmony with either law or justice. They say that Russia is angry. Russia 
is not angry; Russia is focusing on itself ”. This is a well-known phrase that the 
head of  the MFA of  the Russian Empire, Alexander M. Gorchakov wrote in a 
circular dispatch, sent shortly after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1856. 
At that time, the country’s relations with the opposing powers became very tense 
and the foreign press commonly characterised Russia as “angry”.
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that many of the most developed states in the world have failed 
to avoid. So, regardless of whether Putin will stay or not, during 
the next four years he will have to tackle the need to rebuild 
trust in the political regime. This will be done mostly through 
economic means, i.e. by increasing the budget for social services, 
but the economic situation will hardly allow Russia to become 
involved in new adventures that may lead to new sanctions or 
cause further economic troubles. 
It is interesting that, following the logic of America and a 
number of European governments, determined to protect the 
interests of their own citizens and to review international treaties 
and supranational EU norms etc., the Russian leadership is 
insisting on the priority of the Constitution over international 
law. Article 79 of the Constitution states that “decisions of 
international bodies adopted on the basis of the provisions of 
international treaties of the Russian Federation that are contrary 
to the Constitution of the Russian Federation will not be 
implemented within the Russian Federation”. As Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov explained18, this does not mean that Russia is 
going to withdraw from international organisations or treaties. 
But it is obvious that from now on, each new decision taken by 
international bodies will undergo a “check” for compliance with 
the constitutional norms of the Russian Federation.
We should not expect a significant reduction in Russia’s 
involvement in international affairs in favour of concentrating 
on internal development. The fact that Lavrov and Defence 
Minister Sergey Shoigu retained their posts in the new cabinet 
means that the President is satisfied with the current foreign 
policy course. Russia, according to Putin, has assumed its rightful 
place in the world: its voice is listened to. In coming years, while 
we can probably expect that the Russian leadership will stop 
making additional efforts to achieve this “rightful place”, as it 
did during the previous decade, it will obviously continue to 
18 Acting Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media 
questions at a news conference on Russia’s diplomatic performance in 2019 
Moscow, MFA, 17 January 2020. 
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take all necessary measures to maintain and secure it. Russia is 
highly unlikely to become inactive in the international arena.
This is already evidenced by Putin’s first foreign policy 
initiative after the Address, namely, the proposal to organise 
a meeting of the leaders of the UN Security Council members 
and a joint security event19. The value of this initiative cannot 
be overestimated. Firstly, Russia again takes the initiative as a 
global player and emphasises its place among the great powers. 
Secondly, the proposal clearly reflects the desire of the Russian 
President, in the last four years of his tenure, to achieve a change 
in the perception of Russia on the world stage – as a responsible 
stakeholder capable of contributing to the creation of a new 
multipolar world order.
It is clear that the Russian leadership will actively develop 
this discourse in 2020 in connection with the 75th anniversary 
of victory in the Second World War in May and the creation 
of the UN in September, as well as in connection with Russia’s 
chairmanship of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), two 
organisations viewed as contributors to the formation of a fairer, 
multipolar world order. It can be assumed that the Russian 
leadership views the task of increasing trust in Russia on the 
world stage as a key foreign policy task for the next four years.
These intentions can also be seen from recent positive 
developments in the direction of Ukraine, namely the exchange 
of prisoners, the restart of “Normandy format” talks and the 
resumption of gas supplies through the country. The readiness 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intensify negotiations in 
the “5 + 2” format to resolve the conflict in Transnistria also 
signals that Russia is interested in the successful resolution 
of at least one frozen conflict in post-Soviet space in order to 
demonstrate its intention to become a peace-provider rather 
than a conflict-provider in Europe.
19 “Putin predlozhil Sovbezu OON provesti obshchee meropriyatie po 
bezopasnosti” (“Putin invited UN Security Council to hold joint security event”), 
RIA Novosti, 23 January 2020. 
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Other symbolic gestures have been made against the 
backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic. Russia’s leadership 
has sent medical personnel and equipment to Italy, Serbia and 
even to the US. These steps are obviously intended to confirm 
Russia’s readiness to cooperate with political opponents, even 
NATO members and America itself, in the event of a real 
emergency or humanitarian catastrophe. Russian politicians 
have also called for all sanctions to be lifted in the context of 
the global pandemic. 
Nevertheless, at least one factor can be identified that could 
prevent the rebuilding of trust between Russia and the EU. 
This is the active use of historical memory in political struggles, 
i.e. the reassessment of the role played by the USSR in World 
War II. Officials in some Eastern European states20, for example, 
have accused the USSR not only of starting the War, but also 
of facilitating the Holocaust. For the Russian leadership and 
for the whole of Russian society this is a red line, a morally 
sensitive topic with the potential to reverse positive dynamics in 
relations with states in Eastern Europe and the EU as a whole. 
For the EU, with its current numerous internal crises, all 
internal bonds that can promote solidarity are objectively 
important. The identification of an external enemy and appeals 
to the community to share a common perception of its role 
in the history of a united Europe are perfectly suited to this 
purpose. However, one must be aware that solidarity around 
a new assessment of the events of 75 years ago may become 
detrimental to the present and the future. The anniversary of 
the end of World War II and the creation of the main institution 
of international cooperation for peace – the UN – may become 
the starting point for a restoration of trust between Russia and 
Europe, but it may also become the point of its total loss. It all 
depends, as always, on a concrete political will.
20 M. Morawiecki, “Moscow’s Holocaust revisionism”, Politico.eu. 21 January 2020; 
“Vladimir Zelenskij obvinil SSSR v razvyazyvanii Vtoroj mirovoj” (“Vladimir 
Zelensky accused the USSR of  unleashing World War II”), Kommersant, 27 
January 2020.
2.  Greater Eurasia. Opportunity 
     or Downsizing for Russia?
Aldo Ferrari
In recent years the idea of Greater Eurasia seems to constitute 
the main strategic reference of Russian foreign policy. However, 
as many analysts observe, the outlines of this idea are still largely 
uncertain, if not contradictory. In particular, it is difficult to 
clearly distinguish its relationship with other recent Russian 
intellectual and political ventures such as Eurasianism, Eurasian 
Economic Union (EUAE) and Turn to East1. The emphasis 
with which Greater Eurasia is used by the Russian leadership 
and its diffusion in political research testify to its relevance. 
Furthermore, the role of Eurasianism in the Greater Eurasia 
grabbed international attention and even rang some alarm 
bells: indeed, Eurasianism could be interpreted as a cultural and 
geopolitical justification for Russian imperialism replacing the 
role Marxism-Leninism in Soviet times. Considering all of the 
above, this topic of Greater Eurasia should be addressed very 
carefully in order to try to define Russia’s self-perception as well 
as its ability to produce an effective foreign policy. 
1 B. Lo, Greater Eurasia. The Emperor’s New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come?, 
Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), July 2019, p. 11.
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From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia
A long time has passed since 2001, when the President of the 
European Commission Romano Prodi proposed common 
economic space between the EU and Russia. A proposal 
that seemed entirely utopian in the absence of a free-trade 
agreement, but which showed that the Brussels leadership was 
willing to take this perspective into consideration. On the other 
hand, Russia too appeared amenable to the project of a Greater 
Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Putin himself referred to 
this idea in his speech at the 2005 EU-Russia summit2. 
As a matter of fact, even in those honeymoon years of the 
Russian-EU relations Moscow was not fully willing to accept 
EU norms and standards. The political deterioration between 
the EU and Russia in the years that followed made such a 
development less realistic3. Moscow then began to develop a 
Eurasian integration project that provoked both contempt and 
alarm in the West4. While there are fears that Russia may use 
Eurasianism to replace Marxism-Leninism as a new imperial 
ideology in the post-Soviet space, its ability to achieve this goal 
was completely denied. In any case, the results of this Russian 
project have so far been modest: in July 2011 a Customs Union 
was born, including only Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; it 
became the Common Economic Area in 2012 and the EAEU 
in 2015. While covering three quarters of the post-Soviet space, 
this project was strongly hindered by the failure to include 
Ukraine, which after the 2014 crisis turned decisively towards 
the West. Indeed, the rivalry between Russia’ Eurasian project 
2 A.V. Tsvyk, “‘Greater Europe’ or ‘Greater Eurasia’? In search of  new ideas 
for the Eurasian integration”, RUDN Journal of  Sociology, 2018, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 
262-70.
3 A. Kortunov, “One More Time on Greater Europe and Greater Eurasia”, 
Russia in Global Affairs, 5 October 2018.
4 S.F. Starr and S.E. Cornell, Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its 
Discontents, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 
Washington D.C.; N. Popescu, Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the likely, 
Chaillot Paper, no. 132, 9 September 2014.
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and the European Eastern Partnership project should be seen 
as the main cause of the Ukrainian crisis and of the conflict 
between Russia and the West5. 
In addition, the growing reluctance of Belarus and Kazakhstan 
to engage politically as well as economically within the EAUE 
weakens the integration process enhanced by the Kremlin. 
The entry into the EAEU of economically and politically weak 
states such as Armenia (October 2014) and Kyrgyzstan (May 
2015) has hardly changed this rather disappointing situation6. 
Russia’s persistent economic weakness and the diffidence of 
many post-Soviet countries to fully adhere to a project largely 
dominated by Moscow make it difficult for the EAEU to meet 
its initial ambitions. Besides, the Eurasian integration project 
also has to deal with the much more dynamic Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 by Beijing. 
Indeed, Moscow put up a good facade before the Chinese 
project, probably because it had no choice. The conflict with 
the West that followed the Ukrainian crisis and the unstoppable 
growth of China actually forced Russia to strengthen strategic 
cooperation with its great Asian neighbour7.
The idea of Greater Eurasia was born in this context of 
challenges coming from both East and West. In an article 
published in February 2015 Dmitry Trenin, the Director of the 
Carnegie Moscow Center, remarked that in place of “Greater 
Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which was proclaimed 
5 E. Korosteleva, Z. Paikin, and S. Paduano (eds.),  Five years after Maidan: Toward 
a Greater Eurasia?, Compass, Uptake, Lse !Ideas, May 2019, p. 7.
6 C. Vasilyeva and M. Lagutina, The Russian Project of  Eurasian Integration. Geopolitical 
Prospects, Lanham - Boulder - New York – London, Lexington Books, 2016; A. 
Ferrari, Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. A Failed Project?, in A. Ferrari (ed.), 
Putin’s Russia: Really Back?, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2016, pp. 115-130.
7  G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to World order. National Identities, Bilateral 
Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s, Woodrow Wilson Center, Stanford 
University Press, 2014; M. Lubina, Russia and China. A political marriage of  
convenience, Opladen - Berlin - Toronto, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2017; A. 
Ferrari and E. Tafuro Ambrosetti (eds.), Russia and China. Anatomy of  a Partnership, 
Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2019.
Forward to the Past?36
by Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev, a “Greater Asia” 
is beginning to take shape8. In April of that year, some analysts 
from the Valdai Club, including Sergey Karaganov and Timofey 
Bordachev, published a report in which they claimed it was 
time to integrate the Russian EAEU project with that of the 
Chinese BRI: 
However, in 2015 we can speak on the birth of the “Central 
Eurasian Moment”, which is the unique confluence of 
international political and economic circumstances that 
allows for the renewed potential for cooperation and common 
development within the states of this region. The main driving 
forces behind the transformation of Central Eurasia into a zone 
of joint development will be Eurasian economic integration, led 
by Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as by Belarus and the Silk 
Road Economic Belt project9. 
In another article of the same period, Karaganov highlights that 
“[...] large blocks are being created in the world and Greater 
Eurasia (Bolshaia Evraziia) will be one of those”10. Alexandr 
Lukin, an important specialist in Russian-Chinese relations, 
also contributed significantly to the formation of this idea by 
supporting the evidence of the formation of “[…] the system of 
Greater Eurasia, the states of which will not be tied by alliance 
relations, as are the United States and its European satellites”11. At 
the end of 2015, the idea of Greater Eurasia had clearly emerged 
in its general outline. This vision obviously does not constitute an 
absolute novelty, since the idea of a particular closeness of Russia 
8 D. Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia, Carnegie Moscow Center, 26 
February 2015.
9 Toward the Great Ocean 3 – Creating Central Eurasia, Valdai Club, 2015, p. 8. On 
the “invention” of  Greater Eurasia see D.G. Lewis, “Geopolitical Imaginaries in 
Russian Foreign Policy: The Evolution of  ‘Greater Eurasia’”, Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 70, no. 10, December 2018, pp. 1615-18.
10 S. Karaganov, “Pervye kontury Bolshij Evrazii” (“First outlines of  Greater 
Eurasia”), Rossja v global’noj politike, 29 May 2015.
11 A. Lukin, Russia, China and the Emerging Greater Eurasia,  The Asan Forum, 18 
August 2015.
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to Asia is already central not only in the Eurasianist thought of 
the 1920-30s12, but also in the “mystical” neo-Eurasism of Lev 
Gumilev (1912-1992)13 and in that of the controversial political 
thinker Aleksandr Dugin, largely influenced by the geopolitical 
ideas of Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt, as well as by the 
positions of the new contemporary European Far Right. 
The neo-Eurasist perspective, especially the radically anti-
Western version elaborated by Dugin, has often been linked to 
Putin since his rise to power. However, this is a quite inadequate 
interpretation: 
Dugin’s networks are those of the European New Right, rooted 
in barely concealed fascist traditions, and with some assumed 
intellectual and individual affiliations with the Nazi ideology 
and post-Nazi elusive transformations. On the contrary, 
the Kremlin has progressively created a consensual ideology 
without doctrine, founded on Russian patriotism and classical 
conservative values: social order, authoritarian political regime, 
the traditional family etc... 14  
Many Western analysts probably overestimate the importance 
of this author, on the one hand attributing to him a non-
existent political and cultural centrality in contemporary 
Russia, on the other hand projecting his ideological extremism 
onto every Eurasian project proposed by Russia. In fact, the 
role of a fundamental figure such as Yevgeny Primakov (1929-
2015), Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Russia in the 
12 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of  Empire, Washington D.C., 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008; D. Shlapentokh (ed.), Russia Between East 
and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2007; M. Bassin, 
S. Glebov, and M. Laruelle (eds.), Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and 
Legacies of  Russian Eurasianism, Pittsburgh, University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2015.
13 M. Bassin, The Gumilev mystique: biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the construction of  
community in modern Russia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2016.
14 M. Laruelle, Dangerous Liasons: Eurasianism, the European Far Right, and Putin’s 
Russia, in M. Laruelle (ed.), Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the 
Euro – Russian Relationship, London, Lexington Books, 2015, p. 23.
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late 1990s15, was much more important for the formation of 
the Greater Eurasia project: “Russia’s Kissinger and architect of 
the Primakov Doctrine espoused a Sino-Russian alliance […] 
against Western unilateralism”16. 
Economic, Security and Ideological Dynamics 
of Greater Eurasia
In the international political scenario, which emerged after 
the Ukrainian crisis, the expression Greater Eurasia began to 
be used more and more frequently by various members of the 
Russian elite until Putin himself adopted it in June 2016 on 
the occasion of the International Economic Forum of Saint 
Petersburg:
We are aware of the impressive prospects of cooperation 
n between the EAEU and other countries and integration 
associations. […] Our partners and we think that the EAEU can 
become one of the centres of a greater emergent integration area. 
Among other benefits, we can address ambitious technological 
problems within its framework, promote technological progress 
and attract new members. We discussed this in Astana quite 
recently. Now we propose considering the prospects for more 
extensive Eurasian partnership involving the EAEU and 
countries with which we already have close partnership – China, 
India, Pakistan and Iran – and certainly our CIS partners, and 
other interested countries and associations. […] Friends, the 
project I have just mentioned – the “Greater Eurasia” project 
– is, of course, open for Europe, and I am convinced that such 
cooperation may be mutually beneficial. Despite all of the well-
known problems in our relations, the European Union remains 
15 See The unknown Primakov. Memoirs, Moscow, Publishing House TPP RF, 2016; 
and the article by D. Novikov, “Rycar’ rossijskogo realizma” (“The Knight of  
Russian Realism”), in F. Lukyanov (ed.), Konservatizm vo vnešnej politike: XXI vek 
(Conservatism in foreign policy: XXI century), special issue of  “Rossia v globalnoi 
politike”, 2017, pp. 119-132. 
16 M.L. Levin, The Next Great Clash. China and Russia vs. The United States, Westport-
London, Praeger, 2008, p. 130.
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Russia’s key trade and economic partner. It is our next-door 
neighbour and we are not indifferent to what is happening in the 
lives of our neighbours, European countries and the European 
economy17.
The concept of Greater Eurasia is presented by Putin as a 
development of the EAEU and does not exclude cooperation 
with Europe, far from it. However, it is clear that the emphasis 
is no longer on the centrality of Russian-European relations, 
but on the possibility that Europe will also participate in the 
larger Eurasian project focused mainly on Russia and China18.
This is obviously a change of great importance. Ever since, 
Greater Eurasia has been an essential part of the official Russian 
discourse, intended primarily as a decisive step in the realization 
of a new multipolar international order based on collaboration 
between the main powers. According to Sergey Karaganov, 
The partnership or community of Greater Eurasia is, first of all, 
a conceptual framework that sets the direction for interaction 
among states on the continent. It should be committed to 
promoting joint economic, political, and cultural revival 
and development of dozens of Eurasian countries, backward 
or oppressed in the past, and turning Eurasia into the global 
economic and political center. […] The partnership of Greater 
Eurasia should be based on the traditional postulates of 
international law and international coexistence, and rejection 
of all forms of universalism, supremacy of certain values over 
others, and one’s a priori rightness or hegemony19.
This project is clearly opposed to the political and cultural 
hegemony of the West and the US in particular, but its 
17 V. Putin, Speech at plenary session of  the XX St Petersburg International Economic 
Forum, Saint Petersburg, 17 June 2016.
18 D.G. Lewis (2018), p. 1617.
19 S. Karaganov, “The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia”, Journal 
of  Eurasian Studies, vol. 9, 2018, p. 90. See also R. Sakwa, Russia against the Rest. 
The post-cold war crisis of  world order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 
pp. 292-293.
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configuration appears to be largely fluid and open to different 
interpretations20. This indeterminacy can be considered a 
weakness, but also a strength as it makes it applicable in 
different fields, not only in the economic one as is the case of 
the EAEU21.
There is of course also an economic dimension of Greater 
Eurasia, which Moscow sees as a privileged space for trade 
between Europe and Asia, especially since the main transit 
routes go through Russia22.
In addition, this project should also contribute to the 
enhancement of the Russian Far East, which remains largely 
underdeveloped despite its immense potential for growth. 
According to most analysts, Russia is unable to effectively carry 
out its Eurasian economic integration project. In particular, the 
attempt to place EAEU at the centre of Greater Eurasia strategy 
has so far produced very limited results23. 
The strengthening of economic cooperation with Asian 
countries certainly constitutes a fundamental priority for Russia, 
but at the same time it suffers from increasing asymmetry with 
China. This situation is often framed in entirely negative terms: 
Instead of taking on the role of a regional integrator, Russia is 
rapidly turning into a subordinate element of China’s own far-
reaching plans. The only beneficiary is Beijing, which is aptly 
capitalizing on Moscow’s misconceptions24. 
20 A. Kuznetsova, Greater Eurasia. Perceptions from Russia, the European Union, and 
China, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 1 September 2017. 
21 B. Lo, Greater Eurasia. The Emperor’s New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come?, 
Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), July 2019.
22 On this topic see G. Diesen, Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy for a Greater Eurasia, 
New York, Routledge, 2019.
23 R. Dragnewa-Lewers, What Role for the Eurasian Economic Union in Greater 
Eurasia?, in E. Korosteleva, Z. Paikin, and S. Paduano (eds.), Five years after 
Maidan: Toward a Greater Eurasia?, Compass, Uptake, Lse !Ideas, May 2019, p. 7. 
24 S. Sukhankin, “From ‘Turn to the East’ to ‘Greater Eurasia’: Russia’s Abortive 
Search for a Far East Strategy”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 15, no. 177, 14 
December 2018.
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Such a view is of course not shared by those who believe that 
Russia is able to successfully manoeuvre in the new Eurasian 
scenario. According to Karaganov, for example: 
The old order is destroyed [...] We have to build a new one, 
which will be weakly bipolar. One pole will be around the 
United States, the other, Greater Eurasia, will have China as 
its economic leader, but this country will not be hegemonic. 
Beijing will be balanced by Moscow, Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, 
Tehran, Jakarta and Manila25.
Moscow’s strength in this new pole evidently depends on 
its ability to guarantee regional security. Indeed, this is the 
only field in which Russia outweighs China, thanks to its 
considerable military modernisation in recent years and the 
successes achieved in Ukraine and especially in Syria:
[...] Russia’s contribution to the fight against the structures of 
Islamic terrorism and the liberation of part of Syria and Iraq 
from its control can be seen as a sort of examination for the role 
of sheriff of the Greater Eurasia26. 
From this point of view, the military effectiveness of Russia 
establishes the necessary balance between the two main 
countries of Greater Eurasia, based on a sort of “division of 
labour”, within which China dominates the economic sphere 
while Russia has a leading role in ensuring security through 
CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) facilities. 
Therefore, this “division of labour” seems to guarantee a 
substantially equal relationship and a win-win perception of 
Greater Eurasia27.
25 S. Karaganov, “God pobed. Chto dal’she?” (“A year of  victories. What else?”), 
Rossiia v globalnoi politike, 16 January 2017.
26 D. Efremenko, “Rozhdenie Bolshoi Evrazii” (“The Birth of  Greater Eurasia”), 
in F. Lukyanov (ed.), Konservatizm vo vneshnei politike: XXI vek (Conservatism in foreign 
policy: XXI century), special issue of  Russia v globalnoi politike, 2017, p. 169.
27 B. Lo (2019). 
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The most controversial aspect of Greater Eurasia is the 
ideological one. Despite its declared pragmatic attitude, this 
project in fact represents a revival of a cultural view that first 
emerged in the XIX century, namely that Russia should follow 
a path based on the autonomous historical, geographical and 
social features of the country as opposed to imitating the 
European model: from Nikolay Danilevsky and Konstantin 
Leontev, who developed a vision of universal history as a plurality 
of autonomous civilisations (“cultural-historical types”), to the 
founder of Eurasianism, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, who vehemently 
contested Eurocentrism in his Europe and Mankind (1920)28, 
until the so-called “civilisational approach”, which spread in the 
post-Soviet era in neo-Eurasianist circles.
This civilisational approach is also evident in many supporters 
of the Greater Eurasia project. Even without contesting the 
essentially European character of Russian culture, the conflict 
with the West that has developed in recent years seems to have 
strengthened Russia’s search for its own specificity. In Russia 
the centuries-long assumption of the pre-eminence of the West 
is now in decline, while the simultaneous growth of the Far 
East leads to rethinking priorities and strategies. The crisis 
with the West has actually pushed Russia to intensify political 
and economic relations with China and other Asian countries 
with which it also broadly shares ideological orientations. 
It is not only a matter of challenging the US-led unipolar 
order that emerged at the end of the Cold War, but also of a 
Weltanschauung that rejects the alleged universality of Western 
values and instead focuses on national ones. If in his official 
speeches Putin increasingly defines Russia as a conservative 
country founded on Christian Orthodox values29, the revival of 
Confucian heritage in China and of neo-Hinduism in India is 
also a form of reaffirming the primacy of national traditions. As 
28 See the English translation in N. Trubetzkoy, The Legacy of  Genghis Khan and 
other essays on Russia’s Identity, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publications, 1996.
29 A. Ferrari, Russia. A Conservative Society?, in A. Ferrari, (ed.), Russia 2018. 
Predictable Elections, Uncertain Future, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2018, pp. 33-53.
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Fedor Lukyanov has observed: 
The need to preserve sovereignty – not only in a political sense, 
but also from the point of view on national identity – is again 
perceived as a norm. The liberal-cosmopolitan utopia of the late 
twentieth century is rejected in the shadows30.
Therefore, according to this author, Russia should pursue a self-
perception based on the idea of “civilisation” that corresponds 
more effectively to Russia’s historic traditions and to its relations 
with neighbouring states31. Such a civilisational approach is 
also expressed in an important speech given by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Lavrov in Munich on 18 February 2017:
Humanity stands at a crossroads today. The historic era that 
could be called the post-Cold War order has come to an end. 
[…]
This global model was pre-programmed for crisis right from the 
time when this vision of economic and political globalisation 
was conceived primarily as an instrument for ensuring the 
growth of an elite club of countries and its domination over 
everyone else. It is clear that such a system could not last 
forever. Leaders with a sense of responsibility must now make 
their choice. I hope that this choice will be made in favour of 
building a democratic and fair world order, a post-West world 
order, if you will, in which each country develops its own 
sovereignty within the framework of international law, and will 
strive to balance their own national interests with those of their 
partners, with respect for each country’s cultural, historical and 
civilisational identity32.
30 F. Lukyanov (2017), p. 9.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/ 
7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2648249 
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Lavrov himself often refers to the Greater Eurasian 
Partnership. For example, in a speech held in New Delhi on 5 
January, he said that “The Russian initiative of forming Greater 
Eurasian Partnership has become established as a concept of 
long-term political and diplomatic efforts [...]”33. 
Assessments of the Russian project of Greater Eurasia 
vary greatly. Western analysts’ comments are usually hostile 
or dismissive. So, for example, Bobo Lo says that “Much of 
the ideology surrounding the Greater Eurasia concept is 
presentational rather than inspirational. It supplies a veneer of 
cultural-civilizational unity to what is really a jumble of ideas, 
few of which have been properly thought through”34.
This kind of criticism seems to be almost unconsciously 
affected by a prejudicial depreciation of any Russian cultural or 
political initiative that calls into question the superiority of the 
Western model and the universal dimension of its values. This is 
especially true if such initiatives are based on the Eurasian idea, 
which seems to be particularly irritating for almost everyone 
who studies it from a Western viewpoint.
Anyway, it should be borne in mind that the conceptual 
elaboration of Greater Eurasia does not come from outsiders 
such as Gumilev or Dugin, but from figures widely included 
in the official discourse of contemporary Russia. Indeed, its 
constant use by Putin and Lavrov also certifies that this is a 
vision now shared by Russian political leaders.
More generally, it cannot be overlooked that this discourse 
intercepts an indisputable reality of today’s international scenario, 
namely the emergence from China to Turkey of an immense 
political space in which Western liberal norms are widely 
challenged. In an international system that increasingly takes 
on the characteristics of a post-liberal and post-western world35, 
33 D.R. Chaudhury, “Russia pushes India’s entry into Eurasian Economic Union 
strengthening third country coop”, The Economic Times, 5 January 2020.
34 B. Lo (2019).
35 A. Colombo and P. Magri (eds.), The End of  a World. The decline of  the liberal order, 
ISPI Annual Report, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2019. 
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the Russian idea of Greater Eurasia is far from groundless. For 
this reason, as some have put it, “[…] the temptation to dismiss 
the Valdai school as merely the latest geopolitical imaginary in 
Russian foreign policy is short-sighted”36. 
The main point is rather to understand the effectiveness of 
this vision as a tool of Russia’s foreign policy. It can be observed 
that while Russia plays a dominant role within the EAEU, 
in Greater Eurasia its role is evidently downsized, primarily 
because of Chinese superiority. Even a supporter of this project 
like Dmitry Efremenko wrote “that Russia cannot avoid 
recognizing the general primacy of China, but maintains equal 
rights and freedom of manoeuvre”37. These are certainly not 
obvious words from the perspective of a Russia accustomed to 
thinking of itself as a great power, but which is hampered in its 
ambitions by numerous internal difficulties, first and foremost 
its structural economic weakness compared to the United 
States and China38. But also by the persistence of a Western 
orientation among the elite and the inertia of the bureaucracy39.
In any event, Russia’s tilt towards Asia is probably destined to 
continue. As Lukin wrote Greater Eurasia should be considered 
“[…] not as goal of Russian and Chinese diplomacy, but as 
an objective reality reflecting fundamental processes in world 
politics”40. Indeed, Russia’s distance from the EU and the United 
States has not diminished in recent years. Moscow’s relations 
with some European countries remain fraught, while Trump’s 
36 D.G. Lewis (2018), p. 1633.
37 D. Efremenko, “Rozhdenie Boshoi Evrazii” (“The birth of  Greater Eurasia”), 
in Konservatizm vo vnešnej politike: XXI vek (Conservatism in foreign policy: XXI century), 
special issue of  Rossiia v globalnoi politike, 2017,  p. 168.
38 A. Ferrari, “Russia between the United States and China: A Possible Third 
Power?”, in A. Colombo and P. Magri (eds.), Work in Progress. The End of  a World, 
part II, Annual Report 2020, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2020, pp. 152-161.
39 See T. Bordachev, “Novoye yevraziistvo: Kak sdelat’ sopryazhenie rabotayushchim” 
(“New Eurasianism. How uniting workers”), Rossiia v globalnoi politike, 14 October 
2015.
40 A. Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Central Asia and the Idea of  
Greater Eurasia”, India Quaterly, vol. 75, no. 1, 2019.
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presidency has not led to the Russia-US rapprochement that 
some have been waiting for. As noted by the Director of the 
Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, the 
Greater Eurasia project does not have to face these difficulties 
because most Asian countries do not perceive Russia as a threat. 
Furthermore, unlike the rigid institutional framework of the 
EU, the various “Eurasian” initiatives are deliberately vague 
precisely so as not to discourage potential partners: 
Therefore, it easier for Russia to plug itself into emerging Asian 
mechanisms and regimes – not as a latecomer, but as one of the 
founding fathers and in some cases as of the leaders. This is not 
to say that the European project is of no significance to Russia. 
Quite the opposite is true. The most important comparative 
advantage of Moscow in Asia is exactly Russia’s “European” 
nature. Only by articulating this nature can Russia become 
a valuable building block in the new Greater Eurasia. […] 
Therefore, for Moscow it is crucially important to maintain and 
to expand its historic human, cultural, educational and other 
ties to Russia’s European cradle41.
Therefore, the turn to Asia can be considered appropriate for 
Russia from a “European” perspective as well. Looking back in 
history, a similar shift occurred in the second half of the XIX 
century when Russia intensified the Eastern vector of its foreign 
policy after the disappointments of the Crimean War and the 
Berlin Congress. It was then that Dostoevsky wrote the famous 
words “In Europe we are hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia 
we walk as masters”42 which are often repeated with regard to 
Russia’s recent pivot to Asia43. 
41 A. Kortunov (2018).
42 F.M. Dostoevsky, The Diary of  a Writer, vol. 2 (1877-1881), Evanston (Ill.), 
Northwestern University Press, 1997, p. 1373.
43 R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 378; 
A.M. Chenoy and R. Kumar, Re-emerging Russia. Structures, Institutions and Processes, 
Singapore, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 229.
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Conclusion
Can the Greater Europe project be considered an effective way 
to restore Russia’s great power status? It is doubtful, indeed. 
Unlike Marxism-Leninism, which had a potentially global 
attractiveness, it lacks an adequate ideological basis. In fact, 
despite the hopes of some and the fears of others, Eurasianism 
is not really attractive to post-Soviet countries, not even to those 
of Central Asia and certainly not beyond them. This project 
therefore does not have real hegemonic potential; it should 
rather be interpreted as a response to the difficult challenges 
imposed on Russia by today’s political and economic evolution. 
At the same time, the Greater Eurasia project is ambitious and 
difficult to implement. It reasserts the persistent Russian claims 
of a historical-cultural specificity in an international scenario 
which sees Russia clashing with an apparently declining West 
and the impetuous rise of the Far East, led by China. This 
project is based on the belief that these three political dynamics 
will continue to develop, and that in this situation the Eurasian 
choice is both advantageous and obligatory for Moscow.
However, this is a risky choice, because the growing economic 
and demographic gap puts Russia in a clearly subordinate 
position with respect to China. Even without sharing the 
prejudicial hostility of many Western observers towards 
Eurasian integration projects, one wonders if this perspective is 
really the most convenient for Russia. But equally legitimate is 
the question of whether it is really convenient for the West to 
persist in its uncompromising and prescriptive attitude, which 
has greatly contributed to Russia’s Eastern choice.
3.  Branding the Country and Its Leader: 
     Soft Power Made in Russia
Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
At a 2018 meeting with the students of the Far Eastern Federal 
University, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov 
stated that Russia has been using soft power confidently, 
filling the gaps caused by the breakup of the USSR1. Even if 
today Russia appears to be “more confident using hard power 
measures to pursue its neighbourhood interests”2, Moscow has 
indeed been trying to boost its power of attraction in what it 
considers its sphere of influence and beyond, cultivating its 
cultural and historical links through specific soft power policies 
such as language programmes and commemorations of events 
of shared history, such as the USSR victory in WWII. In March 
2020, Moscow sent planes of medical personnel and equipment 
to Italy and other countries in an effort to improve its image and 
flex its soft power amid accusations of spreading disinformation 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. But what do we mean when we 
speak about soft power and can Russia claim to have it?
Soft power is a “pop” concept. Indeed, few scholarly concepts 
have “transcended the ivory towers of academia” as strongly as 
soft power3; suffice it to say that in 2005, the British electropop 
1 Sergey Lavrov, Russia is actively using the policy of  “soft power”, Gorchakov Fund, 
13 September 2018.
2 E. Tafuro, Fatal Attraction? Russia’s Soft Power in Its Neighbourhood, FRIDE Policy 
Brief  no. 181, May 2014, p. 1.
3 G. Gallarotti, “Soft power: what it is, why it is important and the conditions for 
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band Ladytron named a song after it. Born in the US, the 
concept gradually went global, and today a growing number 
of states claim to have incorporated soft power policies into 
their foreign policy tools. While there has been some discussion 
about Russia’s soft power in official and academic circles, 
Western academics and practitioners remain focused on a few 
cases, primarily the US and the EU. This oversight leads not 
only to a “major gap” in the academic literature on soft power, 
but also to a “misunderstanding of Russia’s foreign policy 
thinking, motivations, and actions”4. 
This chapter seeks to address this oversight and presents a 
view of Russia’s soft power that takes into account the country’s 
history and specificities. To this end, it first reflects on the 
main definitions of soft power, including the gaps that could 
complicate the concept’s application to non-liberal states5. It 
then looks back at the Cold War era and reviews the main 
soft power sources of the USSR, with a view to comparing 
them with today’s Russia. If it is true that some elements may 
recall the Soviet past – the use of sport mega-events is a case 
in point, with the 2014 Sochi Olympics and the 2018 World 
Cup often compared6 with the Moscow 1980 Games – some 
novel narratives, such as conservatism, are peculiar to the 
its effective use”, Journal of  Political Power, vol. 4, no. 1, 2011, pp. 25-47 (cit. p. 25).
4 Y. Osipova, “Russification of  Soft Power: Transformation of  a Concept”, 
Exchange: The Journal of  Public Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 58.
5 Common categorisations of  Russia’s government include “illiberal democracy” 
and “electoral authoritarianism”. Both terms indicate democratically elected 
regime that, despite formally adopting democratic institutions (such as 
elections, political parties, and a legislature), are essentially authoritarian and 
impose severe constraints on their civil society. See F. Zakaria, “The Illiberal 
Rise of  Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, 1997, pp. 22-43; V. Gel’man, 
Authoritarian Russia. Analyzing post-Soviet regime changes, Pittsburgh, University of  
Pittsburgh Press, 2015.
6 R. Smith, “The World Cup Changed Russia, but for How Long?”, The New 
York Times, 16 July 2018; N. Kramareva and J. Grix, “War and Peace at the 1980 
Moscow and 2014 Sochi Olympics: The role of  hard and soft power in Russian 
identity”, International Journal of  the History of  Sport, vol. 35, no. 14, 2018, pp. 1407-
27, doi: 10.1080/09523367.2019.1610400.
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“new Russia”. While an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness 
of Russian soft power falls beyond the scope of this chapter, 
this study can serve as a stepping stone to further research on a 
relevant yet too often neglected topic.
Which and Whose Soft Power? 
Despite its popularity, soft power is also one of the most 
misused International Relations (IR) concepts, to the extent 
that, according to its creator Joseph Nye, it became a “synonym 
for anything other than military force”7.  But what is soft power? 
Coined in 1990, soft power refers to “the ability to affect others 
through the cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuading, 
and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes”8. A country’s culture, its values and the perceived 
legitimacy of its foreign policies are its three sources of soft 
power, which is different from propaganda9. In Nye’s opinion, 
credibility and legitimacy are strongly related: if a country 
appears to be acting out of narrow self-interest, it is likely to 
be seen as doing propaganda rather than exerting soft power10. 
A common misconception associates soft power almost 
uniquely with immaterial resources such as culture or ideology. 
Yet, the difference between tangible and intangible resources 
is not what differentiates hard from soft power. The former 
can also stem from a number of non-material sources (such 
as competence or status), while the latter can also be based 
on material hard power sources such as military might (i.e. 
7 J. Nye, The Future Of  Power, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, 2011, p. 81.
8 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
9 Propaganda is defined by Taylor as “the conscious, methodical and planned 
decisions to employ techniques of  persuasion designed to achieve specific goals 
that are intended to benefit those organising the process”. P.M. Taylor, Munitions 
of  the Mind: A History of  Propaganda, Manchester-New York, Manchester 
University Press, 2003, p. 6.
10 J. Nye, Soft Power: The means to success in world politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.
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attracting weaker states that need protection). While this aspect 
has attracted criticism from many fronts11, drawing too clear a 
demarcation line between material and immaterial resources, 
as well as failing to acknowledge the strong links between hard 
and soft power, would not show the whole picture. 
One of the most widely debated issues about soft power 
is its applicability to non-liberal, including authoritarian 
countries. Over the past decade, studies over the soft power 
of China, Russia, Turkey and even Qatar and Saudi Arabia12 
have proliferated. These countries, while obviously different 
from one another, share a common non-liberal – even 
authoritarian – form of government, and yet they have also 
adopted the rhetoric of soft power in their public discourse, 
sometimes emulating US and EU soft power institutions and 
style. However, is it possible to speak of a Russian or Chinese 
soft power? The concept was created around American foreign 
policy, and it seems intrinsically linked to democratic values. 
Indeed, Nye stresses the importance of universal and democratic 
values over parochial ones13, although he does not elaborate on 
why universal values are the right ones14 nor does he make an 
effort to escape the trap of identifying Western values exclusively 
with liberal ones. 
11 Leslie Gelb, for instance, argues that soft power has become too inclusive, 
as it “now seems to mean almost everything”: since economic coercion and 
military power have been introduced “through the back door”, soft power now 
includes not only such elements as leadership, persuasion, and values, but also 
concepts like military prowess. L.H. Gelb, Power Rules. How Common Sense Can 
Rescue American Foreign Policy, New York, Harper Perennial, 2010, p. 69.
12 On the less studied topic of  the Gulf  countries’ soft power, see P.M. Brannagan 
and R. Giulianotti, “The soft power – soft disempowerment nexus: the case of  
Qatar”, International Affairs, vol. 5, 2018, pp. 1139-1157, doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy125; 
and G. Gallarotti and I.Y. Al-Filali, “Saudi Arabia’s soft power”, International 
Studies, vol. 49, 2012, pp. 233-61, doi: 10.1177/0020881714532707.
13 J. Nye (2011), p. 11.
14 J. Bially Mattern, “Why Soft Power Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and 
the Sociolinguistic Construction of  Attraction in World Politics”, Millennium - 
Journal of  International Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2005, pp. 583-612.
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What happens, then, when the values projected by a country 
are not liberal-democratic? On the one hand, Nye does 
acknowledge the soft power potential of states like China or 
Russia. On the other hand, reconciling the non-liberal outlook 
of some would-be soft power actors with a liberal soft power 
vision looks difficult. Nye himself argues that Russian and 
Chinese leaders “do not get” what soft power really is; hence 
they are not able to exploit its potential. Whereas much of 
America’s soft power is produced by civil society and not by 
government15, China and Russia, by contrast, due to their 
shared legacy of adherence to Communism and the political 
constrictions they impose on civic activism, deviate from the 
Western understanding, conceiving soft power mainly as the 
“outcome of state initiatives rather than the product of an 
autonomous civil society”16.
Recently, the soft power academic community took up the 
task of finding new appropriate lenses to decouple the soft power 
concept from the US-championed liberal-democratic form of 
government. While some scholars17 simply dismiss Nye’s soft 
power as nothing but a masked neoliberal cultural imperialism, 
Zahran and Ramos, for instance, suggest reconceptualising 
it. They use Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony both 
to recognise the intrinsic link between coercion and consent 
and between hard and soft power, and to de-Westernise soft 
power by dropping the “universal values” implied by Nye. 
They acknowledge the “existence of a struggle over ideas and 
institutions in the international system” and call for “a more 
neutral analysis [that] would recognize that any set of principles 
and values cannot be universal”18. Other non-Gramscian 
15 J. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, 
29 April 2013.
16 J.L. Wilson, “Russia and China Respond to Soft Power: Interpretation and 
Readaptation of  a Western Construct”, Politics, vol. 35, no. 3-4, 2015, pp. 287-300. 
17 J. Bially Mattern (2005); N. Ferguson, “Power”, Foreign Policy, January/February 
2003, pp. 18-27.
18 G. Zahran and L. Ramos, “From hegemony to soft power: implications of  
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scholars arrived at a similar conclusion and operationalise soft 
power in terms of narratives that manage to impose themselves 
internationally as “natural”, regardless of their content19. This 
viewpoint facilitates the application of the concept to non-
liberal countries and informs the next section’s analysis of Soviet 
soft power.
Back in the USSR 
Talking about Soviet soft power may appear inappropriate, 
at first, since the concept was created after the demise of 
the USSR. Moreover, although some Soviet narratives built 
on democratic values (such as equality and solidarity) and a 
“universal” ideology, in practice the USSR was essentially an 
authoritarian/totalitarian state. Yet, it is usually acknowledged 
that the USSR had some powerful soft power sources, including 
its communist ideology, culture, and organisation of sport 
mega-events20. Adopting the wider perspective on soft power 
delineated in the previous section, what follows is an analysis of 
Soviet soft power aimed at enucleating the elements of change 
and continuity with today’s Russia.
Arguably, one of the strongest USSR soft power assets 
was its very existence. The utopic state – originated from a 
popular revolution and formally based on highly ethical values 
a conceptual change”, in I. Parmar and M. Cox (eds.), Soft Power and US Foreign 
Policy: Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives, New York, Routledge, 2010, 
pp. 12-31 (cit. p. 24).
19 See, for example, L. Roselle, A. Miskimmon, and B. O’Loughlin, “Strategic 
narrative: A new means to understand soft power”, Media, War & Conflict, vol. 
7, 2014, pp. 70-84; V. Feklyunina, “Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and 
the ‘Russian world(s)’”, European Journal of  International Relations, 2015, pp. 1-24.
20 N. Kramareva and J. Grix (2018); P. Babiracki, Soviet Soft Power in Poland: Culture 
and the Making of  Stalin’s New Empire, 1943-1957, Chapel Hill (NC), University 
of  North Carolina Press, 2015; P. Amarasinghe, “Reminiscence of  Soviet 
soft power and the way it influenced the ‘Global South’”, Modern Diplomacy, 2 
November 2019. 
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– inspired many people and political movements worldwide, in 
the Global South, but also in the Western world21. In particular, 
the emphasis on anti-imperialism and self-determination 
held a special appeal among colonies fighting for national 
independence. In the Arab world, for instance, the Bolsheviks 
were said to have “brought a messianic concept of salvation, of 
God’s kingdom on earth, with a new, previously unknown and 
mysterious name – ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’”22. The USSR 
also provided assistance to many African countries’ liberation 
struggle, notably South Africa. Vladimir Shubin, a renowned 
Russian Africanist, recalls Nelson Mandela telling him at the 
first African National Congress (ANC) conference in 1991: 
“Without [Soviet] support, we would not be where we are 
now”23.
In its quest for influence, the USSR employed different 
strategies that, today, would qualify as soft power policies:
In addition to diplomatic contacts, the Soviets developed ties 
with a variety of political parties, promoted exchanges with 
labour, students, and cultural groups; disseminated massive 
quantities of print and radio propaganda; and employed tens 
of thousands of civilian and military technicians and advisors24.
Culture was used as a way to cement consensus at home, creating 
a “Soviet” nation, and among the satellite countries, as well as 
an attraction tool for external countries, to gain support for the 
Soviet-backed global order. Stalin, for instance, regarded culture 
as “a fertile experimental terrain for social engineering and a 
21 For instance, Italy’s Communist party was the largest in the Western world 
and maintained close contacts with the Soviet government. L. Weinberg, The 
Transformation of  Italian Communism, New York, Routledge, 1995.
22 A.M. Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East policy. From Lenin to Putin, New York, 
Routledge, 2018, p. 27.
23 V. Shubin, Africa’s Unfolding Potential for Russia, Commentary, ISPI, 15 November 2019.
24 R.H. Donaldson and V. Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of  Russia: Changing Systems, 
Enduring Interests, London, Routledge, 6th edition, October 2018, p. 88.
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convenient tool for legitimating [Soviet] power”25. The Soviets 
inherited from Imperial Russia a thriving music and ballet 
scene. The world-famous Bolshoi Ballet company came to be 
one of the main cultural tools of the newly-born Soviet country 
and even developed a new, revolution-friendly repertoire for 
its domestic and international audiences26. Ballet became a 
“cultural export”, a great source of soft power, displaying the 
“Soviets’ educational model, for their mastery of the traditional 
repertoire, a showcase for their finest and most athletic dancers, 
and thus for the homo sovieticus. It put paid to the Western 
cliché of the Soviet citizenry as dull and barbarous”27.
Russian literature and language were also great soft power 
assets. Starting in particular from the Khrushchev era, the 
USSR invested heavily on translating their great literary classics 
into local languages in South Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
coupling them with the Soviet anti-imperialist narratives. As 
a result, “the characters portrayed by pre-revolutionary Russia 
authors like Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Gogol invoked Asian 
sentiments to think about their own conditions under social 
inequality”28. These translations, hence, seems to have “enriched 
the soft power of the Soviet Union [and] were a bulwark against 
the critical works that sought to demystify the USSR myth”29. 
They also helped boost interest in the Russian language and 
the creation of institutions such as the Centre for Soviet and 
Central Asian Studies established in the 1960s at the Jawaharlal 
25 P. Babiracki (2015), p. 12.
26 S. Morrison, Behind the curtain: Scandal, tragedy, art and politics at the Bolshoi, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2016; S. Gonçalves, “Ballet, propaganda, 
and politics in the Cold War: the Bolshoi Ballet in London and the Sadler’s Wells 
Ballet in Moscow, October-November 1956”, Cold War History, vol. 19, no. 2, 
2018, pp. 1-16; E. Chao, “The ballet that caused an international row”, BBC, 28 
June 2017.
27 S. Gonçalves (2018), p. 2.
28 P. Amarasinghe (2019).
29 A. Lal, “The soft power of  the Soviet Union”, The Economic Times, 10 March 
2011.
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Nehru University in New Delhi30. The establishment of People’s 
Friendship University in Moscow, where several African and 
Asian leaders studied31, was also a great asset for Soviet foreign 
policy vis-à-vis the Third World states. 
The USSR also tried to use sport to project soft power, 
and several propaganda posters portray the USSR as a “sports 
country”.
Fig. 3.1 - “A Mighty Sports Power”, 1962
30 P. Amarasinghe (2019).
31 The university’s alumni include top politicians in Rwanda, Uganda, Mali, Chad, 
Angola, Botswana and other African countries. AFP, “As Kremlin scrambles for 
Africa, Moscow university eyes soft power”, rfi, 20 October 2019. 
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The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games were meant to be the best 
window where the country and its ideology were on display. 
The Games were indeed supposed to “crown the Brezhnev years 
with glory; [and] bring that worldwide endorsement of Soviet 
foreign policy, while rallying domestic support and reinforcing 
the communist elites’ positions”32. Although eventually, the 
Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 compromised 
the country’s greatest soft power opportunity33 and motivated 
the US’ and many of its allies’ decision to boycott the Olympics, 
the USSR did gain enormous visibility through the Games and 
the gadgets of the Soviet mascot, Misha the Bear, are still very 
sought after items among collectors. 
Fig. 3.2 - The soft power of the bear 
Notes. Left: Misha the Bear, the mascot of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. 
Right: statues featuring the main characters of the Russian TV show  
Masha and the Bear”. It is sometimes argued that, given its global success, 
the cartoon is a tool of Russia’s influence.
32 N. Kramareva and J. Grix, (2018), p. 1412.
33 Ibid.
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This brief review of the USSR’s main soft power elements 
throws light on some important aspects that should be taken 
into account when analysing Russian soft power today. If anti-
Americanism and the cultural and education/language elements 
are still there, the next section shows how other fresh soft power 
sources are relevant both in Russia’s neighbourhood and in the 
global arena.  
Soft Power with a (Russian) Twist
What does soft power look like in today’s Russia? Professor 
Andrey Makarychev defines it as a number of
non-military policies projecting specific dimensions of Russian 
power resources beyond Russia’s borders, including communication 
and propaganda, the promotion of the Russian World as a global 
civilizational platform, religious diplomacy, memory politics and an 
external spillover of Russian conservative agenda34.
This definition captures some of the elements – both ideational 
and material – of Russia’s soft power: the civilisation discourse; 
deep economic and social ties with neighbouring countries, 
the significant Russian minorities scattered globally and 
sympathisers of Russian culture, the so-called Russkiy Mir 
(Russian world); and Kremlin-friendly media outlets (mainly 
RT and Sputnik). But how do policymakers in Moscow 
understand it? The concept was first mentioned in February 
2012 by Vladimir Putin during the presidential election 
campaign. One year later, it featured in the Concept of the 
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and its 2016 revised 
version, which defines soft power as “an integral part of efforts 
to achieve foreign policy objectives [including] the tools offered 
by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies 
34 A. Makarychev, “Beyond Geopolitics: Russian Soft Power, Conservatism, and 
Biopolitics”, Russian Politics, vol. 3, 2018, pp. 135-150 (cit. p. 137).
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– from information and communication to humanitarian and 
other types”35. If soft power is acknowledged as an important 
tool, so are its possible negative spillovers. Putin and the 2013 
version of the Foreign Policy Concept lament that soft power 
can be used in a “destructive and unlawful” way, pressuring 
and destabilising on sovereign states, by means of interfering 
in their internal affairs and manipulating public opinion36. This 
ambivalent view of soft power, according to Alexander Kornilov 
and Andrey Makarychev, is the cause of Russia’s inconsistent 
approach: 
On the one hand, the Kremlin accuses the West of using soft 
power to interfere in the domestic affairs of third parties. […] 
On the other hand, Russia’s soft-power institutions are explicitly 
based on their Western homologues. The Russia Today TV 
channel has been modelled on the BBC; the “Russia Beyond 
the Headlines” project started with The Washington Post and the 
Daily Telegraph; the Russian World Foundation is referred to as a 
Russian version of the British Council or the Goethe Institute37. 
Similarly to the USSR, Russia is arguably strong in projecting 
soft power through culture today: Russian is still the lingua 
franca in the post-Soviet region, although English is becoming 
increasingly popular among young people; Russian directors 
often feature at the most prestigious film festivals worldwide; 
the classics of Russian literature still captivate the world’s 
interest and recognition, while the Mariinsky theatre in Saint 
Petersburg and the Bolshoi in Moscow are still key reference 
points for balletomanes. Yet, limiting the analysis to “classical” 
35 The Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy 
Concept of  the Russian Federation (approved by President of  the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin on 30 November 2016).
36 V. Rotaru, “Forced Attraction?: How Russia is Instrumentalizing Its Soft 
Power Sources in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Problems of  Post-Communism, vol. 65, no. 1, 
February 2017, pp. 1-12.
37 A. Kornilov and A. Makarychev, “Russia’s soft power in the South Caucasus”, 
in A. Agadjanian et al. (eds.), Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus, 
London, Routledge, 2015, p. 241. 
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sources or indicators of soft power (such as media, culture or 
the number of students enrolling in Russian universities) would 
show only one side of the picture or even lead to the conclusion 
that Russia has no soft power. The next two subsections take a 
different approach and analyse two of Russia’s current soft power 
sources; the first – anti-US imperialism – draws heavily from 
the Soviet past; the second – conservatism and religious soft 
power – breaks free from the Soviet tradition and constitutes a 
relatively recent trend in Russia’s foreign policy.
Still fighting US imperialism?
One important aspect of Russia’s soft power, to some degree 
inherited from the USSR, is that Moscow still stands at the 
forefront of the opposition to US unipolarism and “normative 
imperialism” and is still perceived as an alternative pole of 
power. In tandem with other countries such as China38 or 
individually, Russia has consistently criticised Western double 
standards and what it claims to be the West’s use of the human 
rights discourse to advance foreign policy objectives. 
Putin’s widely-quoted speech at the 2007 Munich Conference 
on Security Policy is emblematic in this sense. He talks about 
“multilateral diplomacy” as an alternative to the unipolar 
model, which he considers as “not only unacceptable but also 
impossible in today’s world […] because at its basis there is 
and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation”39. 
Russia’s deep dissatisfaction with US unilateralism is shared 
by many other countries that feel underrepresented in US-
dominated international organisations. Putin’s accusation of 
the US’ “disdain for the basic principles of international law” 
and imposition of economic, political, cultural and educational 
38 A. Ferrari and E. Tafuro Ambrosetti, “Russia and China: Countering the 
Dominance of  the West”, in A. Ferrari and E. Tafuro Ambrosetti (eds.), Russia 
and China: Anatomy of  a Partnership, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2019.
39 Vladimir Putin,“Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, 
Munich, 10 February 2007.
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policies on other nations’40 resonates with many countries in 
the Global South but also with anti-imperialist movements and 
populist parties in the West41. For instance, Sweden’s Sputnik 
commonly depicts EU bureaucrats and decision-makers as 
puppets of the US government, while NATO is portrayed 
as both a “US instrument of war and the chief architect of 
Western policy towards Russia”42. Even the Syria campaign has 
been described by some Russian media and analysts as Vladimir 
Putin “cleaning up” the mess left by “illegal Western actions in 
support of rebels and extremist groups”43.
The concert of the Mariinsky Theatre’s Symphony Orchestra in 
Syrian Palmyra was a big public diplomacy operation that arguably 
bought Russia some soft power and inspired comments such as 
“civilization is back in Palmyra” in the international press44. 
The Kremlin’s anti-imperialist and multilateral narrative, 
however, is marked by inconsistencies. Russia acts as an 
“instrumental multilateralist”45: on the one hand, it uses 
international institutions to restrain US policy; on the other, 
it uses regional institutions and ad hoc agreements to legitimise 
its unilateral actions, including the use of military power, in its 
neighbourhood. Moreover, the vocal condemnation of Western 
40 Ibid.
41 On the topic of  Russia’s and especially Putin’s power of  attraction vis-à-vis 
Western populist groups, see E. Tafuro Ambrosetti, “National-populism in 
Russia: Ticking all the boxes?”, in A. Martinelli (ed.), When Populism Meets 
Nationalism. Reflections on parties in power, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2018.
42 M. Kragh and S. Åsberg, “Russia’s strategy for influence through public 
diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case”, Journal of  Strategic Studies, vol. 
40, no. 6, 2017, pp. 773-816 (cit. p. 782).
43 C.J. Williams, “Russian analysts cast Putin as rescuing Syria from Western 
bungling”, Los Angeles Times, 29 September 2015.
44 L. Rotoloni, “Grande concerto russo a Palmira, la città siriana liberata dall’Isil” 
(“Big Russian Concert in Palmyra. Siryan City liberated by Isis”), EuroNews; G. 
Doctorow, “Civilization Returns to Palmyra - While the West Scoffs”, Global 
Research, 8 May 2016.
45 A. Zagorski, “Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches”, in E. 
Wilson Rowe and S. Torjesen (eds.), The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign 
Policy, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 46.
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sanctions as a unilateral and unlawful tool46 in international 
relations did not stop the Kremlin from imposing its own 
sanctions on Turkey after the downing of the Russian jet in 2015. 
Fig. 2.2 - Russia’s Valery Gergiev conducts a concert 
in Palmyra ruins on 5 May 2016 
A “pious” Russia
“Boga niet!”47. There is no God – says a well-known Soviet atheist 
poster. God seems to have a strong presence in today’s Russia, 
though, to the point that it also become a soft power source. 
46 In the Kremlin’s narrative, US and EU sanctions against Russia for the 
annexation of  Crimea symbolised Western partial application of  international 
law and were another attempt to contain Russia’s in its defense of  its “national 
interests”. In a speech on 18 March 2014, Vladimir Putin stated: “We have every 
reason to assume that the infamous policy of  containment […] continues today. 
They [the West] are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have 
an independent position. […] With Ukraine, our western partners have crossed 
the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally”. http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603
47 https://i.imgur.com/yP3WZz0.jpg
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What is sometimes defined as “religious soft power” is made 
possible by the well-documented close relationship between 
the government and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) 
and its leader, Patriarch Kirill48. During the Cold War, state 
atheism defined Soviet communism – often set in contrast with 
“Christian America”49. In reality, the Russian state, whether 
Czarist or Soviet, “used its national church and its religious 
channels as a tool of geopolitical influence and often as a 
source of pressure within the Orthodox world”50. Yet, today’s 
partnership is unprecedented. Under Putin, the Kremlin 
has used the Christian faith as one of the justifications for 
its foreign policy and portrays the country as a champion of 
socially conservative, Christian-based values51. This relationship 
seems to pay off for both actors. In Speedie’s words: 
The significance of religion in Russian life allows the state to 
garner huge social capital from having the blessing of the 
Orthodox Church, and likewise the Church benefits from 
the relationship by disseminating its message of Christianity 
worldwide via Russian foreign policy. For the state, Russky Mir 
48 R.C. Blitt, “Russia’s “orthodox” foreign policy: The growing influence of  
the Russian orthodox church in shaping Russia’s policies abroad”, University of  
Pennsylvania Journal of  International Economic Law, vol. 33, no. 2, 2011, pp. 363-460; 
A. Agadjanian (2017) “Tradition, morality and community: elaborating Orthodox 
identity in Putin’s Russia”, Religion, State & Society, vol. 45, no. 1, 2017, pp. 39-60.
49 P. Henne, The Geopolitics of  Faith: Religious Soft Power in Russian and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, Berkeley (CA), Berkeley University blog post, 6 June 2019. 
50 P. Tasiopoulos, Russia’s Religious Soft Power: Is Christianity Ready for a New Schism?, 
Wilfrid Martens Centre for European Studies, 19 October 2018. After the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s dissolution and the losses of  territorial jurisdiction 
that characterised the period 1917-1939, the interwar years marked the start 
of  a period of  church-state collaboration – a “concordat” – in areas where 
the domestic and international interests of  the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
Soviet authorities overlapped, for example the need to improve the USSR’s 
international image as a guarantor of  religious freedom or the consolidation 
of  all Orthodox structures in the postwar Soviet space under the guidance of  
Moscow’s Patriarchate. D. Kalkandjieva, The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1948: 
From Decline to Resurrection, London, Routledge, 2015.
51 E. Tafuro Ambrosetti (2014).
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is a political/cultural tool for strengthening domestic stability, 
worldwide status, and influence in neighboring states. For 
the Church, it is a religious foundation essential for reversing 
the secularization of society (which it sees as an unwelcome 
evolution already well underway in the West)52.
Synergies between the government and church activities are 
present in Russia’s “near abroad”. Acting in tandem with the 
Russian government to repossess old churches and build new 
ones in neighbouring Orthodox countries, the ROC “signals 
its endorsement of the use of churches to bolster Russia’s 
profile as well as its willingness to avail itself of the Church as 
a potential lever of soft power in its pursuit of foreign policy 
objectives”53. The conservative and religious discourse resonates 
also in neighbouring countries that do not necessarily share the 
same Orthodox faith but share a very conservative outlook, 
such as Armenia. Conservative layers of the Armenian civil 
society look at the “Russian” worldview to balance “Western-
imposed” gender discussions, which they “correlate with moral 
and demographic decline”54.
Partly thanks to this conservative narrative, Moscow seems to 
have become an ideological Mecca for many far-right and socially 
conservative movements, such as the UKIP (UK Independence 
Party) in the UK, the National Rally in France, Jobbik in 
Hungary and Ataka in Bulgaria55. The conservative narrative is 
very anti-liberal, but it does not deny Russia’s belonging to the 
European community; rather, it is an argument for Russia’s “true 
52 D. Speedie, “Soft Power”: The Values that Shape Russian Foreign Policy, Carnegie 
Council, 30 July 2015.
53 R.C. Blitt (2011), p. 424.
54 N. Shahnazarian, Eurasian Family versus European Values: The Geopolitical Roots of  
“Anti-Genderism” in Armenia, PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo 488, October 2017.
55 A. Klapsis, “An Unholy Alliance: The European Far Right and Putin’s Russia”, 
European View, vol. 14, no. 1, 2015; M. Laruelle, “Russia as an anti-liberal 
European civilization in Pål Kolstø”, in H. Blakkisrud (eds.), The New Russian 
Nationalism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016; E. Tafuro Ambrosetti 
(2018).
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European Christian identity”56. Marine Le Pen, for instance, 
called Putin a “a true patriot and defender of European values”, 
allegedly buying into the narrative of some members of Russia’s 
political elite, such as Dmitry Rogozin, who define “Russia as 
the ‘true Europe’, continuing Europe’s XIX century traditions 
of geopolitical spheres of influence and social conservatism”57, 
while praising Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 
The Kremlin has used the protection of the Christian 
population in Syria and of Christians at large to legitimise 
Russia’s military operation in the eyes of its own population58 
and to bolster its influence among Palestinians59. The protection 
of Christians in the Middle East is indeed a stated goal of the 
Kremlin. Speaking at a meeting with heads of Middle East 
Christian churches together with the Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban in 2019, Putin said: “Although the Middle East 
is the cradle of Christianity, the position of Christians in the 
region is very difficult. […] This is an alarming development 
[…] because our identity is based on the Christian culture”, 
and vowed to “help to bring peace and stability”60. The ROC 
actively supports this narrative. For instance, Archpriest 
Nikolaj Balashov, the vice-chairman of the Patriarchate’s 
Department for External Church Relations pointed out that 
Middle Eastern Christians “have known for centuries that 
no other country would look after their interests in the same 
way Russia would”61. The actual weight of this narrative for 
Russia’s influence in the region is hard to determine and will 
56 M. Engström, “Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign 
Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 35, no. 3, 2014, pp. 356-379 (cit. p. 375).
57 E. Tafuro Ambrosetti (2018), p. 144.
58 L. Issaev and S. Yuriev, The Christian Dimension of  Russia’s Middle East Policy, 
Alsharq Forum, Expert Brief, March 2017.
59 A. Abu Amer, “Russia is using religion to strengthen its influence among 
Palestinians”, MEMO Middle East Monitor, 1 February 2020. 
60 President of  Russia, Meeting with heads of  Middle East Christian churches, 30 
October 2019.
61 “Russia’s “protectorate” over Middle Eastern Christians”, La Stampa, 30 
December 2019.
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be further analysed in Mühlberger’s chapter in this volume; 
from a preliminary assessment, though, this narrative seems to 
resonate well with some prominent members of the Christian 
community. For example, Archbishop Pierbattista Pizzaballa, 
apostolic administrator of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 
in an interview concerning the situation in the Holy Land, 
said: “Europe is irrelevant. […] Today, it is Russian President 
Vladimir Putin who counts in the Middle East62”.
Conclusion
Despite its reliance on hard power measures, Russia started 
investing in soft power and public diplomacy from the early 
2000s through media, language and cultural programmes 
targeting its neighbourhood and beyond. Many experts and 
governments dismiss Russia’s soft power and even accuse the 
Kremlin of carrying out covert influence activities – known as 
“active measures” in Soviet times. This chapter has reviewed 
the main soft power sources of the USSR in order to compare 
them with those of today’s Russia, making the case for a less 
“Western” (i.e. liberal) reading of the concept of soft power. 
A neutral reading of the concept reveals that Russia’s soft 
power results not only from public diplomacy initiatives put 
in place by the Kremlin and individual organisations, but also 
from Russia’s very image on the global stage and the values 
it embraces, which often contrast with the “universal” values 
championed by the West. This is particularly clear in the case 
of Russia’s defence of conservative values, national sovereignty 
and multipolarism against the perceived Western interference 
and normative imperialism.
62 Agenzia S.I.R. (Servizio Informazione Religiosa). Terra Santa: Pizzaballa 
(Patriarcato), “l’Europa è irrilevante, è Putin che conta in Medio Oriente” 
(“Europe is irrelevant. Today, it is Putin who counts in the Middle East”), 2 
December 2019.
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Assessing the effectiveness of soft power policies requires us to 
consider how the targeted audiences react to those policies. Even 
if such an analysis falls beyond the limited scope of this chapter, 
two indications may be drawn from the sections above. First, 
soft power is not universal. Different target audiences react to 
the same soft power instruments differently; for instance, some 
of Russia’s narratives may anger Western liberals but entice and 
inspire anti-American, far-right and far-left audiences in the EU 
and US. Moreover, authoritarian institutions and political values 
could also be attractive to political elites in other like-minded 
states (a sort of “authoritarian allure”63). It is also possible to 
unpack the reasons for the success of a soft power instrument: 
for example, for citizens of many post-Soviet countries learning 
Russian is about status and access to economic opportunities, 
in light of Russia’s economic and political position in the post-
Soviet area; for the diaspora and the “Russian world”, it may 
act as a bond with the homeland; globally, it is rather seen in 
cultural terms and linked to Russia’s literature and music. 
Second, it is time to look at soft power objectively. Russia’s 
soft power specificities and strategies include Moscow’s capacity 
to oppose “universal” values and to pitch itself as an alternative 
to the West, possibly calling into question the EU’s capacity 
to project its own values in the shared neighbourhood – for 
instance, vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership countries. This makes 
it even more important for Western academics and practitioners 
to pay adequate attention to the phenomenon of Russia’s soft 
power rather than simply dismissing it as hard power in disguise. 
63 M.H. Van Herpen, “Putinism’s Authoritarian Allure”, Project Syndacate, 15 
March 2013.
4.  Russian Meddling in Democratic 
     Processes in Europe and the US
Giorgio Comai
In recent years, the issue of Russian meddling and Russian 
interference have prominently entered the public and political 
debate in Europe and North America. Given the extraordinary 
attention the issue of Russian interference has attracted in the 
media, the way it poisoned the public debate, and the real-
world political consequences it caused, there is good reason 
to investigate what happened, and to find ways to prevent its 
recurrence or mitigate its consequences.
This chapter firstly defines “Russian meddling” as a temporally 
delimited phenomenon that grabbed the attention of Western 
mainstream media starting with the US presidential elections in 
November 20161. In this context, and in line with the official 
US investigation that led to the publication of the Mueller 
report, Russian meddling allegedly took place particularly in 
two partly overlapping forms: disinformation on social media 
and timed hack-and-dump operations2. After outlining some of 
1 This definition of  “Russian meddling” considerably restricts the scope of  the 
analysis. As a consequence, this chapter does not specifically discuss Russia’s 
operations in its “near abroad” or cases when Russia was itself  victim of  cyber-
attacks, nor does it deal with meddling stemming from other countries, including 
those such as the US with a long history of  conducting both covert and overt 
operations ranging from interference to subversion.
2A third hotly debated part of  the Mueller investigation was aimed at understanding 
if  the Trump campaign “conspired or coordinated with the Russian government 
in its election interference activities”. Given that the investigation “did not 
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the dynamics of this media narrative, this chapter approaches 
each of its main component parts separately discussing evidence 
about their prevalence and impact on both sides of the Atlantic.
Finally, it provides recommendations on how to deal with 
Russian interference and, in particular, with the vulnerabilities it 
exposed. Indeed, the fact that, as will be seen, Russian meddling 
in democratic processes may not have materialised in Europe 
along the lines suggested by the initial media framing does not 
mean that the vulnerabilities that Russia allegedly exploited 
(or could have exploited) do not exist. On the contrary, these 
are structural vulnerabilities of contemporary democracies, 
newly shaped by recent technological developments, that need 
adequate responses in policy and practice, quite independently 
of Russia’s role in them.
What Does “Russian Meddling” Refer To?
Given the multifaceted nature of Russian interference as 
characterised by the media in recent years, as a starting point it may 
be useful to situate this phenomenon temporally and geographically. 
Analysing the publications of major English-language media 
outlets, it appears that the issue of “Russian meddling”/“Russian 
interference” (the two expressions will be used interchangeably 
hereafter) as a media phenomenon has a clear starting date: the 
US presidential vote in November 2016 that determined Donald 
Trump’s election. In the last decade, there is no significant mention 
of “Russian interference” in leading publications such as The New 
York Times or the Guardian before that day, and only a handful of 
them during the campaign (see Figure 4.1)3.
establish such coordination”, and that there is no direct correspondence with 
events in Europe, this chapter does not deal with this component of  “Russian 
meddling”. US Department of  Justice, Special Counsel R.S. Mueller, “Report on 
the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election”, 
Volume I of  II, III, Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) Washington D.C., 
March 2019. 
3 For a debate on the usefulness of  using basic word frequency in delimiting a 
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Fig. 4.1 - Articles mentioning “Russian interference” 
or “Russian medling” in a month on The New York Times
Note: Based on all articles between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2019
At least in terms of media discourse, there is no apparent 
continuity or proximity between “Russian meddling” as 
understood since late 2016 and other phenomena that, 
broadly speaking, may be perceived to be contiguous. In this 
understanding, “Russian meddling” is specifically related to 
activities aimed at interfering with democratic processes in 
established Western democracies, and is distinctly separate 
from other forms of geopolitical contrast between Russia and 
the West. Before November 2016, in terms of media discourse, 
a specific framing of “Russian meddling” simply did not 
exist. The few mentions that can be found on The New York 
Times since the fall of the Soviet Union and until 2016 almost 
invariably refer to either Georgia or Ukraine, and none of them 
to the US themselves or other established democracies. Even 
case study, see G. Comai, “Quantitative Analysis of  Web Content in Support of  
Qualitative Research. Examples from the Study of  Post-Soviet De Facto States”, 
Studies of  Transition States and Societies, vol. 9, no. 1, 30 June 2017.
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these sporadic mentions mostly refer to generic interference, 
and not specifically to tactics such as disinformation and cyber-
attacks which are at the core of the current narrative, in spite 
of the fact that these same tactics (e.g. cyber-attacks) have been 
used at least for a decade before Donald Trump’s election4.
Some analysts have highlighted how the kind of “Russian 
meddling” that has been object of countless media stories since 
late 2016 is just an updated version of tried and tested Soviet-
time tactics. Disinformation, after all, was a widely discussed 
part of Moscow’s arsenal of “active measures” in Soviet times5. 
In a 1981 US Senate hearing, for example, it was claimed that 
the KGB’s Disinformation Department achieved its goals “by 
fabricating lies, planting forged documents and spreading issue-
obfuscating propaganda in situations where a story-hungry 
and sometimes gullible press would seize upon them”6. Such 
characterisations would not seem to be particularly out of place 
almost forty years later. Taking clues from the literature from 
the time of “developed socialism” and apply it to the Russia 
of “developed Putinism” and the international context of the 
2010s, however, risks obscuring, rather than illuminating, 
the issues being analysed. No matter how tempting it may be 
to cherry-pick quotes from Soviet-time literature, there are 
obvious differences in context, contents, methods, and goals, 
that limit the usefulness of a direct comparison, in particular if 
the goal is to find actionable policy responses.
4 P. Pernik, “The Early Days of  Cyberattacks: The Cases of  Estonia, Georgia 
and Ukraine”, in N. Popescu and S. Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions 
– Russian Cyber Strategies, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
2018.
5 R. Godson and R. Shultz, “Soviet Active Measures: Distinctions and 
Definitions”, Defense Analysis, vol. 1, no. 2, June 1985, pp. 101-10.
6 United States Senate, The Origins, Direction, and Support of  Terrorism: Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of  the Committee on the Judiciary, Ninety-
seventh Congress, First Session, on the Origins, Direction, and Support of  
Terrorism, 24 April 1981, Serial no. J-97-17, Washington D.C., G.P.O; see also 
L.J. Martin, “Disinformation: An Instrumentality in the Propaganda Arsenal”, 
Political Communication, vol. 2, no. 1, January 1982, pp. 47-64.
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Russian Meddling in the United States
In the United States, the controversy around Russian meddling 
led to the establishment of an official “investigation into 
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election”, which 
resulted in the publication of the so-called Mueller report in 
April 20197. The two main pillars of this effort as confirmed 
by the investigation and detailed in the report were adversarial 
influence operations on social media and hacking-and-dumping 
operations against the server of the Democratic National 
Committee and a number of e-mail accounts, including that 
of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman, John Podesta. Finally, 
the investigation inconclusively tried to establish if the Trump 
campaign had actively conspired with the Russian government.
The activities detailed in the Mueller report can be considered 
a blueprint of what is understood by “Russian meddling”. 
The report itself and other materials produced during the 
investigation provide substantial evidence that there were 
indeed active attempts to interfere in the elections, including 
by generating and promoting divisive content on social media, 
and that such efforts originated in Russia, in particular in the 
“Internet Research Agency” in Saint Petersburg8. Similarly, the 
investigation put the blame of the cyber-attacks that victimised 
the Democratic party on hacking units belonging to the Russian 
security apparatus, confirming earlier analyses and adding 
considerable details, including the exact GRU units allegedly 
chiefly responsible for the attacks9.
7  R.S. Mueller (2019).
8 R. DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of  the Internet Research Agency, New 
Knowledge, December 2018.
9 As a rule, in the case of  cyber-attacks “the most useful and detailed attribution 
reports that are publicly available are published by companies, not governments”, 
see T. Rid and B. Buchanan,  “Attributing Cyber Attacks”, Journal of  Strategic 
Studies, vol. 38, no. 1-2, 2 January 2015, p. 25. In this specific case, the Mueller 
report and the indictment of  Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al. (US District 
Court for the District of  Columbia, 13 July 2018) stemming from the Mueller 
investigation summarise available evidence and provide additional information; 
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Hacking the US Democrats
In media reports, the term “hacking” is used to describe a vast 
range of events, making it difficult to understand the gravity 
of a given operation without looking at the details. In some 
cases, attacks do not imply access to the computer system of 
the victim or of their personal communications. For example, 
distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that make a given 
website or web-based service unavailable to the wider public 
may cause issues, but they do not give to perpetrators access to 
the victim’s data. Even in cases of defacement, when a hacking 
group gains access to the social media channels or website of 
a victim often to post derisory contents, attackers may have 
limited access to anything besides information that is already 
public. Other types of attacks may disrupt the computer 
services of victims, e.g. by deleting or encrypting contents (e.g. 
with so-called ransomware), without giving the possibility to 
hackers to exfiltrate contents. The cyber-attacks conducted 
by Russia’s secret services against the Democrats have been 
much more pervasive. Through a combination of targeted 
actions they obtained and maintained extended access to 
their computer systems between April and June 2016; “stolen 
documents included internal strategy documents, fundraising 
data, opposition research, and e-mails from the work inboxes 
of DNC employees”10. On top of that, a number of e-mail 
accounts of people working on the Hillary Clinton campaign 
were also hacked.
they are therefore mentioned here as a key point of  reference. While it is difficult 
to establish the veracity of  all the details in the indictment, the contours of  the 
operations as characterised in the report are compatible with analyses published 
by other actors such as cyber-security companies, as well as journalistic accounts 
published by non-US sources offering a different angle on some aspects of  the 
operation. See e.g. H. Modderkolk, “Dutch agencies provide crucial intel about 
Russia’s interference in US-elections”, De Volkskrant, 25 January 2018.
10 R.S. Mueller (2019), p. 40.
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As the name suggests, hacking-and-dumping operations 
have two phases: first there is the hack, then exfiltrated contents 
are made public online and actively promoted. In the case of 
the US democrats, these materials were first published on a 
purposefully created website, then they were distributed little 
by little by Wikileaks, thus ensuring enhanced and prolonged 
media attention. The hacking and the public distribution of 
internal communications of the campaign of a leading candidate 
to the presidency and of the party that supports it by a foreign 
power is a clear case of interference in a democratic process, 
made all the more egregious by the fact that the victims are the 
United States of America and the perpetrators are, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, the secret services of the Russian Federation. 
Disinformation and Impact of 
Russian Meddling in the US
Given the sheer amount of domestic resources poured into 
political campaigning in US presidential contests, it beggars 
belief that a relatively tiny initiative run from the outskirts of 
Saint Petersburg could swing election results. Indeed, recent 
quantitative analyses seem to confirm that such efforts had most 
likely negligible impact, in spite of the fact that they reached 
millions of US residents11. The possibility that the hacking-and-
dumping operations against the Democrats had some impact 
on voters is more difficult do dismiss completely considering 
how it influenced election coverage on mainstream media at 
a key phase of the campaign. But so did many other events of 
debatable political significance that grabbed a disproportionate 
11 S. McCombie, A.J. Uhlmann, and S. Morrison, “The US 2016 Presidential 
Election & Russia’s Troll Farms”, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 35, no. 
1, 2 January 2020, pp. 95-114; C.A. Bail et al., “Assessing the Russian Internet 
Research Agency’s Impact on the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of  American 
Twitter Users in Late 2017”, Proceedings of  the National Academy of  Sciences, vol. 117, 
no. 1, 7 January 2020, pp. 243-50.
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amount of media attention in the run-up to the vote, first 
among them the scandal on Hillary Clinton’s use of her own 
private e-mail server during her term as Secretary of State12.
The fact that the question on the actual impact of “Russian 
meddling” has no conclusive answer does not remove from 
the understanding that there is solid evidence that Russia did 
interfere in the US presidential elections, as detailed in the 
Mueller report, in intelligence reports, in internal investigations 
conducted by companies with direct knowledge of the matter 
as well as by independent analyses conducted on the hacked 
e-mails.
Expectations of Russian Meddling in Europe
The situation on the other side of the Atlantic is however 
much less clearly defined. In the aftermath of the eventful 
presidential election in the US, both researchers and journalists 
were ready to investigate Russian interference in elections 
scheduled in Europe in 2018 and 2019, including the vote for 
the European Parliament in 2019. In line with events recorded 
in the US, interference was expected to take place in the form 
of disinformation on social media and targeted cyber-attacks.
The Computational Propaganda Project at the University of 
Oxford has published a series of research reports highlighting 
key aspects of the dynamics observable on social media after 
elections across Europe13. Their reports and working papers 
point at worrying trends such as widespread sharing of “junk 
news”, automated or semi-automated accounts trying to shift the 
public conversation, and limited transparency from platforms 
12 Hillary Clinton herself  refers to the e-mail server affair as the thing that 
“first, and most importantly” turned away voters from her in the final stretch 
of  the campaign, see H. Rodham Clinton, What Happened, New York, Simon & 
Schuster, 2017, p. 403.
13 Part of  their research has been collected in an edited book, S.C. Woolley and 
P.N. Howard (eds.), Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political 
Manipulation on Social Media, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018.
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such as Facebook that made it more difficult to investigate 
such dynamics. These phenomena, however, developed quite 
independently from Russia and seem to be predominantly 
domestic. For example, their analysis of Russian involvement 
during the Brexit referendum pointed at the fact that contents 
promoted by Russian accounts “contributed relatively little to the 
overall Brexit conversation” and that Russian news contents were 
not widely shared14. Their analysis of social media during the 
2018 general elections in Sweden found that “only 0.2% content 
of all junk had Russian origin”15. Many of these junk contents 
are produced simply for gaining a profit through the traffic they 
generate, not only in the US but also in European countries such 
as Italy, highlighting the relevance of structural issues with the 
advertisement-based model that dominates the internet16.
The mismatch between expectation of renewed attempts 
by Russia to interfere in elections across Europe and lack of 
the kind of extended meddling efforts seen in the US emerged 
clearly, for example, in the title of an article published by The 
New York Times after the German elections in 2017: “German 
Election Mystery: Why No Russian Meddling?”17. A report 
to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly combines the concern 
about Russian interference that was widespread at the time 
and the perceived need to do something to prevent it, with 
observations that in practice elections in Europe in 2017 and 
2018 took place without any noteworthy interference18.
14 V. Narayanan et al., Russian Involvement and Junk News during Brexit, Data Memo, 
University of  Oxford, Computational propaganda project, 19 December 2017.
15 F. Hedman et al., “News and Political Information Consumption in Sweden: 
Mapping the 2018 Swedish General Election on Twitter”, Data Memo, University 
of  Oxford, Computational propaganda project, 6 September 2018.
16 N. Bruno, “La Fabbrica di Fake News italiane? Si trova a Taurianova, in 
Calabria” (“The Italian Fake News Factory? It is located in Taurianova, in 
Calabria”), SkyTg24, 6 April 2018; C. Silverman and A. Lawrence, “How Teens 
In The Balkans Are Duping Trump Supporters With Fake News”, BuzzFeed 
News, 3 November 2016.
17 M. Schwirtz, “German Election Mystery: Why No Russian Meddling?”, The 
New York Times, 21 September 2017.
18 D. Susan, “Russian Meddling in Elections and Referenda in the Alliance”, 
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A lengthy report published by the Carnegie Endowment on 
Russian election interference in Europe highlights significant 
concerns about Kremlin-linked activities in time of election, and 
details relevant preparatory actions conducted in five countries 
which held national votes in 2017: the Netherlands, France, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden19. The sections on 
“notable interference” that accompany each of these case studies, 
however, do not highlight events that could meaningfully 
impact the vote in either of those cases or that could be credibly 
attributed to Russia. At least in part, this may be due to a media 
and political environment that was more alert to this threat, 
to measures taken by social media companies to hinder the 
most blatant tactics used to spread disinformation, or, finally, 
to the fact that Russia did not engage in such “sweeping and 
systematic” (to use the words of the Mueller report) attempts of 
electoral interference in the first place.
Hacking-and-Dumping Operations in Europe
Recent years have not gone without hacking operations against 
leading political figures and institutions across Europe. The 
event that most closely resembles the pattern seen in the US 
is the publication of emails and documents emerging from the 
accounts of staffers of Emmanuel Macron’s political campaign 
two days before the 2017 presidential election in France. In 
the case of the so-called “#MacronLeaks” there has been no 
consensus on attributing the attack to Russian actors. The head 
of the French cyber-defense agency declared in an interview that 
the hack to Macron’s campaign was “not very technological; 
[...] the attack was so generic and simple that it could have been 
practically anyone”20. In spite of inconclusive evidence, some 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 18 November 2018.
19 T. Maurer and E. Brattberg, Russian Election Interference: Europe’s Counter to Fake News 
and Cyber Attacks, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment, May 2018.
20 “AP Interview: France Warns of  Risk of  War in Cyberspace”, AP NEWS, 1 
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reports still seem to assume it was an operation conducted by 
the Russian secret services21 and some later journalistic reports 
insisted on some technical aspects of the operation that would 
link it to Russia22. The released contents were however of 
limited scope, of little interest, and largely politically irrelevant: 
even if it was a Russian operation, it was an unsuccessful and 
poorly conducted one23.
Across the European Union there have been other hacking 
operations involving politicians, but none completely in line 
with the format observed with the hacking of the US Democrats. 
For example, the computer systems of the German parliament 
were hacked in 2015, most likely by Russia’s secret services; as a 
result of the operation, “the offices of at least 16 parliamentarians 
were combed through, mail boxes copied, hard drives scrutinized 
and internal data, some of it likely classified, misappropriated”24. 
There was concern that the materials taken during that operation 
may be published in time for the 2017 federal elections in 
Germany, but nothing happened. If the administrators of the 
relevant IT systems had not found out, it is entirely possible 
that nobody would have known about it, suggesting this may 
have been more of an espionage rather than electoral interference 
operation (of course, one could lead to the other).
In an unrelated event in December 2018, personal data 
(including emails and personal chats) of hundreds of German 
politicians and public figures were released online. Soon 
after the dump received substantial visibility online, German 
authorities discovered that it had been the result of actions by 
a 20-year-old local resident, with no third parties involved; he 
June 2017.
21 T. Maurer and E. Brattberg (2018).
22 “Les preuves de l’ingérence russe dans la campagne de Macron en 2017”, Le 
Monde.fr, 6 December 2019.
23 S. Soesanto, The Macron Leak That Wasn’t, European Council on Foreign 
Relations (ECFR), 9 May 2017.
24 P. Beuth et al., “Cyberattack on the Bundestag: Merkel and the Fancy Bear”, 
Die Zeit, 12 May 2017.
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had a lot of free time but no exceptional IT skills, and made use 
of poor cyber-security practices of public figures or people close 
to them25. Having personal chats and other materials published 
online was certainly annoying and perhaps embarrassing for 
some of those involved, but the event did not have major 
political consequence, at least in part because journalists took 
a more considerate approach on how they reported about the 
dump considering their largely personal nature26.
The extreme vulnerability of computer systems of political 
parties has been exposed also in Italy. The online platform used 
by the Five star movement has been repeatedly breached in 2017, 
leading to an official investigation by Italy’s data protection 
authority that demonstrated disregard for basic cyber-security 
practices27. The platform was hacked again in 201828. In all 
these known cases, attacks were conducted by individuals with 
no particular political motives, and seemingly did not require 
the kind of advanced intrusion techniques adopted by Russian 
hackers in other occasions. In all of these cases, the attacks were 
made public by the intruders themselves; based on the technical 
details released by Italy’s data protection authority, it seems that 
other actors could have accessed and even modified those data 
without leaving any trace.
Finally, just a few weeks before Italy’s political elections in 
2018, Lega’s social media account, website, and e-mails have 
been repeatedly hacked. A dump with more than 20 giga bytes 
25 “Mass Data Attack on German Politicians”, BBC News, 4 January 2019; K. 
Connolly, “German Cyber-Attack: Man Admits Massive Data Breach, Say 
Police”, The Guardian, 8 January 2019.
26 L. Franceschi-Bicchierai, J. Koebler, and E. Maiberg, “Before Germany’s 
Massive Hack, We Learned What Not to Do With Sensitive Stolen Information”, 
Motherboard, 4 January 2019.
27 Garante privacy, “Provvedimento su Data Breach” (“Provision in Data 
Breach”), garanteprivacy.it, 21 December 2017.
28 R. Nejrotti and F. Coluccini, “‘È un luna park ormai’: abbiamo parlato con 
l’hacker di Rousseau” (“It’s an amusement-park now: we talked to Rousseau’s 
hacker”), Vice (Tech by Motherboard), 7 September 2018.
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of e-mails belonging to Lega staffers was published online29. It 
seems that also in this case no particularly advanced technique 
was required, and no foreign actor was involved. In spite of 
the obvious political significance of the breach, the issue only 
marginally featured in Italian media and never became a major 
news story, indirectly demonstrating the importance of curating 
the distribution of the hacked contents in traditional and social 
media in “successful” hacking-and-dumping operations30.
This brief overview of high-profile cases is far from complete: 
data breaches involving political organisations, institutions, 
and individual public figures happen routinely across the 
continent. What emerges from this summary of data breaches 
involving national-level political organisations in the biggest 
EU countries in recent years is that it hardly takes advanced 
foreign intelligence actors to violate the computer systems of 
major political organisations. At the same time, the fact that 
non-professional hackers with limited resources could penetrate 
such high profile targets suggests that those very same targets, 
and perhaps others, may have been attacked by malicious 
foreign government actors without them even realising it. 
This is however part of a broader problem related to limited 
awareness about cyber-security issues, rather than to Russian 
interference in democratic processes.
Contrasting the Promotion of 
Disinformation in Time of Elections
Both of the issues at the core of the public preoccupation 
with “Russian meddling” reflect legitimate concerns as we 
29 F. Martelli, “Anonymous ha pubblicato online 70.000 email della Lega” 
(“Anonymous has published on the web 70,000 Lega’s emails”) , Vice (Tech by 
Motherboard), 23 February 2018.
30 It is telling that in the Mueller report the dissemination of  hacked materials 
through Wikileaks and other channels receives more attention than the hack 
itself.
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enter the 2020s. Online disinformation and other worrying 
trends emerging from an online landscape dominated by a 
small number of mostly US-based tech companies focused 
on increasing revenue by selling the privacy and attention of 
citizens should be a concern. However, the focus on Russia in 
this context seems to be misplaced. Malicious, targeted, and 
highly political disinformation campaigns on social media 
originating from Russia did happen. They represented however 
what is literally a drop in the ocean of the multi-billion media 
eco-system that revolves around US presidential elections. 
More “traditional” forms of disinformation and disingenuous 
support for far-fetched conspiracy theories have been used by 
Russia in recent years in a number of circumstances. Initiatives 
such as the EU-sponsored “EU vs Disinfo” (euvsdisinfo.eu) 
provide extensive lists of such cases and debunks them. Many 
of the materials denounced by “EU vs Disinfo” may well be 
problematic, but they hardly pose a threat to the integrity of 
electoral processes in Europe.
In other cases, they may not even be as problematic as “EU vs 
Disinfo” and some Western media make it to be. For example, a 
stereotyped understanding that Russian state-sponsored media 
must function as vectors of disinformation has facilitated 
widespread acceptance of the notion that they have actively 
engaged in disinformation related to the Covid-19 pandemic 
in early 2020; as highlighted in a scholarly analysis of the issue, 
such claims are questionable31.
The report released by the Kofi Annan Commission on 
Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age summarises best 
some of “the challenges to electoral integrity arising from 
the global spread of digital technologies and social media 
platforms”, and proposes policy and advocacy actions to deal 
with them32. Other initiatives and reports similarly tackle this 
31 S. Hutchings and V. Tolz, “The Challenge to Counter-Disinformation Analysts: 
A COVID-19 Case Study for Policy Makers and Journalists”, ‘Reframing Russia’ 
research project website, University of  Manchester, 6 April 2020. 
32 Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age, 
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issue without unduly focusing on the Russian component33. 
What emerges from these and other documents is that the 
story around “Russian meddling” has brought to light many 
of the weaknesses enabled by digital platforms and patterns of 
behaviour that have been used by domestic campaigners, foreign 
spoilers, and controversial communication consultancies 
that have made a business of muddying the waters in time of 
electoral campaigns around the globe34.
As a consequence, policy recommendations mentioned in 
these reports do not focus on a specific foreign actor, but rather 
on the eco-system that makes such interference possible. Possible 
responses include basic steps such as updating the current 
legislation on advertising for political campaigns to the digital 
age and introducing substantive transparency requirement 
for social media platforms, as well as broad initiatives to 
promote digital and media literacy among the population 
at large. New regulations should ensure that consultancies 
promoting and implementing deceptive digital campaign 
practices cannot legally sell their services in time of elections. 
The disproportionate power wielded by a small number of 
companies which ultimately owe their loyalty only to their 
shareholders may eventually require bolder action; perhaps 
revised anti-monopoly legislation could be used to limit the 
current extreme concentration of control on the information 
environment that can in itself be considered a form of “external 
interference” into democratic processes.
There is no silver bullet that will completely remove the issue 
of disinformation from electoral processes. There are however 
“Protecting  Electoral Integrity in the Digital Age”, January 2020.
33 See e.g. Chatham House’s Commission on Democracy and Technology, 
https://demtech.chathamhouse.org/; P. Butcher, Disinformation and Democracy: 
The Home Front in the Information War, Brussels, European Policy Centre (EPC), 30 
January 2019; F. Mat and N. Caranti, Dossier: Disinformation, Trento, Osservatorio 
Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT), January 2019.
34 Indeed, as highlighted by the Kofi Annan Commission, the issue of  
disinformation, hate speech, external interference, and domestic manipulation 
are due to be of  particular concern in time of  elections in the global South.
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a number of steps that can be taken to mitigate this risk, no 
matter where it comes from, and there is broad consensus 
among experts on some of them. Updated regulations on 
political advertisements, mandatory transparency requirements 
for social media platforms, and initiatives promoting digital 
and media literacy are the obvious starting points.
Taking Cyber-Security and 
Russian Cyber-Attacks Seriously
As previously discussed, political parties across Europe do 
not seem to take their own cyber-security seriously. The sheer 
amount of private data held by political organisations should 
compel them to take adequate measures to protect their 
computer systems. If, as it is apparently the case at the moment, 
they do not, governments should intervene. Also in this case 
there is a broad consensus in the expert community among 
some of the initiatives that should be taken, well summarised 
by a set of recommendations on election cyber-security released 
in 2019 by ENISA, the EU cyber-security agency. Among 
other things, ENISA suggests that “a legal obligation should 
be put in place requiring political organisations to deploy 
a high level of cyber-security in their systems, processes and 
infrastructures”, and that other initiatives should be aimed at 
“assisting political practitioners in the securing of their data and 
their communications”35.
In the case of cyber-security, however, the focus on Russia 
may not be out of place. As detailed in a gripping, book-length 
journalistic account of Russia’s cyber-operations published in 
2019, Russia has been engaging in disruptive cyber-operations 
well beyond the cases of electoral interference discussed above36. 
35 ENISA, Election Cybersecurity: Challenges and Opportunities, Brussels, ENISA - EU 
Cybersecurity agency, February 2019.
36A. Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of  Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s 
Most Dangerous Hackers, New York, Doubleday, 2019.
Forward to the Past?84
While, for example, China has so far engaged more in cyber-
espionage, Russia has not shied away from the most aggressive 
forms of cyber-attacks, including actions that disrupted 
physical infrastructure (e.g. provoking black-outs in Ukraine) 
as well the irresponsible distribution of malaware that in one 
instance in 2017 stopped hundreds of thousands of computers 
across the globe and deleted data, causing billion of dollars of 
damages and disrupting services in a wide range of contexts, 
from airports to hospitals37. In February 2018, a number of 
Western governments, including the US and the UK, officially 
attributed the attack to Russia’s military38.
Attribution of cyber-attacks is notoriously difficult, and 
digital forensic analyses are often interpreted in context, 
including aspects such the capacity, resources, and motivation 
of potential attackers39. This is why attribution is often 
communicated with qualifiers such as “with a moderate-to-high 
degree of confidence”. Governments have traditionally been 
reluctant to attribute an attack to a specific state actor both 
because of the lack of certainty the characterises attribution, 
and because official attribution often calls for some sort of 
official reaction, such as sanctions and retaliation, that may be 
politically or strategically inconvenient. Given that the option 
of retaliation is however always on the table, cyber-attacks can 
escalate quickly in spite of uncertain attribution.
Admittedly, uncertainty of attribution is not exclusive 
to cyber-attacks, and often applies, for example, to acts of 
terrorism. For better or worse, states have made momentous 
decisions of war and peace based on inconclusive evidence on 
37A. Greenberg, “The Untold Story of  NotPetya, the Most Devastating 
Cyberattack in History”, Wired, 22 August 2018.
38 UK National Cyber Security Centre, Russian Military “Almost Certainly” 
Responsible for Destructive 2017 Cyber Attack, ncsc.gov.uk, 14 February 2018.
39 For a detailed breakdown of  the main elements that contribute to determine 
attribution in the context of  cyber-attacks, see T. Rid and B. Buchanan, 
“Attributing Cyber Attacks”, Journal of  Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 1-2, 2 January 
2015, pp. 4-37.
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attribution for a long time40. However, the structural complexity 
of attributing cyber-operations and the limited understanding 
of many of these issues by government officials and the wider 
public makes it particularly important that all involved take a 
cautionary approach.
Instruments for deterrence are needed, and initiatives such 
as the European Union cyber diplomacy toolbox should receive 
more attention41. Establishing active dialogue with Russia 
may be difficult as long as the Kremlin insists in denying any 
responsibility in such events, but all efforts should be taken to 
ensure there are open communication channels to reduce the 
risk of escalation.
Conclusion
A media narrative that exaggerated the impact of Russia’s efforts 
at the time of the 2016 US presidential elections has effectively 
contributed to its success: as argued by Stephen McCombie, 
Allon J. Uhlmann, and Sarah Morrison, “it is precisely because 
it is commonly assumed that Russia engaged in an effective 
information campaign to sway the election results, that the 
post-election destabilising effects of the Russian campaign 
are made possible”42. In spite of the fact that even this most 
blatant attempt at interfering in an election has most likely 
had negligible direct impact on the outcome of the vote, this 
40 “The assassination of  Archduke Franz Ferdinand of  Austria on 28 June 1914 
offered a similar conundrum: who was Gavrilo Princip, the assassin? And was he 
an agent of  the Serbian state?”, Ibid., p. 1.
41 “The Path to Digital Peace Requires Deterrence”, EU Policy Blog, 20 May 
2019; Council of  the EU, “Cyber Attacks: EU Ready to Respond with a Range 
of  Measures, Including Sanctions”, consilium.europa.eu, 19 June 2017; P. Ivan, 
Responding to Cyberattacks: Prospects for the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, Brussels, 
European Policy Center, 18 March 2019; E. Moret and P. Pawlak, The EU Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox: Towards a Cyber Sanctions Regime?, Paris, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017.
42 S. McCombie, A.J. Uhlmann, and S. Morrison (2020).
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narrative gave to Russia’s “implausible deniability” the flavour 
of a victory: the narrative of “Russian meddling” poisoned and 
polarised political debates in the US long after 2016 and led 
more people to question the integrity of the vote43.
The fact that the direct impact of Russian interference in 
the US in 2016 has been limited and that a US-style scenario 
did not repeat itself on European soil does not mean, however, 
that the vulnerabilities to democratic processes exposed by the 
scandals related to “Russian meddling” do not exist. They do, 
but focusing exclusively on the “Russian” component may 
distract from a more convincing definition of the problem to be 
addressed and hinder an adequate debate on policy responses. 
Ironically, they also distract from far more problematic aspects 
of Russia’s foreign intervention repertoire. As Ivan Krastev put 
it, “getting over our Putin paranoia will be a welcome first step 
at eroding Russia’s destabilizing international influence”44.
Evidence-based analyses and cold blood are needed to 
approach the important questions brought to light by “Russian 
meddling”: an information environment and digital space 
where disinformation thrives, limited understanding and 
awareness about the wide-ranging implications of vulnerable 
computer systems, and a Russian Federation that is increasingly 
confrontational at the international level and has demonstrated 
to be willing to use a wide range of non-conventional approaches 
to increase its clout.
43 As of  January 2020, the news event category on the website of  The New York 
Times, “Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election - Complete coverage 
of  Russia’s campaign to disrupt the 2016 presidential election” includes more 
than two thousand articles; the fact that new contents are added to this category 
on an almost daily basis more than three years after Trump’s election testifies 
the enduring prominence of  this debate in American media and the extent 
to which this conversation is inextricably related with the figure of  Donald 
Trump and its election in 2016. See https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/
russian-election-hacking.
44 I. Krastev, “America’s Dangerous ‘Putin Panic’”, The New York Times, 8 August 
2016.
5.  Arab Public Opinion: The View 
     on Russia’s Foreign Policy
Wolfgang Mühlberger
In October 2019, when President Putin visited the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), the de facto ruler of the country, Mohammed 
bin Zayed, greeted his visitor with a remarkable comment: 
“I consider Russia my second home”1. If an Arab ruler from 
the Gulf allows himself to make such an official comment, 
it goes far beyond a standard statement of friendship in line 
with diplomatic protocol. In particular, for a country that is 
to a large extent part of the Western sphere of influence, it 
may even seem rather strange. Indeed, in the fields of security 
policy, arms purchases, hydrocarbon flows, nuclear energy and 
counterterrorism cooperation, strong and mutually binding ties 
between the Arab Gulf states and Western countries have been 
maintained since the 1970s, with the latter often operating 
as external security providers2. In the Near East and North 
Africa, following the Camp David agreement (1979), Jordan 
and Egypt have also become pivotal Arab allies of the West, 
even allowing to further extricate Cairo from Russia’s Soviet 
embrace, still looming large at the time.
1 “UAE and Russia sign major deals in energy and aviation”, The National, 15 
October 2019.
2 On the other hand, the kingdom of  Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have 
started to establish their own nascent arms industries, operate in regional military 
theatres (Yemen, Syria and Libya) on their own device, often via proxies, and 
pursue an increasingly autonomous foreign policy. F. Gaub and Z. Stanley-
Lockman, “Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies”, EU ISS, 
Chaillot paper no. 141, March 2017.
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So, what are the motivations for such a warm-hearted 
reception, which also aims to have a signalling effect on various 
audiences, including domestic ones? Is the UAE, like several 
other regional players, indicating its fundamental dissatisfaction 
with the handling of regional affairs by the United States, be it 
over the Iranian nuclear question under President Obama, the 
lack of military posture by the incumbent president in response 
to Iranian asymmetric warfare in the Persian Gulf or the 
choice of non-interference in Syria’s civil war? Is it a pragmatic 
rapprochement with a re-emerging regional player that also has 
good relations with Tehran and hence could play a mediating 
role? Could there even be an element of admiration for an 
authoritarian, self-confident non-Western leader? 
In practice, there is a convergence of interests on a number 
of topics between Russia on the one hand, and Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE on the other. First and foremost among 
them is the question of ‘political Islam’ in its majoritarian and 
republican manifestation; second, and closely related to the first, 
is a shared conception of how to handle the Libyan conflict; 
and third, there is a shared wish to counterbalance any single 
external hegemon. Nevertheless, if media coverage of these 
comments is hinting at a certain Russophile attitude and shared 
interests at the elite level, public opinion polls in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region suggest a mixed picture 
when it comes to perceptions of Russia. As far as finding a job 
or the desire for an alternative place to live is concerned, Russia 
is by no means a top-ranking country3. Admiration for Putin’s 
political leadership is also limited, mostly restrained by the 
Kremlin’s military action in Syria4. Measuring Russia’s or Putin’s 
3 In a poll conducted in 2011, Russia ranked second to last with 4%, just before 
Pakistan. See: S. Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, New York, Basic Books, 
2013, p. 180.
4 On the official level, the “defeat” in Syria has been acknowledged though. See 
G. Steinberg, Regionalmacht Vereinigte Arabische Emirate: Abu Dhabi tritt aus dem 
Schatten Saudi-Arabiens (Regional power United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi emerges 
from the shadow of  Saudi Arabia), Siftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-Studie 
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popularity throughout the region effectively shows a nuanced 
picture, with strong intra-regional and synchronic variations, as 
well as cleavages between public opinion and elite attitudes.
In order to understand public and elite perceptions of 
Russia in the MENA region, a first step will be to identify the 
basic features, as far as empirically discernible, of Arab public 
opinion5. Basically, three major determinants can be discerned. 
Firstly, non-Arab foreign policy behaviour towards policy issues 
considered as ‘salient’ explains Arab attitudes6. In view of the 
rise of intra-Arab interventions as a result of the 2011 upheavals, 
however, this feature should probably be qualified as being 
complemented by an additional ‘Arab’ dimension. Second, as 
a regional specificity, both a national and transnational (“pan-
Arab”) dimension can be observed in Arab public opinion7. The 
transnational component is essential in order to explain cross-
regional identifications with those issues considered as salient, 
such as the Palestine question, Iraq or lately Syria. Third, the 
development and polarisation of Arab mass media has led to an 
increased autonomy of public opinion and a reduced capacity 
of state-controlled media to impose their narrative and thereby 
influence the formation of public opinion8. However, the 
massive recent use of bots by state actors to influence opinions 
on social media also needs to be taken into account to paint 
a more complete picture9. Additionally, as a general trend, 
2, February 2020.
5 The focus of  this chapter is on the Arab world. Some of  the polling data 
quoted below also refer to Israel and Turkey though.
6 P. Furia, A. Russel, and E. Lucas, “Determinants of  Arab Public Opinion on 
Foreign Relations”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 50, 2006, pp. 585-605.
7 M. El-Oifi, “L’opinion publique arabe entre logiques étatiques et solidarités 
transnationales”, Raisons politiques, vol. 19, August-September 2005, pp. 45-62.
8 M. Lynch, “Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere”, Politics 
and Society, vol. 31, no. 1, March 2003, pp. 55-91; M. El-Oifi, “Les opinions 
publiques arabes comme enjeu des relations internationals”, Maghreb-Machrek, 
no. 204, summer, 2010, pp. 107-130. 
9 M.O. Jones, “The Gulf  Information War| Propaganda, Fake News, and Fake 
Trends: The Weaponization of  Twitter Bots in the Gulf  Crisis”, International 
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the availability of polling data has considerably increased, in 
particular since the uptick in regional polling following the 
mass-terrorist attacks on US soil in the early 2000s10. Despite 
these characteristics, technical questions about data reliability 
remain, while the relevance of measuring public opinion for the 
foreign policy formulation of – authoritarian – Arab regimes 
remains equally open to debate. 
But how does Russia fit into this picture? With Russia’s foreign 
policy driven by geostrategic considerations and mercantilist 
reflexes, how is this Machiavellian approach perceived in 
MENA? This chapter, backed by relevant surveys, argues that 
a tactical convergence of interest and “autocratic reciprocity” 
seem to shape elite attitudes, creating mixed perceptions at the 
public opinion level.
Putin’s Path Dependence: 
Machiavellian Foreign Policy 
Russia’s approach to international affairs could be summarised 
as “Make Russia Great Again” via geopolitical manoeuvres 
underpinned by the search for new markets, with products 
and commodities that not only enjoy a competitive advantage 
but also tend to strengthen the state due to the companies’ 
ownership structures. Following a shaky domestic stabilisation 
in the 1990s, President Yeltsin eventually nominated then 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as his successor. The by now 
longtime Russian leader felt compelled to enter the geopolitical 
game beyond the country’s adjacent rimlands (Eastern Europe 
and Southern Caucasus), increasingly challenging US and 
“Western” hegemony in permissive settings, such as hotspots in 
a conflict-ridden Middle East.
Journal of  Communication, vol. 13, 2019, pp. 1389-1415.
10 J.J. Gengler et al., “Why do you ask?’ The Nature and Impacts of  Attitudes 
towards Public Opinion Surveys in the Arab World”, British Journal of  Political 
Science, 25 October 2019, pp. 1-22; S. Telhami (2013), p. 10.
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More importantly, even though Russia’s evolving role and 
policies in the region are born out of a fundamental rivalry 
with the US over global status, they do not translate into direct 
confrontations on the ground. In this sense, they represent a 
continuation of the Cold War period, with roughly defined 
zones of influence – the most important difference being the 
lack of ideology on the Russian side, which is why Russia’s 
discourse and self-representation has required post-Soviet and 
conflict-related adaptation11. Nevertheless, Russia also tries to 
undermine established US-Arab relations, and, more generally, 
to enter NATO’s area of Southern partnerships, for instance 
by training Haftar’s Libyan forces in Jordan with Russian 
equipment12, by seeking close ties with Egypt over its role in 
Libya, and by offering and selling military equipment to US 
allies, including Arab Gulf countries and Turkey.
A central tenet of Putin’s raison d’état is domestic regime 
continuity, a goal that requires both reshaping the national 
narrative and leveraging disarray in MENA for scoring foreign 
policy points. This strategic approach includes the tactics of 
using available entry points13, embracing balance of power 
thinking as well as the drive to improve Russia’s standing.
Concerning values, the traditional argument of “protecting 
Orthodox Christianity” has been revived under Putin14, leaving 
open the question of how Russia’s role is perceived in Middle 
Eastern conflict zones where Christians are disproportionately 
affected (Iraq, Syria). For instance, Putin’s actions in Syria could 
11 A. Miskimmon and B. O’Loughlin, “Russia’s Narratives of  Global Order: 
Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World”, Politics and Governance, vol. 5, no. 
3, 2017, pp. 111-120; D. Dajani et al., “Differentiated visibilities: RT Arabic’s 
narration of  Russia’s role in the Syrian war”, Media, War & Conflict, 12 December 
2019, pp. 1-22.
12 Cf. Marsad Libya https://www.marsad.ly/en/2019/05/23/jordan-arming- 
libyas-haftar-armored-vehicles-weapons/
13 W. Mühlberger and M. Siddi, In from the cold: Russia’s agenda in the Middle East and 
implications for the EU, EuroMeSCo Policy Brief  no. 91, 2019.
14 L. Issaev and S. Yuriev (2017) The Christian Dimension of  Russia’s Middle 
East Policy, Expert Brief, Alsharq Forum, March 2017.
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to a certain extent explain positive attitudes towards him in 
Lebanon15.
Also, compared to the pragmatism often attributed to 
China16, which equally seeks economic opportunities in the 
MENA region (mostly via the Belt and Road Initiative - BRI), 
Russia plays a strongly proactive role of an engaged actor. In 
terms of public opinion, this seems to incur a certain cost, with 
popularity levels varying according to Russia’s role, whereas 
China is generally heading the polls in terms of popularity17 .
Russia’s evolving role in the Middle East has been marked not 
only by personal choices, in particular Putin’s and Primakov’s, 
but also by the strategic exploitation of circumstances, as 
the recent actions in Libya and Syria attest. In parallel, the 
increasingly authoritarian governance under Putin has fostered 
a truly Machiavellian foreign policy, idiosyncratically mingling 
regime continuity, state-building, external deterrence and 
national pride.
Deliberate and coerced mercantilism:  
Export drive and sanctions-induced 
import restrictions
Russian geopolitics is underpinned by domestic goals that 
include countering so-called colour-revolutions18. At the same 
time, Russia is being coerced into looking for new economic 
opportunities due to massive Western sanctions following 
the 2014 annexation of Crimea. In the MENA context, an 
15 According to a poll conducted in 2019 for the BBC by the Arab Barometer, 
Putin’s popularity in Lebanon is on an equal footing with Erdogan, possibly due 
to a positive reputation among some confessional groups. See: The Big BBC 
News Arabic Survey, 24 June 2019.
16 H. Stålhane Hiim and S. Stenslie, “China’s Realism in the Middle East”, Survival, 
vol. 61, no. 6, 2019, pp. 153-166.
17 J. Friedrichs, “Explaining China’s popularity in the Middle East and Africa”, 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 9, pp.  1634-1654.
18 A. Choumiline, La diplomatie russe au Moyen-Orient: retour à la géopolitique, Notes 
de l’Ifri/Russie.Nei.Visions no.93, IFRI, May 2016, p. 9.
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associated discourse has been developed that presents Moscow’s 
foreign policy as being driven by an anti-regime change, pro-
sovereignty and non-interference agenda, basically aimed at 
denying access to the US and other players with a stake in 
regional affairs. The levers used by the Kremlin to enact these 
policies are based on traditional diplomacy, bolstered by the 
use of economic means, which, on the contrary, serve the goal 
of state and regime consolidation using strategically relevant 
goods. 
These trends are epitomised by the hydrocarbon sector, which 
accounts for a considerable part of Russia’s GDP, state budget 
and foreign currency revenues due to its high levels of exports. 
Furthermore, these figures highlight the country’s dependence 
on commodity price levels for ensuring stable incomes. For 
this reason, quantitative arrangements, and disputes, with 
global energy players such as Saudi Arabia19 and Qatar have 
become an important element of Moscow’s foreign policy mix. 
Furthermore, the strong element of direct state-control over the 
energy sector transforms it, like it or not, into a foreign policy 
tool. Another key sector, whose role has been expanding, is the 
arms production and export industry20.
Against this background, instead of pushing for diversification, 
the national economy is virtually trapped in a rentier state 
model, fashioned around its most relevant (hydrocarbons) and 
most innovative (arms) sectors, both under strong state tutelage. 
A third sector of strategic relevance for Russia’s foreign policy is 
agriculture, where it seeks to penetrate formerly closed markets 
for its export commodity (most recently Saudi Arabia). This set 
of goods and commodities is complemented by nuclear energy 
cooperation in the civilian realm and the supply of satellite 
technology. The elements of comparative advantage compared 
to other economies, as well as the state’s grip on these strategic 
19 “Russia-Saudi Arabia rapprochement reshapes more than the oil market”, 
Financial Times, 30 October 2018.
20 A. Borshchevskaya, The tactical side of  Russia’s arms sales to the Middle East, 
Jamestown Foundation, December 2017.
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economic sectors, explains the dominant role given to these 
goods and commodities in its foreign policy with the MENA 
region, transforming them into Machiavellian foreign policy 
instruments.
Russian geostrategy: Endeavour and limitations
In 2013, Joseph Nye criticised Russia for employing a strategy 
of state-driven soft power, instead of acting according to his 
own understanding of a civil society-based version of soft 
power, arguing that the version he considers smarter makes a 
powerful country appear less frightening21. However, he might 
have missed the point that Russia actually aims to appear 
frightening to the outside world, and that events such as the 
Sochi Olympics are linked to status seeking rather than being 
part of soft power projection22. Effectively, as Miskimmon 
argues, Russia’s “strategic”, i.e. foreign policy, narrative primarily 
seeks prestige and authority23. Its militarised foreign policy, 
recently culminating in the annexation of Crimea (2014) and 
intervention in Syria (2015) also point to hard power assertion 
in international affairs where deemed strategically useful, either 
as a means of deterrence or as forward-looking posture.
Yet, this approach also entails a prestige-linked component 
as it allows Russia to get a seat at the negotiation table, thereby 
raising its diplomatic profile24. However, some scholars argue 
that at the heart of this approach is not genuine conflict 
resolution but rather the freezing of conflicts25, as numerous 
festering conflicts on the fringes of the former Soviet Union 
21 J.S. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, 
29 April 2013.
22 On the topic of  Russia’s soft power, see chapter 3 by E. Tafuro Ambrosetti in 
this volume. 
23 A. Miskimmon and B. O’Loughlin (2017).
24 M.A. Suchkov, “How Moscow is positioning itself  as broker amid Mideast 
tensions”, Al-Monitor, 7 January 2020.
25 I. Fraihat and L. Issaev, “Russia Doesn’t Solve Conflicts, It Silences Them”, 
Foreign Policy, 12 June 2018.
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indicate. This might also explain China’s higher approval ratings 
in numerous polls, as an emerging global player that exercises 
strategic restraint in MENA in contrast to Russia’s quite activist 
stance in the region. The only pragmatic component is its 
reluctance, or lack of capability, to enter into new alliances – 
or to replace the US as an external security provider beyond 
the Syrian theatre of operations. In line with these limitations, 
the preferred modus vivendi is to enter partnerships, defined by 
a range of formal cooperation agreements and memoranda of 
understanding on various subjects.
Regional Perceptions in MENA: 
From the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation
During the Soviet era, Russia shared no physical border with 
any of the Arab countries, yet the ministers of foreign affairs 
nurtured close ties with a range of governments because of 
the ideological competition with the capitalist West. Only five 
years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the 
scholar Rashid Khalidi pointed to a deterioration of previously 
close ties with a list of countries, leaving only Syria, Iraq and 
Algeria in the close orbit of the Kremlin’s foreign policy26. These 
developments also led to the perception that the Soviet Union 
was a less capable superpower than the US, although “[…] Arab 
public opinion pays attention to the position adopted by the 
Soviet Union on certain critical problems (emphasis added)”27.
At the beginning of the first decade following the demise of 
the USSR, Russia’s regional influence reached a historic low. 
Middle Eastern relations, including with Turkey and Iran, only 
received a new impetus when the former head of the Institute of 
Oriental Studies Primakov was promoted to minister of foreign 
26 R. Khalidi, “Arab Views of  the Soviet Role in the Middle East”, The Middle East 
Journal, vol. 39, no. 4, autumn, 1985, p. 719.
27 Ibid, p. 726.
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affairs in 199628. He later became foreign policy advisor to 
Putin during his first presidency, even though Middle Eastern 
foreign policy then took a more ideological, anti-Western turn 
through the nurturing of close relationships with countries 
and non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran. During 
the same period, Russia sought to build relations across the 
region, including with Arab US allies in the Persian Gulf – 
while Obama’s apparent retreat from pro-active engagement 
in Middle Eastern affairs was portrayed by Putin as a Russian 
victory29. As Saudi Arabia also grew increasingly uncomfortable 
about US policies towards Iraq, the Kingdom calculated that 
Russia, through its relationship with Iran, could equally play 
the role of counterbalancing Tehran30. From this perspective, 
circumstances and the geopolitical choices of other external 
players in the region created an environment conducive to 
increased, and welcome, Russian action. The eruption of the 
Arab Spring, however, initially threatened Russia’s advances 
towards the region’s centres of power, especially when the 
uprisings reached Syria and transformed into an armed 
insurgency against its closely allied Assad regime. Seemingly 
on the advice of the former head of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service Mikhail Fradkin31, the Syrian armed forces devised a 
plan to suppress the insurgency. However, due to substantial 
levels of foreign support and financing of the armed, jihadist 
wing of the rebellion32, Russia eventually had to come to the 
rescue of Damascus, preventing its collapse in autumn 2015 
with a massive military intervention.
28 T. Nizameddin, Trent’anni di rivoluzioni ed evoluzioni: la Russia e il Medio Oriente 
(Thirty years of  revolutions and evolutions: Russia and the Middle East), Milan, 
Mondadori-ISPI, 2017. 
29 Ibid, pp. 167-169.
30 Ibid, p. 170.
31 Ibid, p. 172.
32 KSA, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, initially the UAE, and Turkey have been the 
most important foreign sponsors of  Syria’s armed insurrection against the Assad 
regime. See: C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle 
East, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2016, pp. 105-146.
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Nevertheless, authors such as Alexey Vasiliev emphasise two 
central factors in Russia’s foreign policy in the MENA region. 
First, Moscow’s exit strategy in Syria will be a challenge, and 
secondly, Russia’s weak economy does not allow a regional 
hegemonic power projection on the same scale as that of the 
US. Nevertheless, Vasiliev welcomes the shift away from the 
long-standing normative foreign policy prescription towards 
greater consideration of national interests since Putin came to 
power. Conversely, the author attributes the relative failure of 
Western influence in the region to its quasi-messianic behaviour 
connected with the notions of democratisation33.
The Middle Eastern view
The external relations of Middle Eastern states with Russia as 
well as Arab public opinion about Russia’s role in regional affairs 
can be assessed from different angles. At the end of 2019, the 
Egyptian news website Ahram published a piece titled 2019: The 
Russians are coming back34, offering a comprehensive regional 
overview of Russian foreign policy. Partially based on interviews 
with (former) Arab and European, Cairo-based diplomats, 
it also reflects elite views on this question. Underlining that 
“Russia has spared no efforts to remind [Arab] rulers across the 
region that when push came to shove during the 2011 Arab 
Spring the US turned its back on its closest regional allies”, 
as well as highlighting Russia’s opposition to the ‘Arab Spring 
uprisings, the article alludes to Moscow’s narrative that Russia 
not only represents a more reliable partner but also opposes 
revolutionary changes to the political systems with uncertain 
outcomes.
The attitudes expressed in Ahram’s article tie in well with 
the findings of one of the most experienced pollsters in the 
Arab world, Shibley Telhami. In The World through Arab Eyes 
33 See A. Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East Policy: From Lenin to Putin, Oxon, Routledge, 
2018.
34 “The Russians are coming back”, Ahram online, December 2019.
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(2013) he identifies “Arab resentment against US dominance, 
in particular since the end of Soviet Union”35, fuelled by specific 
US foreign policy positions on salient issues such as Palestine, 
Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, the Arab world at large is in search 
for a global counterweight to the US and considers Russia and 
China as candidates for this role. This longing for a balancing 
power is nonetheless qualified by perceptions of external players 
in terms of their dominance and threat assessments. In a series 
of polls conducted between 2005 and 2011, Russia’s ratings 
as “Preferred World Power” incrementally rose from only 5% 
in 2005 to 12% in 2011, thus ranking third36. Arab concerns 
about unchecked US power seem to have been driving these 
polling results, probably more than proactive Russian foreign 
policy activities in the region.
In this context of widespread regional acceptance of Russia as 
an emerging regional player, Mark Katz highlights the Russian 
ability to be on good terms with virtually every state of the 
region and to foster close relationships with a series of non-
state actors, even though a range of these actors are locked in 
mutual conflict. Nevertheless, there are potential limitations to 
this successful balancing act, especially if a military escalation 
should occur in the Persian Gulf area37.
Other authors stress the Arab need for external security 
providers38 paired with a trend to view the US as a (rather) 
disruptive force in regional affairs, whereas Russia is increasingly 
perceived by a range of Arab governments as a force of stability, 
i.e. a stabilising force, favouring the status quo of political 
systems. In an environment not especially inclined towards 
protecting human rights or embracing reform agendas, Russia 
35 S. Telhami (2013), p. 2.
36 Ibid., pp. 170-175.
37 See M. Katz, “What Do They See in Him? How the Middle East views Putin 
and Russia”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 2193, May 2018, pp. 2-4.
38 S. Al-Makahleh, “The Arab View of  Russia’s Role in the MENA: Changing 
Arab Perceptions of  Russia, and the Implications for US Policy”, in T. Karasik 
and S. Blank (eds.) Russia in the Middle East, Jamestown Foundation, 2018.
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must be appealing, at least as an optional or complementary 
external partner. Nonetheless, scepticism prevails in certain 
quarters, in particular with regards to Russian claims to uphold 
the principle of non-interference, despite actions to the opposite 
effect in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk) and Syria.
Convergence of Interest and Authoritarian 
Infatuation: Attitudes Towards Russia 
Similarly to Europe, where populist and far-right political 
movements openly profess their approval of Putin’s 
authoritarian leadership, in the Arab world the consistently 
autocratic potentates have no fear of contact with Putin, nor 
do they hide their admiration for his actions39. Even in the 
context of the Syrian conflict, which is often portrayed as an 
attack against the Sunni majority of the population, Putin’s will 
to power and reliability (towards Assad) are even emphasised. 
Such attitudes are both an expression of wishful thinking 
and a consequence of the latently felt retreat of the US as the 
dominant power in the region. Hence a certain ‘authoritarian 
infatuation’ and (hard) geopolitical considerations equally play 
a role, explaining a limited but open turn towards the potential 
Russian counterweight.
Polling in the MENA region: 
Challenges remain, data increases
Before polling in the Arab world took off in a more systematic 
way, the term “Arab street”40 tried to capture the mood of a 
polity whose views could not be assessed in a reliable manner. 
39 In “Why Russia is back in the Middle East”, Gulf  News, January 2019, Putin 
is accredited with “the credentials as a decisive and effective leader who delivers 
what he set out to achieve”.
40 A. Bayat, La “rue Arabe” au-delà de l’imaginaire occidental, Centre Tricontinental – 
CETRI, 15 December 2009.
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However, when the regional upheaval started in late 2010 
and took shape over 2011, the year of the “Arab revolutions”, 
the term came under growing scrutiny by its own primary 
proponents, as a press review indicated41. An earlier change 
concerning the practice of polling occurred in 2001, as 9/11 
triggered an increased demand for improved understanding 
of popular views throughout the Arab world42. Even though 
questions around the quality and reliability of the collected data 
remain43, an increasing amount of information on Arab public 
opinion has become available, including annual iterations of 
surveys with identical or similar sets of questions, allowing 
developments and trends in people’s opinions to be discerned. 
This also applies to views regarding Russian foreign policy44.
Perceptions of Russia through polls: 
Public opinion on Russia45
The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (based 
in Qatar and Washington) has been publishing the Arab 
Opinion Index (Al-Muashir al-Arabiy) since 2011. In 201546, 
respondents were asked to rate the role of “foreign policies of 
big and international states in the Arab region” along a positive-
negative scheme. Russia came out fourth in the ranking (led by 
Turkey, China and France), with 54% viewing Russia as having 
41 T. Guaaybess, “L’opinion publique et la rue arabes au prismes de la presse 
française, britannique et américaine”, Revue française des sciences de l’information et de 
la communication, no. 11, 2017.
42 P. Furia, A. Russel, and E. Lucas (2006), p. 585.
43 J.J. Gengler (2019).
44 The increased sophistication in polling in MENA also allows to break down 
results in relation to specific samples, be they national polls or age groups. What 
remains challenging is a separate assessment of  public opinion and elite attitudes.
45 For reasons of  space limitations the Arab Barometer (https://www.
arabbarometer.org) and the annual Arab Youth Survey (by Burson-Marsteller), 
are both excluded from this overview.
46 The Arabic version of  the 2015 report can be accessed here: https://www.
dohainstitute.org/ar/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/document_1541AAF4.
pdf
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a negative or somewhat negative role and 34% a positive or 
somewhat positive role. According to the pollsters, compared 
to the previous year (2014) this corresponds to a significant 
increase in negative perceptions (from 42%) and a slight decrease 
in positive perceptions (from 37%). In a regional country 
breakdown (interestingly including neither Libya nor Qatar), 
national public opinion data specifically on Russian foreign 
policy is also provided. On average, only a third of respondents 
(34%) attribute a positive role to Russia, whereas a substantial 
proportion (54%) of them see Russia as acting in a negative 
manner. Countries with a more positive view include Kuwait 
(63%), Iraq (49%) and Lebanon (43%), whereas negative 
perceptions are predominant in most countries, headed by 
Saudi Arabia (77%), Jordan (74%) and Algeria (69%).
Polling by Zogby Research Services (based in Washington) 
also tries to capture the foreign policy dimension of the MENA 
region, including Arab perceptions regarding Russia’s role in 
the region. For instance in 2019, Looking to the next decade47, 
a sort of forecasting poll, covers opinions on Russia and asked 
respondents to assess the future role of Russia in Syria, to 
identify the most dependable ally and to define priorities for the 
decade ahead. In the context of the Syrian war, the importance 
of external players Russia and Iran will remain, including the 
possibility of tensions between the two over their roles in future 
Syria. Asked to respond to the question “What in your opinion 
will be the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria?”, 
49% of Lebanese think that “Russia and Iran will remain in 
Syria and together exert influence over the Assad government”, 
whereas only 6% in the UAE consider this outcome as realistic. 
By contrast, 61% in the UAE think that “Russia and Iran will 
remain in Syria, but the Assad government will be in control 
over decisions that affect the future of the country”, whereas 
only 19% of Lebanese endorse such a scenario, suggesting 
47 Looking to the Next Decade: Arab, Turkish & Iranian Opinion, Zogby Research 
Services, November 2019.
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strongly diverging views across the region on the future role of 
external actors in a post-conflict Syria48. Answering to “As you 
look to the next decade, which of the following countries do 
you believe would be the most dependable partners for your 
country?”, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are quoting Russia 
as their second most important future ally, preceded by Saudi 
Arabia and the US, respectively. Iraq and Turkey both rank 
Russia fourth, while in the UAE Russia only ranks fifth (cf. 
p23). In the section on priorities for the next decade, in general 
(mean value), respondents seem to care least about improving 
relations with the South (Africa) or the East, including Russia.
Previously, in 2017, Zogby conducted49 a trans-regional poll 
(9 countries, including Turkey and Iran) assessing “Attitudes in 
the Middle East towards foreign involvement”50. Responding 
to “How important is it that your country have good relations 
with Russia?”, Jordan and the UAE saw significant upticks 
in positive responses (“Important”), jumping from 26% to 
65% and from 41% to 93%, respectively. Egypt and Lebanon 
also indicate strong support, with 86% and 70%, confirming 
the importance of cordial relations with Russia. Among the 
surveyed countries, the lowest levels of support can be found in 
Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), still ranging at 
almost two-thirds (58% and 53%). A second question relates 
to roles of external actors in Syria (“Which countries do you 
believe are playing a positive/negative role?). While in KSA 
72% see  Russia as playing a negative role, similar opinions can 
be found in Egypt, Jordan and the UAE (61%, 58% and 57%), 
with Lebanon having the least negative view of Russia in Syria, 
with only 38%.
In his survey conducted in late 2011, Shibley Telhami found 
that only 12% of respondents chose Russia in response to 
the question “In a world where there is only one superpower, 
which of the following countries would you prefer to be 
48 Ibid., p. 13.
49 “Russia in the Middle East”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 219, May 2018. 
50 Ibid.
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that superpower?”, though up compared to 7% in 2009. 
Furthermore, only 4% thought of Russia as an attractive place 
to live (“If you had to live in one of the following countries, 
which one would you prefer most?”), compared to 28% opting 
for France and 22% for Germany51.
The annual Euromed “Survey of experts and actors”52 draws 
specifically from a pool of regional experts, which is why it 
cannot be strictly considered a standard public opinion survey. 
Its sample is mixed in the sense that it represents voices from the 
MENA region as well as from European researchers (although 
some graphs provide a breakdown into Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean – SEM – and EU countries). Nevertheless, it 
provides a valuable data set for triangulation with other surveys 
on regional perceptions. The survey, published in 2018, refers 
to Russian foreign policy in a number of questions. Answering 
the question “Which of the following actors are more likely 
to have a negative effect on the stability of the Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean region?”, Russia is ranked as the third 
most disruptive force with roughly a fifth of the sample (18%), 
preceded by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
(19%) and the US with 28%. The regional breakdown also 
indicates that EU respondents have a more negative view of 
Russia with 22%, compared to SEM countries with only 15%. 
SEM respondents were also invited to identify the top foreign 
policy partner of their respective countries, with only 4% 
attributing this role to Russia. A qualitative analysis attributes 
Russia’s rather positive standing (among the SEM respondents) 
to “massive Russian propaganda disseminated across the Arab 
world”, a view that could be analytically challenged, however, by 
the fact that researchers tend to critically examine information 
disseminated by certain sources.
Pew research issues annual surveys on “global attitudes”, 
including on the image of political leaders. In 2017 the survey 
51 S. Telhami (2013), pp.175, 180.
52 EuroMed Survey of  Experts and Actors, Changing Euro-Mediterranean 
Lenses, IEMed, 9th edition, 2018.
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Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin53 included five 
Middle Eastern countries, with a strong emphasis on the Near 
East (four countries, including Israel and Turkey) and only one 
North-African country (Tunisia). Compared to the worldwide 
average, remarkably, Tunisian respondents are roughly 
equally divided over confidence in Putin’s right handling of 
international affairs (32% positive, 39% negative), while 92% 
of Jordanians do not have confidence in the Russia leader. 
Interestingly, a majority in Lebanon trust Putin more (46%) 
than they place confidence in US President Trump (15%). 
The other regional extreme is represented by Israel, where 
Trump (56%) overrules Putin (28%) in terms of confidence 
attribution. In addition, the threat perception of Russia is 
relatively pronounced in Jordan (49% consider it a threat to 
national security), compared to a global median of 31%, but 
even higher in Turkey (54%), despite comparatively lower rates 
of no confidence (74%). In Israel only roughly a quarter view 
Russia as a potential threat (27%). Concerning the generic 
view of Russia in a positive or negative light, 93% of Jordanians 
have an unfavourable opinion of Russia54, down to only a third 
(37%) in Tunisia, the only MENA country below the global 
median (40%) with an unfavourable view of Russia. However, 
favourable and unfavourable views are highly polarised in both 
Lebanon and Tunisia, with almost equal shares (48% vs. 47%, 
and 37% vs. 39%, respectively). In terms of education level, 
respondents with higher education backgrounds in Tunisia 
and Turkey expressed more favourable views of Russia. Also, 
regarding citizens’ rights, 80% of Tunisian respondents think 
that Russia’s government respects personal freedoms, whereas 
66% in Israel hold the opposite view, possibly informed by the 
53 M. Vice, Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia, Pew Research Center, 
16 August 2017.
54 Noteworthy is the development of  negative perceptions in Jordan, developing 
from an evenly spilt opinion in 2007 (49% unfavorable, 48% favorable) to the 
most pronounced anti-Russian sentiment among the surveyed countries only ten 
years later (graph p. 9).
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large Russian element in its population with closer insights into 
Russian domestic affairs.
The following year, the Pew survey Image of Putin, Russia 
Suffers Internationally55 similarly concluded that President 
Putin’s standing faces increasingly negative views, despite 
the acknowledged surge of his country as a power-player on 
the international scene. The scope of this annual survey is 
considerably reduced, however, as only two Middle Eastern 
countries, Tunisia and Israel, are included. Yet, this still enables 
a limited comparison of public opinion as these two countries 
were also represented in the previous annual polling.
Gallup’s polling on the MENA region is focused on specific 
topics, usually not touching on political themes such as foreign 
policy or providing synchronic perspectives of opinions. 
However, the 2020 Vision report includes a ten-year timeline 
of “global leadership” ratings, with Russia ranking below 
China (34%) at 30%56. Notably, according to this poll, Russia’s 
percentage evolved within a ten percent bracket from 2007 till 
2018, with a steady increase in ranking since 2014. 
Taken together, these polls provide a comprehensive 
overview of Arab public opinion about Russia. Even though 
the approaches, polling methods and samples are not identical, 
the available results allow comparisons and do not show any 
substantial inconsistencies. Russia is indeed perceived as a 
rising global power, yet with a mixed record concerning its role 
in the MENA region. 
Conclusion
Russian engagement with Middle Eastern countries can best 
be understood through an imperial lens. Putin, inspired by the 
past glories of both the expansionist Czarist Empire and the 
55 C. Letterman, Image of  Putin, Russia Suffers Internationally, Pew Research Center, 
6 December 2018. 
56 J. Ray and R.J. Reinhart, 2020 Vision: Global Trends to Watch, Gallup, 8 January 2020. 
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Soviet Union’s global action, seeks to re-establish the grandeur 
of the past by embracing a proactive role on the international 
stage. Even though such neo-imperial ambitions remain limited 
by the availability of material means and constrained by other 
actors, the Middle East and North Africa have proved to be a 
fruitful terrain for Russia’s search for international status. 
Furthermore, the trajectory of US interventionist foreign 
policy in the region, especially since 9/11, has reinforced the 
generally shared view that a balancing, internationally capable 
force was necessary to counter US hegemony in the Middle 
East and North Africa57. It seems that Russia under Putin has 
managed to assume this role in a credible manner. However, 
his foreign policy discourse, featuring strong anti-Western 
elements, can only exert an effective attraction insofar as shared 
negative assessments of his own Western contenders exist, and 
specific interests coincide. 
When trying to assess Arab public opinion on Russia through 
polls, three types of survey questions can be identified. The 
first group of questions relates to attitudes in the Middle East 
towards Moscow’s foreign involvement, which can be specified 
in terms of stability effects or threat perceptions, as well as to 
Russian involvement in specific conflicts, above all in Syria. 
In the second cluster of questions, respondents are also asked 
to express either their confidence in Putin or in Russia as an 
ally or as a superpower, thus generally gauging the quality or 
importance of the relationship. A third group of questions is a 
more mixed bag, with questions assessing the general attraction 
of the country, for instance as a potential place to live and work.
What clearly emerges from this analysis is the perception 
of Russia as a decisive foreign policy actor that inspires both 
respect and fear in certain quarters. In line with the traditional 
regional perception of the need to counterbalance any 
hegemonic external actor, Russia under Putin has been able to 
position itself as a relevant player for this role. However, views 
57 S. Telhami (2013), p. 171.
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vary quite significantly from country to country and between 
the sub-regions of the wider Arab world. And even though the 
recognition of Russia’s global standing is on an upward trend, 
the relatively distant China and the assertive Turkey under 
Erdogan seem to exert a stronger attraction. 
6. iRussia in Latin America: 
     Beyond Economic Opportunities
Alexandra G. Koval, Vladimir Rouvinski
Despite the physical distance that separates Russia from Latin 
America and the Caribbean and weaker dynamics of trade 
and commerce compared with many other cases, relations 
with the countries of the region occupy a special place in the 
contemporary Russian foreign policy. As we explain in this 
chapter, this is because the government of Vladimir Putin has 
learned to appreciate the value of Russia’s interactions with this 
part of the world for Moscow’s short-, medium-, and long-term 
goals on the international arena. 
At the same time, considering the changing patterns of 
Russian-Latin American relations, it is important to point 
out that the evolution of Russia’s post-Soviet approach to 
this distant geographical area cannot be separated from the 
transformation of Russian foreign policy in broader terms. 
When Russia decided to return to the Western Hemisphere at 
the end of the 1990s, it did not want to replicate the USSR’s 
Cold War policy, although the Soviet legacy was certainly 
taken into account. Back then, Moscow’s primary interests in 
its international relations responded to the urgent tasks on the 
domestic political agenda and to the need to find new business 
opportunities for its defence industries and energy sector. 
In this context, the beginning of the Russian love story 
with Latin America and the Caribbean was barely noticed by 
outside observers. However, two decades later, the scenario is 
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completely different. There is widespread recognition of Russia 
as a major extra-regional actor whose actions can be a game-
changer, as evidenced by the 2019 political crisis in Venezuela. 
In addition, some of the most important Russian energy and 
defence companies have established a noticeable presence in the 
region. The volume of trade and commerce has risen steeply as 
well. This change has taken place since Russia’s current strategy 
in Latin America is an essential part of a complex foreign 
policy design by the Kremlin, in which reciprocity with the 
United States is not the only logic that rules the day. Legitimate 
concerns over the future of Russia as a global economic player 
are also important. 
The main objective of this chapter is to trace the evolution 
of Russian relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in 
order to explain the key reasons behind the change in Moscow’s 
policies towards the region. We will also illustrate our general 
assumptions through the case study of Venezuela. We will 
conclude our review of Russian-Latin American relations by 
describing some of the challenges faced by Moscow with regard 
to future scenarios. 
Historical Background of 
Russian-Latin American Relations
The first contacts between Russia and Latin America date 
back to the XIX century. Indeed, before the fall of the Russian 
monarchy, many young Latin American governments managed 
to establish direct contacts with Saint Petersburg. However, 
while Latin Americans sought recognition by one of the most 
important European powers of that time in order to improve 
their nations’ visibility in the international landscape1, the 
1 See N.L. Korsakova and V.V. Noskov, “Spiski diplomaticheskogo korpusa v 
Sankt-Peterburge, 1835 g. (po materialam RGIA)” (“Lists of  the diplomatic corps 
in Saint Petersburg, 1835 (based on materials from the Russian State Archives)”, 
Peterburgskii Historicheskii Journal, 2015, no. 4, pp. 172-210. The first diplomatic 
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interest of the Russian Empire in the distant continent was of 
a different nature. Rather than a desire to establish full-fledged 
relations with the new states of the Western Hemisphere, it was 
an attempt to use Russia’s participation in the various scenarios 
in the New World in order to gain an advantage in the political 
struggle with other European powers elsewhere2. Nevertheless, 
thanks to these first limited diplomatic contacts, as well as to 
Russian scientific expeditions to the region3, Russia built up 
some initial knowledge about Latin America.
The change in Russia’s approach to Latin America and the 
Caribbean is associated with the beginning of the Soviet era 
and the creation of the Third International (Comintern). 
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant view of 
Comintern activities in the region between 1919 and 1940 was 
that of a subversive clandestine organisation that fully obeyed 
any order received from Moscow and helped to advance the 
Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals. Only in the 1990s, with the 
opening of previously inaccessible Comintern archives, did it 
become clear that a number of significant discrepancies existed 
between Moscow and Latin American communists concerning 
both the assessment of the socio-economic situation in specific 
countries and the type of practical activities to be carried 
out in cooperation with the Bureau in Russia4. Of course, 
the Comintern sent its agents to the region. They sought to 
representation of  the Russian Empire in South America was established in Rio 
de Janeiro on 30 July 1811. Before the 1917 Revolution, the Russian Empire has 
established diplomatic contacts with 10 Latin American states. 
2 B. Komissarov, “Under the constellation of  the Southern Cross. 200 years of  
the Russian consular and diplomatic service in Latin America”, Consul, vol. 4, no. 
27, 2011, pp. 14-17.
3 K. Buinova, Russkie puteshestvenniki v Latinskoi Amerike v XIX – nachale XX v. 
(Russian travelers in Latin America in the 19th - early 20th centuries), Moscow, MGIMO 
University, 2017.
4 M. Caballero, “Latin America and the Comintern, 1919-1943”, Cambridge Latin 
American Studies, 1986, no. 60; V. Jeifets and L. Jeifets, “The Comintern and the 
formation of  the Latin American Communist militants”, Izquierdas, no. 31, 2016, 
pp. 130-161.
Russia in Latin America: Beyond Economic Opportunities 111
coordinate the work of local communist organisations and 
provided financial support. The governments in Latin America 
interpreted the Comintern’s activities as extremely dangerous 
and aimed at undermining the existing political institutions as 
well as at the disruption of public order. Due to the influence 
of the Comintern’s clandestine network in sensitive political 
processes across the continent, the Soviet Union quickly 
acquired the image of the key foreign enemy5. 
Despite the above antecedents, during the Second World War 
most of Latin America joined forces with the USSR fighting the 
Axis powers6. But the wartime alliance was quickly forgotten 
after Colombia accused Stalin’s government of masterminding 
the assassination of the prominent political leader Jorge Gaitan 
in April 1948, triggering the longest civil war in the region7. 
With the creation of the Organization of American States, the 
fight against Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere was 
declared to be the primary goal of Latin American governments, 
and most of the countries broke diplomatic relations with 
the USSR. For an important part of Latin American elites, 
the image of Moscow as an enemy was back. Soviet support 
to revolutionary Cuba and the leftist movements in other 
countries only reinforced it. 
In October 1962, the Soviet Union deployed short and 
medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba8. After the world 
balanced on the edge of a nuclear disaster for thirteen days, 
5 M. Cajas, “The law against the communism in Colombia, 1920-1956”, Izquierdas, 
2020, no. 49, pp. 1-22.
6 S. Brilev, Zabytye sojuzniki vo Vtoroj mirovoj vojne (The Forgotten allies in the Second 
World War), Moscow, OLMA Media Group, 2012; A. Sizonenko, “SSSR i 
Latinskaja Amerika vo vremja Velikoj Otechestvennoj Vojny” (“The Soviet 
Union and Latin America during the Great Patriotic War”), Latin American 
Historical Almanac, no. 16, 2016, pp. 141-147.
7 See J. Trapani, “Seeing ‘Reds’ in Colombia: Reconsidering the ‘Bogotazo’, 
1948”, Revista Esboços, no. 36, 2017, pp. 352-372.
8 For the latest review of  the Cuban missile crisis that use newly available sources, 
see H. Karlsson and T.D. Acosta, The Missile Crisis from a Cuban Perspective. 
Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Reflections, New York, Routledge, 2019.
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the subsequent removal of the missiles marked the beginning 
of detente in US-Soviet relations and the changing of the 
rules of the game regarding Soviet policies towards the region. 
From this perspective, the Cuban crisis was not only a crucial 
moment in the Cold War but also the turning point in the great 
power competition in the Western Hemisphere. On the one 
hand, Moscow came to appreciate the value of the geographical 
proximity of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United 
States in the context of the balance of power and logic of 
reciprocity9. As a result, for 30 years, Cuba became a vital and 
costly Soviet outpost in the US “backyard”, characterised by the 
permanent presence of Soviet military personnel and Havana’s 
total dependence on Soviet aid10. Moscow also supported many 
other leftist movements in the continent, although trying to 
avoid direct involvement in internal conflicts. On the other 
hand, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union managed 
to restore diplomatic relations with many Latin American 
governments and diversified its methods of engagement. For 
instance, despite sharp ideological differences, the USSR 
promoted trade, commerce and technical cooperation with 
some of the region’s strongest economies ruled by the military, 
namely, Argentina and Brazil11. At the same time, the Soviet 
government offered scholarships for university studies in the 
USSR, and tens of thousands of Latin Americans, many of 
whom are part of their national business and intellectual elites 
9 J. Suchlicki, “Soviet Policy in Latin America: Implications for the United States”, 
Journal of  Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1, 1987, pp. 25-46.
10 In the beginning of  the 1980s, it was estimated that the daily cost of  the Soviet 
economic aid to Cuba was $11 m a day (about $4 bn a year) plus another $600 m 
in military aid (United Press International, 18 June 1983). The issue of  the Cuban 
debt was one of  the most difficult to resolve in Russia’s post-soviet relations with 
Cuba. Only in 2014, an agreement was reached between Moscow and Havana to 
write off  90% of  $35.2 bn Cuban Soviet-time debt. 
11 N. Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959-1987, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; A. Varas, “Soviet Union-Latin American Relations: A 
Historical Perspective”, in H. Munoz, J.S. Tulchin and D.G. Becker (eds.), Latin 
American Nations In World Politics, New York, Routledge, 1996.
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today, were educated in the Soviet Union12. In the end, until its 
demise in 1991, the USSR possessed diverse and valuable links 
with Latin America and the Caribbean.      
Latin America in Contemporary 
Russian Foreign Policy  
The end of the Soviet Union saw a drastic reduction in 
Moscow’s influence in the region. The volume of trade declined 
dramatically and many other types of contacts stopped. In its 
early days, post-Soviet Russia wanted to collaborate with the 
West on many items on the global agenda and, as a result, lost 
any strategic interest in the region’s geographical proximity to 
the United States. Cuba had a particularly hard time. The new 
authorities in Russia stopped providing crucial aid and closed 
their military base, removing almost all of the former Soviet 
Union’s tangible presence in the island. Facing enormous social 
and economic difficulties, the Castro government had to declare 
a “special period”13. The abandonment of Cuba and the decline 
of economic relations with other countries dealt a serious blow 
to Russia’s prestige among Latin Americans.
The situation changed after Vladimir Putin took office as 
Russian President in 2000 and began to adopt a more assertive 
policy on the international arena. Against this background, it is 
possible to identify several reasons for Russia’s renewed interest 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The first reason had to 
do with the fact that the distant continent turned out to be 
a convenient venue for staging a political spectacle of Russia’s 
restored influence around the world. For Putin, the increasingly 
positive perception of Russia’s role on the international stage 
12 T. Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the 
USSR and Latin America during the Cold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2015.
13 M.J. Bain, “Russia, Cuba and colonial legacies in the twenty-first century”, 
Journal of  Transatlantic Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-17.
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among ordinary Russians was key in achieving an extraordinarily 
high approval rating that enabled the Russian President to 
introduce a number of reforms and political changes inside 
the country. Russia’s media machine was the driving force 
behind the new image of a mighty Moscow. In this respect, 
Latin America was useful because the majority of Russian voters 
had vivid memories of the Soviet Union’s glorious past in the 
region (Cuba and Nicaragua). This allowed Russian TV to use 
the frequent visits by heads of states and other similar events as 
evidence of “Russia being back” as a global power14. 
The other reason was the restored value of Latin America’s 
geographical proximity to the United States for Moscow’s 
political elites. Not only the top members of the Russian 
government but also many other powerful decision-makers were 
seriously alarmed by Russia losing control over the political and 
economic scenarios in the former republics of the Soviet Union. 
This area of major security, social, and economic concern was 
labelled by Moscow as Russia’s “near abroad”. Vladimir Putin’s 
government was convinced that the failure to keep many former 
Soviet republics within the Russian orbit was the result of the 
deliberate policy of the United States, and Moscow had to 
act accordingly. Because of the Soviet legacy, Latin America is 
perceived in Russia as Washington’s “near abroad”. Through the 
prism of reciprocity – even if mostly symbolic – it was decided 
that establishing and sustaining relations with Latin American 
governments was in the Kremlin’s best interests. 
Engaging the regimes belonging to the so-called “pink tide”15 
was given priority since their leaders frequently rejected US 
14 V. Rouvinski, “Understanding Russian Priorities in Latin America”, Kennan 
Cable No.20, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2017.
15 “Pink tide” (also “left turn”) refers to the wave of  leftist governments that 
came to the power by winning elections in Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia in the end of  the 1990s-begiining of  the 2000th. 
Their permanence in power mostly coincided with the commodity boom of  
the first decade of  the 21st century enabling these governments to carry out a 
number of  impressive social programs.    
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policy and shared many ideas from Putin’s famous 2007 Munich 
speech denouncing the US-led world order. Russia was ready to 
assist its new allies by collaborating with them in international 
organisations like the United Nations and supporting their 
domestic stands, often as the only extra-regional power to do so.16 
They were also offered substantial financial credits, in addition 
to military cooperation and investments in the energy sector. 
Russia’s strategy towards its allies from the Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) was twofold. On the 
one hand, credits from Moscow were easy to obtain because 
they played the role of rewards to Russia’s Latin American 
supporters. On the other hand, the credits were normally tied 
to the acquisition of Russian machinery and equipment, thus 
opening new markets or allowing Russian producers to return 
to the markets they had before the collapse of the USSR17.    
During the late 2000s and the 2010s, it became clear that 
the Russian strategy worked. For example, in 2008, after the 
Russian-Georgian five-day war, leftist regimes in Latin America 
were among only a handful of governments that supported the 
Russian position in the conflict and recognised the breakaway 
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. In 
addition, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua allowed Russia to send 
its strategic bombers and navy ships to their countries in a widely 
televised coverage. In turn, Moscow provided well-timed credits 
and investments. Russia also shipped machinery and various types 
of industrial equipment and promised impressive projects in the 
energy sector. On a separate front, with the help of new partners 
in the region, Russia’s arms sales skyrocketed and turned Moscow 
into the second biggest arms trader in the world18.   
16 For instance, for the government of  Hugo Chavez, it was very important to 
show Venezuelans that Russia – a major world power – supported his policy. 
17 See V. Rouvinski, “Russian Re-Engagement with Latin America: Energy and 
Beyond”, in B.M. Bagley, D. Mouliokova, and H.S. Kaab (eds.),  Impact of  Emerging 
Economies on Global Energy and the Environment: Challenges Ahead, Lexington Books, 
2015.
18  The estimated $14.5 bn worth of  Russian arms were sold to Latin American 
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The third reason behind Russia’s return to Latin America 
and the Caribbean are long-term goals related to the future of 
global economic relations. The Kremlin’s energy policy is aimed 
at keeping Russia’s status as an energy superpower for many 
years to come. While Russia managed to replace the old gas and 
oil distribution networks it inherited from the Soviet Union 
with new ones, there are experts who speak about the risk of 
diminishing Russian domestic oil and gas production in the mid-
term perspective19. Moscow hopes that Russia’s energy mega-
companies like Rosneft will be able to expand the geography of 
oil and gas exploration and its worldwide distribution. In the 
Western Hemisphere, Rosneft focuses on Venezuela and Cuba, 
where the company has made significant investments and owns 
a number of joint ventures. As shown by the 2019 political crisis 
in Venezuela, examined in the last section of this chapter, Russia 
is determined to protect its investments in the energy sector in 
the region because they are of strategic value.  
Finally, yet importantly, Moscow’s post-Soviet rapprochement 
with the Western Hemisphere has opened new opportunities 
for the diversification of the geography and tools of Russia’s 
foreign policy. Nowadays, the Kremlin is careful not to place 
all its eggs in one basket, and its policy towards Latin America 
is becoming more pragmatic. Besides Venezuela and Cuba, 
Vladimir Putin’s government is attempting to keep workable 
relations with many other countries in the region. It actively 
pursues business opportunities for Russian companies, 
and constantly monitors political, economic, and social 
processes. Moreover, official country-to-country contacts are 
complemented by informal links, tourism20, cultural exchange 
and the use of non-traditional means of engagement. In this 
countries since the mid-1990s. See V. Jeifets, L. Khadorich, and Ya. Leksyutina, 
“Russia and Latin America: Renewal versus continuity”, Portuguese Journal of  Social 
Science, vol. 17, no. 2, 2018, pp. 213-228.  
19 See International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2019.
20 In 2019, Latin America became the first entire region, which allows Russian 
nationals travel visa-free for short-term visits.
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context, the Russian media can be considered a true success 
story. As of the beginning of 2020, RT in Spanish (and in 
English in the English-Speaking Caribbean nations) was freely 
available in every country of Latin American and the Caribbean 
and on the Internet. Today, it is likely to be the most consulted 
foreign source of information on international developments 
for Latin American journalists and young people21. Sputnik 
Mundo news has its own network of correspondents in the 
region and has many subscribers on the Internet. Both outlets 
are owned by the Russian government and are included in 
the list of strategic companies with guaranteed funding. The 
Russian media exposes Latin American audiences to alternative 
interpretations of international events from those originating 
in Western countries and which are in line with Moscow’s 
official stand instead. RT and Sputnik are highly critical of US 
domestic and foreign policy as well. 
Russian Economic Cooperation with Latin America 
There are four major dimensions of Russian economic 
relations with Latin America: trade, investments, scientific and 
technical cooperation22, in addition to foreign aid23. However, 
21 Based on interviews conducted by one of  the authors to journalists in 
Colombia, Ecuador and Argentina in June-November 2019.
22 Some of  the examples of  Russian-Latin American cooperation in this area are 
the promoting of  the use of  Russia’s satellite navigation system Glonass in several 
countries of  Latin America. Just recently, the plans of  introducing Glonass had 
been discussed in Venezuela (https://ria.ru/20181206/1547557658.html). 
The other example is the production of  vaccines using Russian technologies 
that was launched in April 2019 at the immunobiological center in Managua 
(Nicaragua) according to Russia’s Foreign Ministry https://www.mid.ru/
problemy-vzaimootnosenij-so-stranami-latinskoj-ameriki-i-karibskogo-bassejna 
23 The share of  Latin America in total Russian development assistance programs 
is approximately 20 percent (estimated); much less than that devoted to Asia 
and Africa. The main recipients of  the Russian aid in the region are Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Venezuela. At the same time, Russia 
represents only 4 percent of  total foreign aid received by Latin America. Most 
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it is primarily trade that represents the cornerstone of Russia’s 
economic links with the region. It is worth mentioning here 
that trade was also an important instrument of Soviet policy 
towards Latin America and the Caribbean. For instance, in 
1970, the USSR’s trade with the region amounted to $975 
m24 (excluding Cuba, $48 m).  In 1985, it reached $11.85 bn 
(excluding Cuba, $2.52 bn)25. The Soviet Union exported not 
only raw materials but also many manufactured goods while it 
imported mainly agricultural goods. 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian-Latin 
American trade fell sharply and between 1992 and 1994 it 
amounted to only about $1.4 bn (excluding Cuba; $700 m)26. 
Russia almost entirely ceased to supply high-tech products, 
and the lion’s share of its exports consisted of raw materials. 
The main reasons for such dramatic changes can be linked to 
the transformation of the Russian economic model to that of 
a market economy and the Westernisation of Russian foreign 
policy27. The dynamics of trade only changed at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. As Figure 6.1 shows, Russian-Latin 
American trade has substantially increased for the last twenty 
years. Already in 2007, Russia’s trade with the region exceeded 
$11.9 m and achieved the same volume as Latin American 
trade with the Soviet Union.  
of  Russia’s assistance goes to the area of  education, health, fighting illegal drug 
trafficking and humanitarian aid. See: A.G. Koval and A.M. Lantukh, “Rossijskie 
programmy sodejstvija razvitiju v Latinskoj Amerike” (“Characteristics of  
Russian development assistance programs in Latin America”), Latinskaya 
Amerika, no. 3, 2018, pp. 45-55.
24 $ - US dollars.
25 L. Klochkovsky, “Situacion y Perspectivas de las Relaciones Comerciales entre 
Rusia y America Latina”, CEPAL LC/R, no. 1435, 1994.
26 V.M. Davidov, “Rusia en América Latina (y viceversa)”, Nueva Sociedad, no. 226, 
2010, pp. 4-12.
27 See A.G. Koval and S.F. Sutyrin, “Transformation of  the Russian trade policy 
facing the geopolitical challenges”, in S.F. Sutyrin, O.Y. Trofimenko, and A.G. 
Koval (eds.), Russian Trade Policy: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, Abington, 
New York, Routledge, 2019.
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Fig. 6.1 - Russia’s trade with Latin America in 2001-2018, 
$ thousand
Source: ITC Trade map 2019, www.trademap.org.
In recent years, the global financial crisis, Western sanctions 
and Russia’s counter sanctions and the fall in oil prices have 
had a negative impact on the Russian economy, leading to the 
decline of trade by Russian companies. At the same time, Russia 
started to implement an import substitution strategy and to 
support, inter alia, domestic agricultural companies. Therefore, 
the Russian embargo on certain agricultural products from the 
West has not resulted in a significant increase in imports of 
agricultural products from Latin America, even though this 
option has been widely discussed28.
28 See, for example, C. Meacham, What Does the Russian Food Import Ban Mean for 
Latin America, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2014. 
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Western sanctions forced Russia to begin searching for 
potential new economic cooperation opportunities. Arguably, 
Latin America could be a possible focus of re-orientation 
in Russian foreign trade29. Yet, after 2014, Russia pivoted 
towards Asia, especially China30, and today Asian nations are 
very strong competitors on both the Russian and the Latin 
American market. In the context of this tough competition, 
one of the main obstacles for the growth of business contacts 
between Russia and Latin America remains a lack of market 
information. While official visits to a certain extent intensified 
the dissemination of information and the development of legal 
and institutional framework had resulted in the strengthening of 
Russian-Latin American economic cooperation31, the challenge 
of designing an institutional framework for better exchange of 
business information and product promotion remains on the 
agenda32. Interviews with business representatives have also 
confirmed that information-related barriers together with the 
cost of transportation are major obstacles to Russian-Latin 
American trade33.
29 P.P. Yakovlev, “Rossija i Latinskaja Amerika: parametry strategicheskogo 
partnerstva” (“Russia and Latin America: dimensions of  strategic partnership”), 
Latinskaya Amerika, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5-14.
30 See A.G. Koval, L.V. Popova, and S.F. Sutyrin, “Transformation of  the Russian 
Trade Policy: Pivot to Asia, Focus on China”, in Research on the economic development 
of  Russia in 2017, Renmin University of  China, Beijing, 2018.
31 Institutional frameworks include such organizations for trade promotion as 
trade missions and intergovernmental commissions. Currently, Russia has trade 
missions to Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru and intergovernmental 
commissions with 12 Latin American nations. See Ministry of  Industry and Trade 
of  the Russian Federation, http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/ministry/trade_mission/
world_countries_and_trade_missions/; Ministry of  Economic Development 
of  the Russian Federation, https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/news/
mezhpravitelstvennye_komissii_mpk_po_torgovo_ekonomicheskomu_
sotrudnichestvu_so_stranami_azii_afriki_i_latinskoy_ameriki.html 
32 See Y. Paniev, “Cooperacion Economico-Comercial Ruso-Latinoamericana: 
Adelantos y Deficiencias”, Iberoamérica, no. 3, 2013, pp. 111-127.
33 Interviews were conducted by one of  the authors. See also V. Ryzhkova, and 
A. Koval, “The Role of  Trade Costs in the Russian-Paraguayan Trade Relations”, 
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One of the priorities for today’s Russia is to strengthen the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a customs union based 
on a common foreign trade policy. The 2016 Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation set out the importance of 
a regional approach for Russia in Latin America: “Russia will 
seek to consolidate ties with its Latin American partners by 
working within international and regional forums, expanding 
cooperation with multilateral associations and Latin American 
and Caribbean integration structures”34. Hence, EAEU is now 
actively engaged in discussing the opportunities for signing 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and treaties have already been 
signed with Vietnam, Iran, Singapore and Serbia. Chile and 
Peru were the first Latin American countries to propose FTAs 
to the EAEU. The EAEU had also held preliminary talks with 
MERCOSUR on the subject35. 
In 2018, Russian-Latin American trade amounted to 
almost $16 bn. It is important to emphasise that despite 
some fluctuations in export and import dynamics, the Latin 
American share of Russia’s trade has not changed significantly 
over the past ten years.  It accounted for about 1.8% of Russia’s 
merchandise exports and for 3.8% of Russia’s imports in 2018. 
At the same time, Latin American countries play an important 
role in Russia’s trade when it comes to certain products, in 
particular, raw materials and products thereof (Figure 6.2), with 
fertilisers, mineral fuels, iron and steel representing 80% of 
Russian exports to Latin America. Brazil is a leading importer of 
Latin American Journal of  Trade Policy, vol. 1, no. 2, January 2019, pp. 5-29.
34 Foreign Policy Concept of  the Russian Federation 2016, http://www.mid.
ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/
id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_
cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB
35 Eurasian Economic Commission, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/
nae/news/Pages/18-12-3018-1.aspx. These talks evidenced that agricultural 
sector and trade are ones of  the most sensitive issues in FTA negotiations 
between the EAEU and Latin American countries, which is another reasons 
why Russian-Latin American trade relations did not benefit from the Russian 
sanction regime for agricultural products originating in the West.
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Russian fertilisers. The main recipients of crude petroleum oils 
in the region are Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil and Argentina. 
Mexico is the fourth largest importer of Russian iron and steel. 
Fig. 6.2 - Russia’s trade with Latin America by product, 2018
Source: ITC Trade map 2019, www.trademap.org
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In comparison with the Soviet Union, Russia’s exports of high-
tech products to Latin America are insignificant. Moreover, 
today Russia imports more machinery products from Latin 
America than it exports36. In 2018, Russian machinery exports 
only amounted to about $43 m, while Moscow imported 
products for $112 m. The main importers of Russian machinery 
are Cuba, Argentina and Venezuela, while the key exporters are 
Brazil and Mexico. 
Today, the bulk of Russian imports from Latin America are 
agricultural products: fruit, meat and soya beans, in addition to 
vehicles and machinery (see Figure 6.2). It is worth mentioning 
that some scholars argue that Latin America could be a platform 
for the diversification of Russian exports in order to increase the 
supply of manufactured goods37. However, others are sceptical 
about the extent of the potential for Russian-Latin American trade 
in high-tech goods38. This is because Russian manufacturers seem 
to have difficulties in competing with other producers, above all 
China, for the Latin American market due to the higher costs of 
their products, older technology and lack of financial strength. 
Brazil is a core trade partner for Russia in the region and 
accounts for 32% of Russian-Latin American trade. Apart 
from the trade relations, Brazil, as a BRICS member, plays 
a particular role in Russian engagement in Latin America. 
In Moscow, BRICS is considered an important instrument 
for constructing the new multipolar world order promoted 
by the Kremlin. At the same time, BRICS summits, having 
mostly a geopolitical focus, still contribute substantially to the 
strengthening of Russian-Brazilian economic relations39. While 
36  The only exception is Cuba, where Russian export consists primarily of  
manufactured goods.
37 See P.P. Yakovlev, “Rossija – Latinskaja Amerika: strategija proryva na rynki 
nesyr’evoj produkcii” (“Russia-Latin America: strategy of  entering into markets 
of  industrial goods”), Latinskaya Amerika, no. 12, 2017, pp. 15-28.
38 J.A. Lopez Arevalo, “Las relaciones comerciales (intra e interindustriales) de Rusia 
con América Latina y el Caribe, 2000-2015”, Iberoamérica, no. 2, 2018, pp. 68-97.
39 A.G. Koval and T. Dantas, “Contemporary Russian-Brazilian Trade Relations”, 
in S.F. Sutyrin, O.Y. Trofimenko, and A.G. Koval (eds.), Russian Trade Policy: 
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MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance are not among Russia’s 
key political allies in the region, they constitute the focus of 
Russian commercial trade. By contrast, as Figure 6.3 shows, 
Moscow’s allies Cuba and Venezuela play a much smaller role 
in Russia’s trade (around 3%). 
In comparison with trade, Russian investments in Latin 
America are small. In 2018, Russia’s foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to the region, excluding tax havens, amounted to only 
$177.4 m40. Nevertheless, there are several particular dimensions 
of Russian FDI that must be taken into account. Firstly, as Figure 
6.4 shows, Russian FDI to Latin America follows a pattern 
similar to the dynamics of Russian-Latin American trade.
Fig. 6.3. Russia’s trade with Latin America by country, 
$ thousand, 2018
Source: ITC Trade map 2019, www.trademap.org.
Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, Abington, New York, Routledge, 2019.
40 The investments data on Russian-Latin American investments varies 
substantially depending on its source. Nevertheless, in general the amounts 
of  investments are very low, but there are certain big investments projects. 
Moreover, investments in Venezuela seem to be not included in Figure 6.4.
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Second, Russian-Latin American investment cooperation has 
only developed in a few sectors. The energy sector dominates 
Russia’s FDI to this region, though there are several FDI projects 
in the mining, machinery, transport and IT industries41. Finally, 
political factors play a significant role in Russia’s decisions to 
invest in energy and other sectors. One vivid example of this is 
Russian economic cooperation with Venezuela. 
Fig. 6.4 - Russian FDI to Latin America, 
excluding tax havens, $ million, 2007-2018
Source: Central bank of Russia 2020, www.cbr.ru
41 See A. Koval, “Russian Outward Foreign Direct Investments in Latin America: 
Contemporary Challenges and Prospects”, in  K. Liuhto, S.F. Sutyrin, and J.F. 
Blanchard (eds.), The Russian Economy and Foreign Direct Investment, Abington, New 
York, Routledge, 2017.
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Russia and Venezuela: Key Perspectives 
From the perspective of commercial pragmatism, Venezuela does 
not seem to be at the top of the Russian agenda. Yet, the 2019 
political crisis in Venezuela and Russia’s support of Nicolas Maduro 
grabbed international attention. In order to better understand 
Russia’s engagement, it is necessary to consider a number of factors. 
Firstly, there is a strong geopolitical dimension to Russian-
Venezuela relations: Russia aspires to increase its role as a re-
emerging power in the international arena and promotes the 
idea of multipolarity thus rejecting the US-led world order. 
From this perspective, and because Venezuela is located in the 
Western Hemisphere, Russia’s presence in this South American 
nation is seen in Moscow as a necessary element of a – mostly 
symbolic – reciprocity strategy in response to Washington’s 
influence in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The 
Chavista government of Venezuela depends on Russian 
support in order to stay in power, while an important part of 
the opposition is supported by the Unites States. Hence, the 
political interests of the Kremlin and Maduro coincide.
Second, Venezuela is the most important buyer of Russian 
arms in Latin America and, between 2009 and 2013, Caracas 
was the fifth-largest recipient of Russian arms globally. However, 
between 2014-18, Russia’s arms trade with Venezuela decreased 
by 96%42. Total arms deliveries from Russia to Venezuela since 
2005 are estimated to amount to $11 bn, or almost 80% of 
Russia’s total arms exports to the region43, while Russia’s share 
of total Venezuelan arms imports was almost 90%44. 
42 Trends in international arms transfer 2018, SIPRI Fact Shirt, March 2019, 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf
43 The major arms contracts between Russia and Venezuela were signed in 2005, 
2009, and 2013. They included a wide variety of  deliveries for the subsequent years 
as well as building of  service centres, some of  which are still under construction. 
The last relatively small contract was announced in 2015. Thereafter, Venezuela 
did not make any substantial purchase of  Russian arms and the current focus is 
maintenance and joint military exercises. 
44 However, the share of  all Latin American states in Russian arms transfer 
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Third, between 2007 and 2016, Venezuela played the leading 
role in exports of Russian machinery and equipment to Latin 
America. This was made possible by the opening of Russia’s 
credit lines45. In 2017-2018 machinery trade with Venezuela 
fell sharply and the country seems to be losing its attractiveness 
to Russian businesses. However, KAMAZ, a large Russian 
manufacturer, invested $22 m in bus assemblies in Venezuela, 
and continues to supply spare parts. Moreover, Venezuela is 
currently one of the main importers of Russian cereals46. In 
other words, for some Russian products, the Venezuelan market 
remains rather promising. 
Finally, but most importantly, the crucial issue for Russian-
Venezuelan relations is energy cooperation. In total, Rosneft’s FDI 
stock in Venezuela amounts to $3.5 bn, that is on top of all the 
other Russian investment projects in Latin American countries47. 
In Venezuela, Rosneft has invested in five oil refineries and one 
gas project and has also acquired two oilfield equipment and 
services companies. Moreover, since 2014, Rosneft has provided 
Venezuela with $6.5 bn in prepayments for oil deliveries48. 
Rosneft also holds 49.9% of total stakes in the US-based Citgo 
Petroleum Corporation as Venezuela’s loan collateral. 
At the beginning of 2020, the amount of Venezuela’s debt 
to Rosneft was decreasing49. Rosneft’s loans constituted a 
estimated for only 3 percent of  Russian arms trade. Russia has also exported arms 
to Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador. 
See A.A. Hetagurov, “Voenno-tehnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Rossii: gosudarstva 
Central’noj i Latinskoj Ameriki” (“Military-Technical cooperation of  Russia: 
Central and Latin American states”), Moscow, RIAC, 27 October 2017.
45 In 2012 Russian machinery export to Venezuela achieved more than $63 m.
46 Cereals represent more than 65% of  the Russian export to Venezuela.
47 Along with Rosneft, Gazprombank also invested about $300 m in oil 
production in Venezuela. Most notably, all private energy companies left the 
Venezuelan market.
48 Part of  the deliveries went to the Rosneft associated company in India. 
Vedomosti, 24 January 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/
articles/2019/01/24/792343-rosneft.
49 Vedomosti, 6 November 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/
news/2019/11/06/815574-venesuela-snizila-dolg-do-800-mln
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substantial addition to Russia’s overall financial aid to the 
country of $3.5 bn. However, Venezuela’s total external debt 
amounted to more than $155 bn. From this perspective, the 
volume of Russia’s tangible assistance seems to be minimal50. 
Nevertheless, Russian assistance to Venezuela may help to 
increase creditors’ confidence, at least to some of them, since 
continuous Russian involvement is evidence of Moscow’s interest 
in “keeping the house in order”. All in all, the introduction of a 
new round of US sanctions against Rosneft, announced on 18 
February 202051, shows that Russia’s assistance to Venezuela has 
important political implications in the context of continuing 
tensions between Russia and the United States.
On 28 March 2020, the Russian government established 
a new company under the name of Roszarubezhneft, which 
bought all of Rosneft’s assets in Venezuela52. This step was widely 
regarded as a manoeuvre designed to help Rosneft avoid further 
US sanctions without Russia giving up its support of Venezuela. 
At around the same time, Russia donated 10,000 Covid-19 
test kits in humanitarian aid to the Venezuelan government53 
and co-sponsored, with Venezuela, a “Declaration of solidarity 
of the United Nations in the face of the challenges posed by 
the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19)”54 to be adopted by 
the United Nations. However, the document, which called for 
the lifting of unilateral sanctions, was rejected by the United 
States and its Western allies55. This is yet another proof of the 
continuing US-Russia opposition. 
50A.G. Koval, Russia: Venezuela’s “savior” sets limits?, Commentary, ISPI, 29 March 2018.
51 H. Foy, “Rosneft defies US sanctions on Venezuela oil trading”, The Financial 
Times, 19 February 2020.
52 S. Filatov, “Oil in Venezuela is now the property of  the Government of  
Russia”, The International Affairs, 28 March 2020.
53 RIA Novosti , 24 March 2020, https://ria.ru/20200324/1569049138.html
54 United Nations, General Assembly, “Declaration of  solidarity of  the United 
Nations in the face of  the challenges posed by the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19)”, 27 March 2020.   
55 “West opposes Russia’s proposal in UN General Assembly to reject sanctions”, 
TASS, 3 April 2020.
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Conclusion 
It is possible to outline several key characteristics of contemporary 
Russian foreign policy towards Latin America. Firstly, the role of 
Latin America in Russia’s foreign policy and economy should 
be properly evaluated. While Russia’s priority agenda focuses 
on the former Soviet Union, Europe and some countries in the 
Asian region, Latin America does provide some commercial 
as well as geopolitical opportunities. Indeed, from a political 
standpoint, Russia’s strategy in the region represents a long-term 
commitment designed to provide Moscow with the capacity 
for primarily symbolic reciprocal actions against the United 
States. Russian involvement promotes the idea of multipolarity 
and supports Russia’s stand as a re-emerging power in the 
international arena. 
Second, the regional energy sector constitutes one of the 
priorities for investments and technical cooperation aimed at 
helping Russia achieve the status of energy superpower in the 
future, as illustrated by Rosneft’s engagement in Venezuela. 
Third, today’s Russia follows a more pragmatic approach 
to Latin America compared to the previous ideology-based 
system of preferences. While some cooperation with ALBA 
countries can be considered politically motivated, in the case 
of other countries the driving force of Moscow’s engagement 
is commercial interest. This is particularly evident in Russia’s 
relationships with Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance. In 
addition, the dynamics of trade and investments demonstrate 
that economic engagement should be matched by political 
will if Moscow wants its policy to be successful. However, 
Russia’s potential for increasing economic cooperation with 
Latin America is rather limited: Russian-Latin American trade 
is dominated by primary commodities, while investments and 
other forms of cooperation are only making modest progress. 
7.  Russia’s Enduring Quest for Great 
     Power Status in Sub-Saharan Africa
Samuel Ramani
Russia’s resurgence as a great power in Sub-Saharan Africa 
attracted widespread international attention on October 23, 
2019, as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted 40 African 
heads of state at the inaugural Russia-Africa Economic Forum 
in Sochi. At this historic summit, Russia finalised noteworthy 
commercial deals with African countries and showcased 
Moscow’s re-emergence as a continent-wide player for the first 
time since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 19911. Although the 
Sochi summit was a landmark triumph for Russian diplomacy 
in Africa, its success was the culmination of a decade of steadily 
increased engagement between Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In June 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev showcased 
Russia’s return to Africa with state visits to Egypt, Nigeria, 
Angola and Namibia, and facilitated Moscow’s emergence as 
a crucial player in the civilian nuclear energy, oil and diamond 
mining sectors2. Although Russia’s engagement with Africa 
was principally confined to commercial transactions during 
Medvedev’s presidency, Russia’s footprints in the diplomatic and 
security spheres have strengthened since 2014. This resurgence 
occurred in tandem with the broader systemic crisis in Russia-
West relations triggered by the Russian annexation of Crimea 
1 C. Casola, M. Procopio and E. Tafuro Ambrosetti, Russia is Knocking on Africa’s 
Door, Dossier, ISPI, 23 November 2019.
2 S. Eke, “Medvedev Seeks Closer Africa Links”, BBC News, 23 June 2009.
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and reflected Moscow’s desire to project power in new theatres. 
As a result of its foreign policy reorientation, Russia has emerged 
as a critical diplomatic arbiter in the Central African Republic 
civil war, mediated tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over 
Nile River access and deployed private military contractors 
(PMCs) to Sudan, Central African Republic, Madagascar and 
Mozambique. 
This chapter will examine the drivers and implications of 
Russia’s post-2014 resurgence as a great power in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. To contextualise its analysis of Russia’s Africa strategy, 
the chapter will provide a brief comparison between Soviet 
and contemporary Russian objectives and power projection 
techniques in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter will then proceed 
to examine the three pillars of Russia’s resurgence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: energy and mining investments, security assistance and 
engagement with multilateral institutions. Afterwards, the 
chapter will apply its conclusions on the sources of Moscow’s 
resurgence to the case of Nigeria. The Russia-Nigeria bilateral 
relationship incorporates all three pillars of Russia’s African 
strategy and is central to Moscow’s continental outreach efforts. 
The chapter will conclude on a prescriptive note by highlighting 
how European policymakers can contain Russia’s growing 
influence in Africa, and selectively engage with Moscow on areas 
of common interest. As there is a dearth of academic literature 
and country-specific policy reports on the various dimensions of 
Russia’s power projection initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
chapter will extensively reference Russian and Western media 
sources to substantiate its empirical claims, and cite long-form 
reports to support its overarching conclusions. 
Russia’s Geopolitical Ambitions in Africa: 
A Throwback to the Soviet Era? 
In US and European media outlets, Russia’s resurgence in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been often described as a “return” after a 
nearly three-decade hiatus. This depiction is not entirely 
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accurate, as Russia began courting South Africa during the mid-
2000s and participated in anti-piracy operations in Somalia in 
2008. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Russia’s influence in 
Africa is at its highest point since the end of the Cold War3. 
Although Russia’s material resources pale in comparison to 
the Soviet Union’s capabilities, it is essential to place Moscow’s 
current ambitions into their historical context, while avoiding 
exaggerated parallels between Soviet and Russian strategies. A 
misconception circulating in Western analyses is that Russia is 
trying to recreate Cold War-era partnerships in Africa. Although 
Russia retains close bilateral relations with some Cold War 
partners, such as Ethiopia, Angola and Nigeria, the robustness 
of Russia’s diplomatic presence in Central Africa contrasts with 
the USSR’s formidable strength in West Africa during the 
immediate post-colonial period and the Horn of Africa during 
the Leonid Brezhnev era. Even though Russia’s Africa strategy 
has limited geographical overlap with Soviet outreach efforts, 
Moscow has consistently tried to contain Western influence in 
Africa and adapted to China’s growing strategic ambitions on 
the continent. In addition, both Soviet and Russian officials 
have synthesised economic investments, hard military power 
and ideational bonds to carve out a unique place for Moscow 
in African affairs. 
In response to the wave of decolonisation movements in the 
1950s and 1960s, and the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union 
sought to expand its presence in Africa by implementing a 
dual containment policy against the United States and China. 
This policy was characterised by its reliance on co-option and 
emphasis on caution, as the Soviet Union sought to restrain 
hostile powers in ways that did not risk a broader military 
confrontation4. After the Director of the Africa Institute of 
the Soviet Union Ivan Potekhin travelled to Ghana, Mali and 
3 P. Stronski, Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 10 October 2016.
4 R. Yordanov, The Soviet Union in the Horn of  Africa, The Wilson Center, 15 
February 2017.
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Guinea in 1957, the USSR viewed foreign aid as the most 
effective means of spreading socialism in Africa, and was 
convinced that the classless nature of many African societies 
would facilitate the diffusion of Soviet ideology5. Although 
political instability caused Soviet policymakers to question the 
effectiveness of foreign assistance as the 1960s progressed, the 
USSR revived its provision of credit and foreign aid to Africa 
after Marxism spread to Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique 
during the late 1970s6. The events of 1977, which saw Sudan 
expel Soviet military advisers from its territory and Somalia 
pivot towards the United States, inspired this renewed escalation 
of Soviet involvement in Africa. This revival of the USSR’s 
presence converted into military interventions, as Moscow 
sought to contain US influence in the Horn of Africa during the 
Ogaden War and preserve its beachhead in Angola in the face 
of US and Chinese pressure. In order to prevent a superpower 
confrontation, the USSR relied extensively on proxy militias, 
such as Cuban troops and technical advisers from Warsaw Pact 
countries, and largely refrained from promoting communism 
through direct coercion7.  
Although Russia lacks the material resources to simultaneously 
contain both the United States and China, Moscow has 
emulated the USSR’s low-risk, high-impact approach to 
diplomacy in Africa. Russia’s primary goal in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is to capitalise on US disengagement from Africa and 
present itself as a non-hegemonic external power, which could 
help African countries reduce their dependence on China. 
In keeping with the USSR’s instrumental use of foreign aid, 
Russia has leveraged debt forgiveness as a potent diplomatic 
tool. During his first term as president, Putin embarked on a 
5 G. Guan-Fu, “Soviet Aid to the Third World: An Analysis of  its Strategy”, Soviet 
Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, January 1983, pp. 71-72.
6 C.W. Lawson, “Soviet Economic Aid to Africa”, African Affairs, vol. 87, no. 349, 
October 1988, pp. 501-503.
7 E. Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 149
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debt-for-development programme in Africa, which saw Russia 
forgive Tanzania’s debt to reset diplomatic relations, and since 
2015, Moscow has forgiven Soviet-era loans to Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia8. Since Dmitry Medvedev stated 
in June 2009 that “Africa is waiting for our support”9, Russia 
has resumed its historical role as an aid donor to Africa. 
Unlike development assistance provided by the USSR, Russia’s 
foreign aid provision has principally consisted of spontaneous 
donations to help African countries handle humanitarian 
crises. Russia’s deployment of PMCs after securing informal 
invitations by African governments resembles Soviet-era 
patterns of military intervention in Africa. In line with the 
USSR’s conflict mitigation strategies, Moscow has emphasised 
that the Wagner Group − a Russian paramilitary organisation 
sometimes described as a PMC − has no links with the Russian 
government, and has refrained from directly challenging US 
and European forces10.
Now that a synoptic overview of the synergies and points 
of divergence between Soviet and Russian approaches to Sub-
Saharan Africa has been laid out, this chapter will outline the 
three pillars of Moscow’s contemporary influence in Africa. 
Although these pillars will be examined separately, any points 
of integration between these dimensions of Russia’s outreach to 
Sub-Saharan Africa will be discussed where relevant. Russia’s 
economic interests have facilitated the deployment of PMCs and 
encouraged its diplomatic interventions in regional conflicts. 
Similarly, Russia’s rising soft power in Africa has facilitated its 
ability to secure trade deals, which suggests that these three 
pillars should be viewed synergistically as part of a broader 
continental strategy. In the next section, Russia’s proliferation 
of mining and energy sector contracts in Africa will be discussed 
8 “Russia Vows to Forgive Ethiopia’s Debts Amid Growing Push for Influence in 
Africa”, The Moscow Times, 22 October 2019
9 Dmitry Medvedev, “Africa is Waiting for Our Support”, RT, 28 June 2009.
10 “Russia’s Putin: Russians Fighting in Libya Do Not Represent the State”, 
Reuters, 11 January 20a20.
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in depth, as these commercial links dominate the economic 
vector of Moscow’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Economic Pillar of Russia’s Sub-Saharan Africa 
Strategy: Mining and Energy 
Although the US and European foreign policy communities 
view Russia as a rising power in Sub-Saharan Africa, Moscow’s 
geopolitical influence is restricted by its limited trade links with 
the continent. In 2018, the volume of trade between Russia 
and Africa stood at just $20 bn, which paled in comparison to 
India’s $63 bn and China’s $204.2 bn in trade with Africa11. 
In spite of these low trade figures, Russia’s economic ties with 
Africa have dramatically grown in recent years and this positive 
trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Russia’s 
trade links with Africa increased by 185% from 2005-15 
and registered 17% growth in 201812. At the Sochi summit, 
Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s intention to forgive $20 bn 
in debt to Africa and to double its trade links to $40 bn by 
202413. 
Even though Russia is seeking a broad-based expansion of 
trade with Africa, which includes investments in the continent’s 
agriculture, manufacturing and defence sectors, Russia’s 
economic presence in Africa still revolves around mining and 
energy. During a March 2018 tour of southern Africa, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov singled out mining and energy 
as Russia’s two primary economic interests in Africa14. Similarly, 
Russian media coverage of the Sochi summit emphasised 
11 “Russia’s Re-Engagement Raises Stakes in Africa”, Hurriyet Daily News, 5 
November 2019.
12 “Russian Trade Turnover with African Countries Up 17% to US $20 Billion”, 
Russia Briefing, 30 August 2019.
13 “Russia’s Putin Seeks to Double Trade Volume with Africa Within 5 Years”, 
Radio France Internationale, 24 October 2019.
14 “Lavrov Embarks on Tour of  African Countries to Discuss Ways to Boost 
Trade”, TASS, 5 March 2018.
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Africa’s importance as a supplier of minerals and energy, and 
ability to compensate for Moscow’s loss of control over Central 
Asia’s resources after the USSR’s collapse15. Although Russia 
has aspirations of being a continent-wide player in the mining 
sector, its mining investments remain heavily concentrated in 
southern Africa. This concentration is a legacy of the Cold War-
era policies. In spite of its strident opposition to apartheid, the 
USSR retained an informal agreement with South Africa on 
the price regulation of gold, diamonds, platinum and precious 
metals16. The USSR’s collapse triggered a decline in Russia’s 
involvement in southern Africa’s mining industry, but Moscow’s 
economic presence in this region has undergone a resurgence 
over the past decade. In concert with South Africa’s entry into 
BRICS in 2011, Russian industrial giant Renova secured major 
extraction deals in South Africa’s manganese mines17. While 
Russia has struggled to obtain its desired levels of investment 
in South Africa’s diamond sector, as De Beers opposed Russian 
diamond conglomerate Alrosa’s overtures, Moscow has 
noticeably expanded its presence in the diamond industries of 
Angola and Zimbabwe. In May 2017, Alrosa received an 8% 
stake in Angola’s Luaxe deposit, which holds an estimated $35 
bn in diamond reserves18. In January 2019, Alrosa established 
a subsidiary in Zimbabwe to capitalise on Harare’s ambitious 
plans to triple its diamond production by 202319. 
The recent success of Russia’s mining initiatives in southern 
Africa has encouraged Moscow to expand its presence in the 
mining sectors of other African regions. In order to reach out to 
15 “Sammit Rossiya-Afrika: Elektrichestvo Kak Dvizhushchaya Sila Razvitiya 
Afrikanskogo Kontinenta” (“Russia-Africa Summit: Electricity as a Driver for 
the Development of  the African Continent”), Neftegaz.ru, 23 October 2019.
16 A. Weiss and E. Rumer, Nuclear Enrichment: Russia’s Ill-fated Influence Campaign in 
South Africa, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 December 2019.
17 “Russia Opens Manganese Mine in SA”, Mining Review Africa, 23 March 2011.
18 “Russia’s Alrosa Secures Stake in Angola’s Largest Diamond Deposit”, Reuters, 
23 May 2017.
19 “Russia’s Alrosa Returns to Diamond Exploration in Zimbabwe”, Reuters, 14 
January 2019.
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new markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia has capitalised on its 
loyalty to authoritarian allies in crisis and growing presence as 
a diplomatic stakeholder on the continent. Russia’s support for 
Guinea’s President Alpha Conde, in the face of violent protests, 
facilitated Russian aluminium company Rusal’s investments in 
Guinea’s lucrative bauxite deposits and Nordgold’s privileged 
access to Lefa gold mine, which possess 7.78 million ounces 
of gold20. The Kremlin’s close relationship with Sudan under 
Omar al-Bashir’s leadership allowed Russian companies to gain 
extensive access to Sudan’s gold deposits after the discovery 
of new reserves in 201521. Russia’s PMC deployments to the 
Central African Republic have increased its access to the CAR’s 
diamond reserves. Russian Deputy Finance Minister Alexei 
Moiseyev’s efforts to lift the international embargo on “blood 
diamonds” from the CAR support these investments22. If this 
campaign succeeds, other mineral-rich nations facing economic 
sanctions, such as Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, could strengthen their relationships with Russia. 
The expansion of Russia’s presence in Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
energy sector has accompanied the growth of its mining 
investments. The principal components of Russia’s energy 
sector outreach efforts are oil and gas and civilian nuclear 
energy. In the oil and gas sector, Russia has combined strategic 
investments in extant oil reserves with initiatives to enhance the 
refinery capacities of oil-exporting countries and explore new 
offshore fossil fuel deposits. Russia has timed the expansion of 
its oil and gas investments to capitalise on the retrenchment 
of US energy companies from Africa, due to the discovery of 
shale gas in the United States. In April 2019, Exxon Mobil 
20 R. MacLean, “‘Russians have Special Status’: Politics and Mining Mix in 
Guinea”, The Guardian, 27 August 2019.
21 M. Pfichta, “Why Russia is Standing by Sudan’s Bashir”, World Politics Review, 
29 March 2019.
22 O. Carroll, “Russia is Trying to Legalise African ‘Blood Diamonds’”, The 
Independent, 13 November 2019.
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mulled selling its stake in Nigeria’s oil fields for $3 bn23, and in 
January 2020, Equatorial Guinea’s oil Minister Gabriel Obiang 
Lima confirmed that Exxon Mobil wished to sell its assets in his 
country’s oil and gas sector24.
In response to these developments, Lukoil signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Nigeria’s National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) at the Sochi Summit, and 
Obiang Lima has hinted that a Russian company will replace 
Exxon Mobil’s stake in Equatorial Guinea’s Oil industry. Russia’s 
growing presence in Africa’s oil and gas sector has allowed 
Rosneft to compete directly with Exxon Mobil for a share of 
Mozambique’s lucrative offshore natural gas deposits, and both 
companies split a $700 m stake in these reserves in October 
201825. Russia has complemented its plans to capitalise on US 
disengagement by investing in energy development projects, 
such as the Etinde offshore oil block in the Gulf of Guinea, and 
these capital provisions have belied Western allegations that 
Russia pursues a purely extractive approach to Africa’s energy 
sector. 
In addition to Moscow’s oil and gas investments, Russia’s 
civilian nuclear energy company Rosatom has secured contracts 
with Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Congo, Uganda and 
Zambia. Russian policymakers believe that civilian nuclear 
energy is a lucrative investment because the training needs 
of African countries will ensure steady business for Russian 
engineers and technicians26. Despite this optimistic forecast, 
the sustainability of Rosatom’s energy investments is unclear. 
Due to the small size of many African economies, there are 
23 R. Bousso and J. Payne, “Exxon Weighs Selling of  Nigerian Oil and Gas Fields 
for Up to $3 Billion”, Reuters, 2 April 2019.
24 B. Faucon, “Exxon Considers Sale of  Oil Assets in Equatorial Guinea”, Wall 
Street Journal, 12 January 2020.
25 “Mozambique Signs Oil Exploration Agreements with Exxon, Rosneft”, 
Reuters, 8 October 2018.
26 C. Chimbelu, “African Countries Mull Nuclear Energy as Russia Extends 
Offers”, DW, 22 October 2019.
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concerns that countries with Rosatom nuclear power plants 
could become over-reliant on a single energy source. Popular 
backlash is also growing against the high costs of nuclear power 
for African economies, and this trend jeopardises Russia’s soft 
power27. South Africa’s August 2018 decision to divest from 
nuclear energy in favour of natural gas and wind power eroded 
Rosatom’s commercial advantages on the continent. In light of 
this precedent, Russian policymakers are concerned that other 
nations could follow South Africa’s lead once the costs and risk 
of dependency on nuclear energy become evident. 
The Security Pillar of Russia’s Power Projection 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In tandem with the expansion of Russia’s investments in Sub-
Saharan Africa’s mining and energy sectors, Moscow has emerged 
as a leading arms supplier to African countries. According to 
aggregated Stockholm International Peace Institute data from 
2014-2018 Russia supplied 28% of all arms purchased by Sub-
Saharan African countries, which gives it a greater market share 
than China (24%), Ukraine (8.3%), the United States (7.1%) 
and France (6.1%)28. Although more recent data on Russia’s 
share in Sub-Saharan Africa’s arms markets is unavailable, 
there are indications that Russia is expanding its lead role as 
a weapons supplier to the continent. At the October 2019 
Sochi summit, Rosoboronexport CEO Alexander Mikheev 
announced that Russia supplied $4 bn in arms to Africa in 2019 
and the Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical 
Cooperation Dmitry Shugaev stated that Russia has $14 bn 
in outstanding arms contracts with African countries29. Russia’s 
27 “Russia Pushing ‘Unsuitable’ Nuclear Power in Africa, Critics Claim”, The 
Guardian, 28 August 2019.
28 P.D. Wezeman, A. Fleurant, A. Kuimova, N. Tian, and S.T. Wezeman, “Trends 
in International Arms Transfers, 2018”, SIRPI Fact Sheet, March 2019, p. 8.
29 “Rossiya Postavit v Afriku Oruzhiye Za Chetyre Milliarda Dollarov” (“Russia 
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arms contracts to Africa are diffuse in scope, but are especially 
concentrated in air force technology, air defence systems, small 
arms, the supply of anti-tank missiles and armoured vehicles.  
The marked expansion of Russia’s arms exports to Sub-Saharan 
Africa since 2012 can be explained by Russia’s willingness to 
supply weapons to countries facing economic isolation, and 
efforts to assist African countries on counterterrorism, anti-
piracy initiatives and conflict resolution. In line with Russia’s 
alignments with US-designated rogue states, such as Iran, North 
Korea, Venezuela, Syria and Cuba, Moscow has acted as an arms 
seller of last resort to African countries facing international 
sanctions. This policy was first revealed by Russia’s willingness to 
supply 87% of Sudan’s conventional weapons needs from 2003 
to 200730, even though the UN had banned arms supplies to 
non-governmental forces in Darfur. Although Russian military 
technology transfers to Sudan consisted of Soviet-era weaponry, 
these sales were enthusiastically received by Sudan’s primarily 
conscript army31, and encouraged Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir to rely on Russian PMCs during his last months in 
power. Russia’s arms sales to Sudan while the country faced 
international isolation have been mirrored by its delivery of two 
major weapons tranches to the Central African Republic since 
201732, and Moscow’s negotiations with Eritrea on the sale of 
missile boats, helicopters and small arms after its peace treaty 
with Ethiopia33.  
will Supply Four Billion Dollars of  Weapons to Africa”), RIA Novosti, 23 October 
2019.
30 A. McGregor, “Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: 
Part Two”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 6, no. 29, Jamestown Foundation, 12 
February 2009.
31 Ibid.
32 “Russia Delivers New Batch of  Weapons to Central African Republic”, The 
Moscow Times, 27 September 2019.
33 “Eritreya Prismatrivayetsya K Rossiyskim Kateram I Vertoletam, Soobschayet 
FSVTS” (“Eritrea is Eyeing Russian Boats and Helicopters, FSVTS said”), RIA 
Novosti, 23 October 2019.
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In addition to its willingness to sell arms to African countries 
under sanctions, Russia has played an active role in combating 
piracy and Islamic extremist movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In May 2010, Russian special forces stormed an oil tanker that 
was hijacked by Somali pirates, and this decisive action revealed 
Moscow’s willingness to join the US and European countries 
in combating the threat of piracy34. Russia has also stepped up 
its counterterrorism efforts, as African countries have become 
frustrated with Washington’s pattern of carrying out unilateral 
strikes without consulting with African governments. Russia’s 
military intervention in support of Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad in September 2015 increased respect for Russia as a 
counter-terrorism partner, as Moscow framed this campaign as 
an example of its ability to combat the Islamic State (ISIS) by 
promoting state centralisation. This “strong state” approach to 
counterterrorism has encouraged Somalia to request Russian 
assistance by enacting military reforms and promoting economic 
stability35, and has also inspired Mozambique to enlist Russian 
PMCs in the struggle against Islamic extremism in the Cabo 
Delgado province36. 
Although Russia’s security cooperation with authoritarian 
regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa has sullied its international 
reputation, and its counterterrorism initiatives have been 
accompanied by unforeseen costs, such as the deaths of seven 
Russian PMCs in Mozambique in October 2019, Moscow’s 
outreaches have achieved notable successes. Since 2015, 
Russia has signed nineteen military cooperation agreements 
across the continent, which have formalised counter-terrorism 
collaboration with Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad and Ethiopia, 
and technical cooperation with Botswana, Cameroon and 
34 “Pirate Killed in Russian Rescue of  Sailors”, The Guardian, 6 May 2010.
35 “Somalia Would Like Russia to Help Develop Economy, Support Army- PM”, 
Sputnik, 19 April 2016.
36 A. McGregor, “Why Mozambique is Outsourcing Counter Insurgency to 
Russia: The Historical Relationship”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 16, no. 150, 
Jamestown Foundation 29 October 2019.
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Eswatini37. At the Sochi summit, Vladimir Putin stated that 
military personnel from twenty African states were studying at 
institutions affiliated to Russia’s Ministry of Defence and noted 
the expansion of the Army-2019 international army games to 
include representatives from eleven African countries38. These 
forms of cooperation have facilitated the marked increase in 
Russian arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa and could help Russia 
establish a network of military bases on the continent. Russia 
has actively engaged with Sudan on the establishment of a naval 
base on the Red Sea39, and at the Sochi summit the CAR’s 
President Faustin-Archange Touadera expressed interest in 
hosting a Russian base40. By constructing these facilities, Russia 
will be able to gain preferential access to critical trade routes, 
such as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and to mineral-rich areas 
with inadequate external investment.  
Russia’s Engagement with Multilateral Institutions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The third pillar of Russia’s resurgence as a great power in Sub-
Saharan Africa is its growing engagement with multilateral 
institutions that shape the continent’s economic development 
and political trajectory. Although Russia’s patterns of multilateral 
engagement on African affairs have ebbed and flowed since 
the mid-2000s, Moscow has consistently used its permanent 
membership in the UN Security Council, engagement with 
BRICS and relationship with the African Union to expand its 
37 “Factbox: Russian Military Cooperation Deals with African Countries”, Reuters, 
17 October 2018.
38 “Putin Zayavil, Chto Rossiya Postavlyayet Oruzhiye V Nesol’ko Desyatkov 
Afrikanskikh Stran” (“Putin said Russia Supplies Weapons to Several Dozen 
African Countries”), TASS, 24 October 2019.
39 “Sudan May Show Interest in Hosting Russian Naval Base, Expert Says”, 
TASS, 22 April 2019.
40 A. Roth, “Central African Republic Considers Hosting Military Base”, The 
Guardian, 25 October 2019.
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influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the UN Security Council, 
Russia has consistently defended authoritarian governments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa from Western sanctions and leveraged these 
voting patterns to expand its array of continental partnerships. 
Russia’s emphasis on authoritarian solidarity emerged with its 
veto against UN sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2008. Russia 
justified this veto by arguing that Zimbabwe’s President Robert 
Mugabe did not pose a threat to international peace and 
security. Russia’s position on Zimbabwe was received positively 
by African leaders, like South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma 
and Libya’s dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi41, and caused these 
leaders to view Moscow as a normative counterweight to the 
United States. As Russia’s geopolitical influence in Africa grew, 
Moscow’s resistance to Western pressure against authoritarian 
regimes in the UN expanded further. After Sudan’s Transitional 
Military Council (TMC) was implicated in the massacre of 
a hundred and twenty-eight protesters in Khartoum in June 
2019, Russia blocked a draft UN resolution condemning the 
TMC by describing it as “unbalanced”42. Russia’s solidarity 
with its authoritarian allies in crisis bolstered its perceived 
reliability as a partner for African leaders, and has encouraged 
under-fire presidents, like Guinea’s Alpha Conde, who faces 
mass protests over his scheduled term extension, to tighten 
their relationships with Moscow. Russia’s resolute opposition to 
unilateral US campaigns against authoritarian leaders, such as 
the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, has helped it construct 
ideational coalitions in Africa. These normative coalitions have 
caused the majority of African countries to support or abstain 
from UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s 
policies towards Ukraine.  
To bolster the partnerships it gained through UN votes, Russia 
has used its engagement with BRICS and the African Union to 
41 P. Worsnip, “Russia and China Veto UN Zimbabwe Sanctions”, Reuters, 12 
July 2008.
42 “Toll in Sudan Army Attack Jumps as China, Russia Block Action”, Al Jazeera, 
5 June 2019.
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present itself as a supporter of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
development and security. In 2013, South Africa enthusiastically 
supported Russia’s proposal that each BRICS member invest 
up to $10 bn in a BRICS bank43. Vladimir Putin enticed 
African countries to support Moscow’s economic development 
proposals by publicly linking Russian development plans to 
Soviet-era foreign aid donations. At the 2018 BRICS summit 
in Johannesburg, Putin emphasised the “decades-old traditions 
of friendship and mutual aid that bind Russia with Africa”44. 
This statement encouraged leaders of Soviet-aligned countries 
during the Cold War, like Angola’s President Joao Lourenco, 
to seek Russian support for their economic diversification 
plans. Russia has supplemented its economic outreach efforts at 
BRICS with the training of African Union (AU) peacekeepers, 
and enthusiastic support for African-led solutions to regional 
security crises, such as the ongoing Libyan civil war. Russia’s 
recognition of the AU’s constructive role furthers its ambitions 
to create a multipolar world order and could allow Moscow to 
transfer the arbitration experience it has gained in the Middle 
East to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although Russia’s pledges of diplomatic assistance and 
investments often surpass its actual accomplishments, Moscow’s 
engagement with multilateral institutions is vital in expanding its 
soft power in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s 
rhetorical emphasis on forging equal partnerships with 
African countries, instead of dependency-based relationships, 
and Moscow’s frequent condemnations of US hegemony in 
multilateral settings, have improved public perceptions of Russia 
on the continent45. These patterns of diplomatic conduct in 
43 I. Arkhipov, “Russia Says BRICS Nations Plan to Create Development Bank”, 
Bloomberg, 18 March 2013.
44 T. Stanley and B. Fletcher, “Russia Steps up its Game in Africa”, The Moscow 
Times, 18 October 2019.
45 S. Sukhanin, The Kremlin’s Controversial Soft Power in Africa, Jamestown Foundation 
(Part One), 4 December 2019. On the issue of  Russia’s soft power, see E. Tafuro 
Ambrosetti, “Branding the Country and its Leader: Soft Power Made in Russia”, 
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multilateral institutions ensure that Russia’s frequent emphasis 
on its long-standing opposition to “colonialism, racism and 
apartheid”, and resistance to Western “pressure, intimidation 
and blackmail” gain widespread attention in Africa46. Soft 
power-building initiatives by Russian officials have been further 
strengthened by complementary messages in Russian state 
media outlets, like RT and Sputnik, which highlight positive 
news stories in Africa more frequently than their Western 
counterparts47. Although February 2020 Pew Research Center 
data, which showed Russia receiving low favourability ratings 
in Nigeria (41%), Kenya (38%) and South Africa (33%), 
reveal that Moscow’s outreach efforts have room for progress48, 
its soft power-building initiatives mitigate damage among the 
public caused by negative aspects of Russian conduct, like 
PMC deployments and election interference campaigns.
Russia’s response to Covid-19 provides it with a unique 
opportunity to reframe extant narratives about its role in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. On April 7, Russia expressed support 
for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s calls for IMF 
and World Bank involvement in ameliorating the pandemic’s 
socioeconomic impact49, and Ahmed publicly endorsed Putin’s 
“mobilisation of resources” to counter Covid-19 in Africa50. 
Although Russia’s provisions of medical supplies to Europe 
and the United States have been criticised for their geopolitical 
motives, humanitarian assistance to African countries and 
chapter 2 in this volume.
46 “Vladimir Putin: Rossiya Gotova Poborot’sya Za Sotrudnichestvo s Afrikoy” 
(“Vladimir Putin: Russia is Ready to Compete for Partnerships in Africa”), 
TASS, 20 October 2019.
47 E. Gershkovich, “At Russia’s Inaugural Africa Sumit, Moscow Sells 
Sovereignty”, The Moscow Times, 26 October 2019.
48 C. Huang and J. Cha, Russia and Putin Receive Low Ratings Globally, Pew Research 
Center, 7 February 2020.
49 “Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of  Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed”, 
Kremlin.ru, 7 April 2020.
50 J. Omondi, “Abiy, Putin hold telephone conversation over COVID-19 
Pandemic”, CGTN, 7 April 2020.
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support for debt relief could bolster Moscow’s soft power, if 
prominent African leaders depict Russia as a constructive force 
on the continent. 
Synthesising the Three Pillars of Russia’s 
Resurgence in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The Case of Nigeria
Although the three pillars of Russia’s resurgence are apparent 
in many African countries, Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most 
populous country, largest economy and leading regional power 
in West Africa make it an especially important case study. In 
order to expand the Moscow-Abuja trade partnership, Russia 
has invested extensively in Nigeria’s oil sector. In November 
2014, Lukoil announced a major joint investment with 
Chevron in an unnamed Nigerian energy project, and its 
entry into Nigeria’s oil sector was viewed as a step towards 
the globalisation of Russia’s oil investments51. As US oil 
companies scaled back their presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Russia capitalised by expanding its investments in Nigeria. As 
Nigeria plans to double its production of crude oil and triple its 
refinery capacity by 2025, the NNPC signed a memorandum 
of understanding with Lukoil in October 201952. In order to 
de-emphasise the extractive nature of its economic presence 
in Nigeria and advance its “equal partnership” approach to 
diplomacy, Rosneft held discussions in May 2018 with Nigeria’s 
Oranto Petroleum on developing twenty-one major oil assets 
in Africa53. In order to highlight its commitment to economic 
diversification, Rosatom signed a deal with Nigeria in June 
51 “Russia’s Lukoil to Invest in Nigeria’s Project with Chevron”, Reuters, 21 
November 2014.
52 “Nigerian State Oil Firm Signs Memorandum to Work with Russia’s Lukoil”, 
Reuters, 24 October 2019.
53 T. Paraskova, “Nigerian Firm to Partner with Rosneft to Develop 21 African 
Oil Assets”, Oil Price, 24 May 2018.
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2019, which would allow nuclear power to assuage its chronic 
energy shortages. The Russian company Metprom ratified an 
agreement in October 2019 that would contribute to the revival 
of the Nigerian steel industry54. As a result of these contracts, 
Nigeria imports $665 m in goods from Russia every year, which 
makes Russia its eleventh largest import destination55, but the 
balance of trade remains decidedly in Moscow’s favour. 
In tandem with Russia’s burgeoning economic relationship 
with Nigeria, Moscow has converted Abuja into a vital 
security partner by taking a proactive stance against the Boko 
Haram insurgency and advancing a “strong state” approach to 
counterterrorism. In response to the Obama administration’s 
unwillingness to transfer advanced US helicopters and fighter 
jets to Nigeria, Russia offered Abuja an array of weapons to 
combat the Boko Haram insurgency, including Mi-35 and 
Mi-17 jets and ground attack helicopters, in December 
201456. Russia’s willingness to entrust the Nigerian military 
with offensive weaponry contrasted with US concerns about 
militants gaining access to arms, and highlighted Moscow’s 
willingness to cooperate directly with African states against 
extremist movements. Russia’s military intervention in Syria 
enhanced bilateral security cooperation. Nigeria’s Ambassador 
to Russia Steve Ugbah stated in October 2019 that “We’re sure 
that with Russian help we will be able to crush Boko Haram, 
given Russia’s experience crushing the Islamic State in Syria”57. 
Ahead of the Sochi summit, Nigerian President Mohammadu 
Buhari consulted Putin on how Russia has preserved stability in 
a 17 million square kilometre country, as Nigeria tried to model 
54 W. Clowes, “Russia to Revive Nigerian Steel Plant on Hold Since Soviet Era”, 
Bloomberg, 31 October 2019.
55 Observatory of  Economic Complexity (OEC), Nigeria, Imports Visualization, 
2017, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/nga/#Exports
56 J. DeCapua, “Analysts Weigh Russia-Nigeria Arms Deal”, Voice of  America, 10 
December 2014.
57 “Nigeria Looks to Sign Military Cooperation Deal with Russia this Month”, 
Reuters, 11 October 2019.
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its state-building initiatives after Russia’s experience58. This 
positive momentum culminated in a Russia-Nigeria military 
cooperation agreement at the Sochi Summit, which ensured 
that Russian technical experts will play a critical role in shaping 
the Nigerian military’s future development. 
Although convergent economic and security interests provide 
strong foundations for a durable Russia-Nigeria partnership, 
Moscow’s overtures towards Abuja have also been strengthened 
by engagement with multilateral institutions and soft power. 
Russia’s consistent support for the reform of the UN Security 
Council to include more non-Western countries, such as India, 
Brazil and an African candidate, has been enthusiastically 
received by Nigerian officials, and Nigerian Defence Minister 
Mansur Dan Ali openly courted Russian support for a 
Security Council seat in 201759. During the 2011 Libyan civil 
war, Nigeria joined Russia in supporting a no fly zone that 
strictly provided humanitarian assistance, and both countries 
consistently supported an end to US unilateral sanctions 
against Zimbabwe. These synergistic normative positions 
have strengthened the Russia-Nigeria partnership, and built 
on residual goodwill towards Moscow, which originated with 
the Soviet Union’s strident opposition to Biafra separatism 
during the 1967-70 civil war60. Historical legacies profoundly 
influence Nigerian elite attitudes towards Russia. At the Future 
Investment Initiative in Riyadh on 31 October 2019, Buhari 
noted that “Those who focus on the progress of developing 
countries would see what Russia right from its days as the 
Soviet Union had done for us”, and remembered Moscow’s 
58 “Stiv Ugba: Nigeriya Mozhet Priglasit Rossiyshkih Voyennykh Obuchat 
Spetsnaz” (“Steve Ugbah: Nigeria Might Invite Russia to Train Special Forces”), 
RIA Novosti, 10 October 2019.
59 S. Hamza, “Nigeria Seeks Russia’s Support for UN Security Council Bid”, 
NNN, 24 August 2017.
60 A. Stent, “The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of  
Realism”, Issue: A Journal of  Opinion, vol. 3, no 2, Summer 1973, pp. 43-45
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support for state centralisation in the 1960s61. Although 
Nigerian public perceptions of Russia remain polarised and 
business elites question Moscow’s sincerity about investments 
in diversification initiatives, soft power plays an important role 
in consolidating the Russia-Nigeria partnership. 
How Can European Policymakers Handle Russia’s 
Growing Influence in Africa?
Although Russia’s rising geopolitical influence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is primarily aimed at profiting from US disengagement 
and diluting China’s hegemony wherever possible, Moscow’s 
resurgence as a great power in Africa challenges European 
interests on the continent. In the past twelve months alone, 
Russia has used its UN Security Council seat to rebut British 
and French requests for a continued peacekeeping presence in 
Sudan, and condemned Paris’s efforts to enforce a strict arms 
embargo against the Central African Republic. As Russia’s 
media presence and political influence in Africa grows, 
Moscow’s relentless criticisms of what it believes to be European 
neo-colonial policies could erode Europe’s soft power on the 
continent. In order to counter these challenges to European 
interests, the EU should continue stepping up its investment 
presence in Sub-Saharan Africa and emulate Russia’s direct 
cooperation with African states against regional security 
threats. The 2007 joint EU-Africa strategy, which transformed 
European economic cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa 
from a donor-based to a complementary interest focus, and 
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2018 
calls for continent-wide investments in Africa could help the 
EU challenge Russia’s growing investment presence62. In order 
61 “Nigeria Will Never Forget Russia’s Assistance During Civil War, says 
President”, TASS, 31 October 2019.
62 European Commission, Towards Stronger EU-Africa Cooperation, 12 September 
2018.
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to more effectively counter Russia’s mining and energy-focused 
economic outreach efforts, European investment initiatives 
should focus more overtly on diversification plans, which deal 
with the needs of an increasingly urbanised continent and assist 
Sub-Saharan African countries in harnessing their immense 
human capital. The EU should also cooperate with the African 
Union on economic development challenges on an equal 
partnership basis and avoid the “dictation without prescription” 
approach to development that has alienated African public 
opinion from European institutions63.  
In the security sphere, European policymakers should 
eschew the temptation of unilateral campaigns, like the US 
counterterrorism policies in Somalia, and engage national 
governments, civil society organisations and moderate Islamist 
groups against the threat of Islamic extremism. The need for 
Europe to embrace a cooperative approach to African security 
has grown, as US counterterrorism policies in Africa under the 
Trump administration have become increasingly incoherent. In 
December 2019, the United States pledged to increase its focus 
on security challenges in the Sahel, but abruptly withdrew 
troops in February 2020. Given these inconsistencies in US 
policy, European countries need to reassure African countries of 
their commitment. France’s retention of a 4,500 strong military 
force in the Sahel since 2013 and pledge to add an additional 600 
troops for counterterrorism purposes is a positive contribution. 
Despite this decision, Russia is emboldened to take action in 
the Sahel because it is sceptical of France’s power projection 
capacity, in the absence of consistent US support64. In order 
to blunt Russia’s advance, countries with geopolitical interests 
in Africa, such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany, 
should consider deployments in solidarity with France. Targeted 
63 B. Stout, “It’s Africa’s Turn to the Leave the European Union”, Foreign Policy, 
10 February 2020.
64 “V SSHA Dumali O Sokraschchenii Voyennykh Kotingentov V Afrike” 
(“The US Thought about Reducing Military Deployments to Africa”), MK.ru, 
20 January 2020.
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cooperation with Russia on limited areas of common interest, 
such as protecting maritime shipping in the Horn of Africa 
and stabilising Mali, should be included in European security 
strategies towards Sub-Saharan Africa. However, European 
countries should not passively acquiescence to Russia’s view 
that authoritarian stability is the antidote against terrorism but 
actively encourage states that are showing signs of liberalisation, 
like Sudan and Ethiopia, to resist external pressures towards 
authoritarian backsliding. 
Conclusion 
Although Russia’s resurgence in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
often been described as an opportunistic reaction to US 
disengagement from the continent, the revival of Moscow’s 
influence in Africa is the product of a decade-long strategy of 
renewed engagement. Russia’s resurgence in Africa is grounded 
in Moscow’s partial restoration of Soviet geopolitical strategies, 
and a targeted focus on three pillars: mining and energy; 
security and counterterrorism; and multilateral engagement. 
Although Russia’s economic resources pale in comparison to 
China’s, and Russia has faced criticisms for its support for 
authoritarian regimes and PMC deployments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Sochi summit’s success bodes well for the future of 
Moscow’s geopolitical influence on the continent. In order to 
counter Russia’s growing economic and security presence and 
reduce the effectiveness of anti-Western narratives that expand 
its soft power, European countries should engage with African 
governments on an equal partnership basis and repair their 
frayed relationship with the African Union. 
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